Barry Kagan v. R. Grant McCranie and Jim McCranie

Docket: 02-04-00136-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; March 30, 2005; Texas; State Appellate Court

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil
In the case of Barry Kagan v. R. Grant McCranie and Jim McCranie, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas addressed a dispute arising from a sale of a modified 1979 Porsche. Appellees Grant and Jim McCranie sued Appellant Barry Kagan for misrepresentations under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), as well as for common-law fraud, negligence, and gross negligence, following the purchase of the vehicle. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of Grant McCranie, awarding him $17,000 for actual damages based on Kagan's violations of the DTPA.

Kagan appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of the Porsche's market value at the time of sale to support the damage award. The appellate court agreed, noting that to determine "out of pocket" damages—a measure based on the difference between what the plaintiff paid and the market value of the defective item—evidence of both the purchase price and the market value in its defective state is required. The court found that there was no evidence presented regarding the market value of the Porsche in its allegedly defective condition, leading to the decision to reverse the trial court's judgment and render a ruling that Grant take nothing. The court emphasized that market value is defined as the price a willing seller would accept and a willing buyer would pay, further clarifying the standards for evaluating evidence in such cases.

Grant purchased a Porsche from Kagan for $22,000, despite knowing it needed repairs. Jim, the driver, incurred $4,139 in repairs within two weeks and continued to take the vehicle to the mechanic for various issues, including water damage and modifications. Despite these repairs, Jim found the Porsche "really not operable" for daily use. There was no expert testimony on the market value at the time of sale, and the trial court rejected Mr. Ed Mayo's testimony regarding value since he was not designated as a testifying expert on that issue. Mayo examined the Porsche after extensive repairs and noted its value was significantly less than standard models, estimating it at $5,000. Jim attempted to sell the car for $30,000 after repairs but provided incorrect information to potential buyers. The court emphasized that proof of market value at trial does not establish value at the time of sale. Mayo indicated that while repairs would not significantly alter his value opinion, the unique modifications of the Porsche meant that its market value was subjective and variable. The court found that the intrinsic value to Jim was not equivalent to market value, and only Grant, as the owner, could testify about the intrinsic value.

No evidence was presented to establish the market value of the Porsche in its allegedly defective condition at the time of purchase. The court referenced a prior case where a car owner's testimony about the car's market value was deemed sufficient to establish value at purchase. Since the lack of evidence warranted a "no evidence" ruling, the appellate court is required to render judgment for the appellant, in this case, Kagan. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and ruled that Grant take nothing. Additionally, the trial court had previously limited the testimony regarding the vehicle's value, allowing only for assessments based on observed parts rather than blue book or fair market value.