Francisco Zaragosa v. Chemetron Investments, Inc., Chemtron Food Equipment Company, Sunbeam Corp., Sunbeam Products, Inc., Apache Stainless Equipment Corp.- a Division of Mepaco, Apache Stainless Equipment Corp., Mepaco, Mepaco-Apache Stainless Equipment Corp.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-00-00328-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; November 5, 2003; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Francisco Zaragosa, an employee of H&M Food Systems Company, sustained a serious injury involving a commercial mixer/blender on September 2, 1997, resulting in a partial amputation of his right hand. He filed a lawsuit on April 22, 1999, against several parties, including Chemtron Food Equipment Company and Sunbeam Corp., claiming strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligence. The defendants sought summary judgment, arguing that Zaragosa’s claim was barred under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 16.012(b), which prohibits product liability claims for equipment sold more than fifteen years prior, noting that the mixer/blender was sold in 1978. Zaragosa contended that the equipment was not used for manufacturing "tangible personal property," that it was purchased by his employer in 1990 or 1991, and that the statute was unconstitutional. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants without specifying reasons, leading Zaragosa to appeal on grounds of genuine material fact disputes and the constitutionality of the statute. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, reiterating that the movant must show no genuine issue of material fact exists to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A defendant can obtain summary judgment on an affirmative defense by conclusively proving all elements of that defense, as established in KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp. To succeed, the defendant must provide evidence that establishes each element as a matter of law, as stated in Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood.

In this case, the appellant contends that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to the Product Defendants due to disputed facts regarding whether the mixer/blender was utilized in manufacturing 'tangible personal property' and the timing of its sale. The fifteen-year statute of repose under section 16.012 requires that the mixer/blender qualifies as manufacturing equipment used for tangible personal property. While 'tangible personal property' is not explicitly defined in the statute, it is interpreted using its ordinary meaning, which includes items with a physical presence, such as food products.

The evidence demonstrated that the mixer/blender was employed to process textured vegetable proteins for a food processing plant, satisfying the definition of manufacturing equipment under the statute. Consequently, there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding this aspect, leading to the overruling of the appellant’s argument.

Regarding the date of sale, the statute mandates that a products liability action must be initiated within fifteen years following the sale of the equipment. Evidence showed the mixer/blender was last sold in June 1978, while the appellant filed suit in 1999, well beyond the fifteen-year limit. Thus, the statute of repose precludes the appellant's claim.

Appellant contends that the evidence of a non-defendant third party selling a mixer/blender in the late 1980s or early 1990s creates a factual dispute regarding the age of the equipment. However, the court finds that the relevant date is solely the sale by the defendant, rendering the appellant’s claims irrelevant. The court concludes there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the sale date by the Product Defendants and overrules the appellant's second issue.

In addressing the constitutionality of section 16.012, the appellant argues it violates equal protection and open courts guarantees under both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions, and that it constitutes an improper special law. The court rejects these claims, asserting that statutes are presumed constitutional unless a clear violation is evident. It notes that equal protection is upheld when a statute does not infringe on fundamental rights or discriminate on suspect bases. The statute in question is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose: protecting manufacturers and sellers from stale claims.

The court further states that statutes of repose do not violate open courts provisions. A common law action must represent a vested right to be protected, and since the statute of repose barred claims against the Product Defendants before the appellant's injury, there was no vested right to violate. Thus, the court overrules the appellant's fourth and seventh issues.

The constitutional prohibition against special laws aims to prevent the enactment of laws that serve personal interests over public ones and to eliminate practices like trading and logrolling. The determination of whether a law is general or special is based on two criteria: 1) the presence of a reasonable basis for the law's classification, and 2) the law's equal application to all individuals within that classification. The statute in question, which focuses on "manufacturing equipment," meets these criteria as it is reasonably based and operates uniformly within the defined class. Consequently, the statute remains valid without requiring any provisions to be removed. The court has overruled the appellant’s fifth, sixth, and eighth issues on appeal. 

The conclusion affirms the trial court's judgment after dismissing all issues raised by the appellant. Additionally, one of the defendants, Apache Stainless Equipment Corp., argued for summary judgment based on its lack of involvement with a specific product, having only purchased assets from an affiliated entity. The appellant contended that Apache's Asset Purchase Agreement did not exclude claims for negligence. However, the court determined that summary judgment was appropriate under section 16.012, rendering Apache's alternative argument irrelevant to the summary judgment concerning the Product Defendants. The ruling aligns with precedent, affirming that as long as any grounds for summary judgment are valid, the decision will stand. The court also noted constitutional references relevant to the case.