in the Interest of C.S.C., a Child

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-06-00254-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; November 29, 2006; Texas; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Jennifer Thomas appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter, C.S.C., claiming insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings that termination was in C.S.C.'s best interest and that she endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being. The court affirms the termination.

C.S.C. was taken into the custody of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (TDFPS) immediately after her birth on July 14, 2005. Prior to C.S.C.’s birth, significant concerns regarding Jennifer's behavior were documented. She exhibited violent tendencies, including an incident where she caused extensive damage to her apartment during an argument with C.S.C.'s father. Police reports indicated that Jennifer had a history of violent outbursts, such as breaking windows and damaging doors, and had expressed a desire to harm her unborn child, stating she would rather "throw it in the trash can" than let it live under her circumstances.

Following a violent incident on April 15, 2005, where she injured herself by punching a window, Jennifer was evaluated by police and subsequently taken to a hospital for mental health assessment. During this evaluation, she displayed aggressive behavior and was uncooperative, refusing examinations and expressing anger towards her pregnancy. She indicated a lack of concern for the potential harm her actions could inflict on her unborn child. CPS was involved due to her inability to identify responsible adults to care for her, and she demonstrated a refusal to cooperate with their investigation, claiming to have distanced herself from her parents.

Jennifer expressed a desire to escape her current life, stating she did not want her baby and suggested throwing the baby in a dumpster. Thomas testified that Jennifer showed no interest or concern for her child's health and lacked the ability to care for her. He noted her diagnosis of bipolar disorder. Tara Bidwell from TDFPS recounted an incident where Jennifer exhibited violent behavior towards a caseworker, including hitting her with a notebook and damaging the rental car. After these incidents, Jennifer was apprehended by police and later transported to the hospital for cramps.

Jennifer gave birth to C.S.C. on July 14, 2005, and held her for about thirty minutes before TDFPS placed the baby with the Hewitts, a licensed foster home, due to concerns over Jennifer’s behavior during pregnancy, which included self-harm and threats of harm to the baby. Post-birth, Jennifer was placed in a residential treatment center due to her aggressive and suicidal behavior. In September 2005, C.S.C. was temporarily placed with Jennifer's aunt but was removed two weeks later due to neglect, presenting with severe diaper rash, thrush, and weight loss. C.S.C. was then returned to the original foster home, where she thrived.

In November 2005, Jennifer was evaluated at Millwood Hospital and displayed violent behavior, attacking a hospital technician and causing significant injury. Detective Darrin McMichael pursued assault charges against her. Elizabeth Brook Knox, who conducted a mental health screening, noted that Jennifer had initially claimed to have hallucinations but later stated she intended to harm herself and requested hospital transport.

Jennifer initially expressed suicidal intentions, stating she had attempted to hang herself and would do so again without hospitalization. She later retracted this claim, suggesting instead that she wanted to see her boyfriend, whom she believed she could visit if admitted to the hospital. During a screening by Knox, Jennifer appeared calm but became agitated upon learning she would need to wear a "green suit" at the detention center, prompting her to request her CPS case worker. As Knox was unable to leave the holding cell promptly, Jennifer physically attacked her, pulling her hair and forcing her to the ground until a staff member intervened. Knox reported fearing for her life and sustained bruising and pain from the incident. Subsequently, Jennifer was adjudicated delinquent for assault and committed to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC).

Jason Kerr, Jennifer's caseworker at TYC, testified about her progress in a resocialization program, noting her participation in academics and therapy. She was at phase three in academics and behavioral therapy but only phase one in correctional therapy, needing to present her life story and complete an offense cycle to advance. Jennifer's primary goal is to join the WINGS program for mothers and children, contingent on achieving level three in all therapies. Kerr acknowledged Jennifer had some minor violations but no physical altercations since her arrival at TYC and believed her child motivates her to improve her behavior, although he had only known her for two months.

Regarding compliance with her service plan, Bailey reported that Jennifer had participated in parenting classes and completed a psychological evaluation. Despite moving through multiple placements, she maintained hazard-free housing while in TDFPS custody. However, she had not secured employment and needed to show her ability to support her child's needs. Jennifer's contact with her child, C.S.C., was limited to two supervised visits, with the initial visit described as caring and appropriate.

During a two-hour visit, Jennifer lacked an understanding of developmental milestones for her nine-month-old child, C.S.C., believing she should be walking and not on formula. Despite showing interest in C.S.C.'s well-being by contacting her caseworker, Jennifer had only spent three and a half hours with C.S.C. since birth. Testimony from Bailey indicated that the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (TDFPS) did not pursue a monitored return for C.S.C. due to concerns about Jennifer's unpredictable behavior as reported by her mental health providers. Jennifer had not demonstrated the ability to ensure C.S.C.'s safety, meet her daily needs, or provide financial support, leading Bailey to conclude that Jennifer had not satisfactorily completed her service plan. Bailey noted that Jennifer's choices, including engaging in aggressive behavior, contributed to her inability to complete the plan, despite her concern for C.S.C. Bailey believed termination of parental rights was in C.S.C.'s best interest due to Jennifer's ongoing endangering behavior. The plan for C.S.C. is adoption by her foster family, the Hewitts, with whom she has bonded. CASA advocate Penny Chandler supported this recommendation, observing C.S.C.'s healthy development and appropriate placement. Ultimately, the trial court terminated Jennifer's parental rights, which prompted the appeal. For termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001, TDFPS must prove specific acts or omissions and that termination serves the child's best interest, with the burden of proof being clear and convincing evidence due to the significance of parental rights.

The burden of proof in parental termination cases necessitates a higher standard during appellate reviews of both legal and factual sufficiency. Evidence must be evaluated to determine if a fact-finder could reasonably form a firm belief regarding the truth of the matters for which the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (TDFPS) bears the burden. In legal sufficiency reviews, all evidence is viewed favorably towards the finding, and any disbelieved evidence is disregarded, while undisputed evidence must still be considered. If it is determined that no reasonable fact-finder could form a firm belief in the finding, the evidence is deemed legally insufficient.

For factual sufficiency, all evidence must be considered, both supporting and contradicting the trial court's findings. The focus is on whether the evidence is clear and convincing enough for a fact-finder to conclude that a parent violated provisions under Texas Family Code § 161.001 and that termination would be in the child’s best interest. If disputed evidence exists that a reasonable fact-finder could not reconcile in favor of the finding, the evidence is considered factually insufficient.

Specifically regarding endangerment under § 161.001(1)(E), it must be demonstrated that the parent’s conduct directly endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being, requiring a pattern of behavior rather than a single act. Importantly, the endangerment does not need to be directed at the child or result in actual injury; it can be inferred from the parent's misconduct alone.

Courts assess the necessity of terminating parental rights by examining parental behavior before and after a child's birth, emphasizing the importance of stability and permanence in a child's upbringing. Evidence indicates that Jennifer exhibited significant emotional instability and unpredictable behavior, including a history of suicidal tendencies and self-harm, which persisted throughout her pregnancy. She displayed uncontrolled anger, resulting in physical harm to herself and others, including violent confrontations with her boyfriend and aggressive incidents involving law enforcement and medical personnel. Jennifer's destructive behavior extended to property damage, and she made alarming threats regarding the harm of both herself and her unborn child, expressing a desire to discard her baby. Despite her claims that these threats were not intended to be acted upon, the evidence of her harmful actions and statements contradicts her defense. Moreover, the law recognizes that endangering conduct does not need to be directed at the child or result in actual injury to establish grounds for termination of parental rights, allowing for consideration of actions taken both before and after the child's birth.

A review of the entire record supports the trial court's finding that Jennifer endangered the physical or emotional well-being of her child, C.S.C., under Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 161.001(1)(E). Evidence included Jennifer's criminal behavior prior to C.S.C.'s birth and her misconduct while imprisoned, which was deemed sufficient to establish a course of conduct endangering the child. The court overruled Jennifer's challenge to this finding, noting that only one statutory ground is required for termination of parental rights, and TDFPS conceded there was no evidence for two other alleged grounds: constructive abandonment and an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment. 

In addressing whether termination was in C.S.C.'s best interest, the court recognized a strong presumption favoring parental custody but affirmed that significant evidence supported the trial court's decision. Factors considered included the child's emotional and physical needs, the dangers posed by the parent, the foster family's stability, and Jennifer's limited interaction—only three and a half hours since C.S.C.'s birth—leading to a lack of bonding. C.S.C. was reported to be thriving in her foster placement, further supporting the trial court's conclusion.

Mr. Hewitt indicated that his family is committed to meeting C.S.C.’s emotional and physical needs. The prior discussion emphasized the ongoing physical and emotional risks to C.S.C. stemming from Jennifer's erratic and often violent behavior, which led to her being adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for property destruction and assaults. Jennifer contended that her inability to complete her service plan for the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (TDFPS) was due to a lack of stability in her placements. However, her own actions resulted in her frequent changes in living situations and placements in hospitals and detention centers, limiting her ability to parent and visit C.S.C. 

During rare visits, Jennifer demonstrated a lack of understanding of C.S.C.’s developmental needs and appropriate disciplinary measures. Consequently, TDFPS recommended terminating her parental rights and placing C.S.C. for adoption with her foster parents to ensure a safe and stable environment. The court found, based on the evidence presented, that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that terminating Jennifer's parental rights served C.S.C.’s best interests. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support the trial court's decision, leading to the affirmation of the order terminating Jennifer’s rights. The court also noted that the father's rights were terminated, but he did not appeal. Observations by CPS employee Paulette Owens-Flowers during a visit indicated Jennifer's lack of capability in properly caring for C.S.C.