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Kennith Ray Johnson v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-03-00011-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; March 10, 2004; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Kennith Ray Johnson, an African-American employee at Alcon Laboratories, Inc., sued the company for race discrimination and retaliatory termination after a bench trial resulted in a judgment favoring Alcon. Johnson contested the trial court's finding that Alcon did not retaliate against him, arguing it was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

The incident began when Johnson was asked to retrieve tape for a production line but took longer than expected. Chris Kjelland, the group leader, suspected Johnson had been using the phone instead, leading to a confrontation where Kjelland allegedly used the term "boy" in referring to Johnson. Johnson found this term racially derogatory and complained to management, prompting an investigation. Kjelland initially denied making a racial remark but later acknowledged he might have used the term without intending any racial connotation. Management counseled Kjelland to avoid using such language in the future.

Months later, an issue arose regarding a material lot code error on a form completed by Johnson and a coworker, Daniel Ledesma. Kjelland discovered that Johnson had altered a correct code to an incorrect one, raising suspicions of falsification. Ledesma ultimately confessed that the form was not the original, further complicating Johnson's position within the company.

Johnson lost the original production tracking form and was assisted by Ledesma in recreating it. Kjelland and Kubicki reviewed the documentation and determined that both Johnson and Ledesma violated Alcon policy by not obtaining management approval before recreating official records. They reported their findings to Wood-Smith, who instructed them to gather written statements from Johnson and Ledesma. Following a comprehensive review, including interviews and documentation analysis, Alcon's senior management and human resources recommended the termination of both employees for falsifying company records. The vice president of human resources approved the termination, unaware of Johnson's prior racial discrimination complaint. Keith Bell, vice president of quality assurance, made the final decision to terminate Johnson. Johnson appealed the termination internally, but the appeals panel upheld the decision, finding no new evidence to support his claims. Subsequently, Johnson filed a lawsuit against Alcon, which resulted in a judgment favoring Alcon after a nonjury trial. Johnson subsequently appealed the decision.

In the appeal, Johnson contends that the trial judge's finding that Alcon did not retaliate against him, in violation of Texas Labor Code section 21.055, was against the great weight of the evidence. He cites five points: Kjelland's knowledge of his discrimination complaint and hostility towards it, Alcon's failure to follow its progressive discipline policy, the alleged falsity of Alcon's reason for termination, and his consistently positive employee evaluations.

Alcon contends that Johnson has incorrectly represented Kubicki's testimony and maintains that Johnson's termination stemmed from Alcon's good faith belief that Johnson breached company policy, rather than any retaliatory intent. Under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, retaliation occurs if an employer discriminates against an individual for engaging in protected activities such as opposing discrimination or participating in investigations. The Texas Labor Code was designed to align with federal law, specifically Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

To prove retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) engagement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. The plaintiff must demonstrate that, "but for" their protected activity, the adverse action would not have occurred. Once this is established, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, which, if articulated, nullifies the presumption of retaliation.

The trial court found sufficient evidence supporting Alcon’s claim of non-retaliation. Key points include that Kjelland lacked independent authority to terminate Johnson, as the decision involved multiple managers who were unaware of Johnson's race and discrimination complaint at the time of termination. Notably, two decision-makers were African-American, and Alcon had previously terminated four non-African-American employees for similar infractions of falsifying records, consistent with its disciplinary policy.

Alcon had the right to terminate Johnson for falsifying or misrepresenting records, despite his positive employee evaluations. Johnson failed to demonstrate a causal link between his complaint about an incident involving a subordinate and Alcon's decision to terminate him, as established in Lane v. Texas. Consequently, he did not make a prima facie case of retaliation. The trial court's conclusion that Alcon did not retaliate against Johnson is supported by the evidence and is not against the great weight of that evidence. Therefore, Johnson's argument is overruled, and the trial court's judgment is affirmed.