Chante Jawan Mallard v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-03-00279-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; March 2, 2005; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Chante Jawan Mallard appeals her convictions for tampering with evidence and murder. She pleaded guilty to tampering but not guilty to murder; the jury convicted her on both counts, sentencing her to ten years for tampering and fifty years for murder. Mallard raises five points on appeal, arguing that the evidence supporting the murder conviction is insufficient, that the trial court improperly defined transferred intent and charged the jury on concurrent causation, and that her motion for a mistrial was wrongly denied due to the State’s comments on her post-arrest silence. 

The factual background reveals that on October 25, 2001, after consuming alcohol and drugs at a club, Mallard drove home while intoxicated. She struck a pedestrian, who became lodged in her windshield. In a distressed state, she parked her car in her garage and did not seek medical help for the victim, despite acknowledging he was alive when she returned home. After a series of events, including attempts to locate friends for assistance, Mallard failed to report the incident or call 911. Witnesses later found the victim's body in her car. The court ultimately affirmed the convictions.

Clete expressed his unwillingness to move a body alone, prompting him to enlist his cousin Tyrone’s help. Together with Mallard, they borrowed a friend's car and transported the body to Mallard's house, where Clete wrapped the body in a blanket, secured it, and placed it in the trunk. They then drove to Cobb Park, where Clete and Tyrone removed the body from the trunk and left it on the ground. Afterward, they discarded the blanket at a car wash. On October 27, 2001, two men reported a dead body at Cobb Park to firefighter Todd Breedlove, who called 911 after confirming the presence of a deceased white male. Officer Brad Patterson from the Fort Worth Police Department conducted a crime scene investigation, noting missing shoes and socks, indicating the victim might have been struck by a vehicle, and concluded the body had been moved. An autopsy revealed the victim, Greg Biggs, died from a near-total amputation of his left leg. Initially, the cause of death was undetermined, but after new information emerged, the medical examiner classified it as a homicide in March 2002. 

Mallard challenged the sufficiency of evidence for her felony murder conviction, asserting that the State failed to prove she committed a dangerous act, arguing the evidence only indicated a failure to act. The State contended that her actions, specifically transporting and concealing the injured Biggs, constituted a dangerous act that led to his death. The legal standard for reviewing evidence sufficiency requires that all evidence be viewed favorably for the verdict, assessing if a rational jury could have found the essential crime elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trier of fact is solely responsible for assessing the weight and credibility of evidence, as outlined in Texas law. During a legal sufficiency review, courts cannot reassess this judgment and must resolve evidence inconsistencies in favor of the verdict. In evaluating factual sufficiency, all evidence is viewed neutrally, favoring neither side, to determine if the fact finder rationally justified a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence may be deemed factually insufficient in two scenarios: first, if the supporting evidence alone is too weak to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and second, if contrary evidence is so compelling that it undermines the finding of guilt, even if the guilty evidence outweighs it. This approach respects the fact finder's determinations regarding witness credibility and requires a thorough examination of all evidence. A proper review must also address significant evidence related to the appellant's claims. 

In the specific case regarding Mallard, Dr. Nizam Peerwani, the chief medical examiner, provided expert testimony about the potential aggravation of injuries to Mr. Biggs caused by actions taken during the incident. He opined that continuing to drive with Mr. Biggs lodged in the windshield would worsen his condition due to instability and movement. Additionally, attempting to remove Mr. Biggs from the windshield shortly after the impact could cause further tissue damage. Dr. Peerwani confirmed that improper movement after injury could exacerbate vascular damage and concluded that driving the car into a garage with Mr. Biggs still lodged was an action clearly dangerous to his life because no help was sought.

An expert opined that Mr. Biggs would have had a better chance of receiving help if he had been left on the roadway rather than being taken to a garage, where he would be less visible. The expert stated that driving Mr. Biggs to the garage and failing to provide medical attention contributed to his death. The medical cause of death was determined to be multiple traumatic injuries from an auto/pedestrian collision, with the manner of death classified as homicide. Evidence indicated that Mr. Biggs survived the initial collision and was capable of moaning, suggesting he remained alive for some time before dying from blood loss due to lack of medical care. Testimony revealed that no patient with similar injuries had died when presented to the emergency room, highlighting that Mallard's actions effectively prevented any chance of Mr. Biggs receiving timely medical treatment. The court found that sufficient evidence supported the conviction for felony murder, rejecting Mallard's claims regarding the jury instructions on transferred intent and concurrent causation, asserting that any alleged errors did not cause egregious harm. Thus, the conviction was upheld as legally and factually sufficient.

Appellate review of jury charge errors follows a two-step process: first, determining if an error occurred, and second, assessing if the error caused sufficient harm to warrant reversal. Errors that are timely objected to require reversal if they harm the defendant’s rights. The degree of harm is evaluated based on the entire jury charge, evidence, contested issues, and trial arguments. If no objection was made, reversal is only warranted if the error resulted in "egregious harm," a challenging standard that must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

The jury charge included an abstract definition of transferred intent, which Mallard objected to during the charge conference, claiming it could confuse the jury regarding the lesser included offense of failure to stop and render aid. However, the record indicates that the prosecutor clarified the jury's options, and the instructions directed them to consider the lesser offense only after a not guilty verdict on felony murder. Thus, the court did not err in overruling Mallard’s objection.

The charge also contained a definition of concurrent causation without an application paragraph, and no objections were raised by either party regarding this aspect.

Mallard contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury instruction on concurrent causation, but the court determined that any potential error in including such an instruction did not result in egregious harm. The court noted that the abstract definition of concurrent causation was not applied to the facts of the case, nor was it incorporated into the application paragraph, meaning the jury could not convict based on that theory of causation. This aligns with precedents stating that the inclusion of superfluous instructions does not necessitate reversal if they are not applied to the case specifics.

In her fifth point, Mallard argues the trial court erred in denying her motion for a mistrial after the State allegedly commented on her post-arrest silence during the punishment phase. The State claimed the objection was untimely, as Mallard had already responded to the prosecutor's question. Despite defense counsel's prompt objection, the court ruled the objection was not timely since it came after the question had been asked and answered. As a result, the court upheld the denial of the mistrial request, reiterating the necessity for timely objections to preserve issues for appeal.

Mallard's objection was deemed untimely, resulting in her forfeiture of the right to present this argument on appeal, as established in Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 342. Consequently, Mallard’s fifth point was overruled. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment after addressing each of Mallard’s points. The appellate challenges pertained solely to her murder conviction, excluding her conviction for tampering with evidence. Notably, the State successfully demonstrated that Mr. Biggs was not experiencing any life-threatening condition at the time of his death. Mallard's failure to seek help at nearby payphones and her refusal to drive to a medical facility were highlighted as her actions related to the felony murder charge. The inclusion of a concurrent causation definition in the jury charge was justified by the State, and no error analysis was necessary since no egregious harm resulted from the alleged unobjected-to error. The court referenced Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 718, which supports this approach.