Lena Jo Barber v. Dorothea Cangelosi, as Independent of the Estate of Anna Lee Cangelosi

Citation: Not availableDocket: 01-08-00781-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; January 13, 2010; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Anna Lee Cangelosi executed her final will in 2004, designating her daughter Dorothea Cangelosi as executrix and sole beneficiary, while specifically excluding her other children, John Charles Cangelosi, Jr. and Lena Jo Barber, stating her reasons were fair. Following Anna Lee's death in 2005, Dorothea sought to probate the 2004 will or, alternatively, the 1999 will, which also excluded John and Lena. Lena contested the 2004 will's validity, claiming it lacked due formalities, was a product of undue influence, and that Anna Lee lacked testamentary capacity at the time of execution. Before the 2008 trial, Lena amended her contest to include applications for probate of her 1989 and 1983 wills, which named her as a beneficiary.

The trial court granted summary judgment favoring the estate on Lena’s claims regarding due formality and undue influence, among other claims, and bifurcated the proceedings, focusing initially on the testamentary capacity challenge of the 2004 will. The jury found that Anna Lee had the requisite testamentary capacity, leading to a final judgment that Lena take nothing from her claims and allowing the 2004 will to be admitted to probate. Lena appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, affirming the jury's finding on testamentary capacity, bifurcating the proceedings, and denying her proposed jury questions related to her attorney’s fees.

The appellate court upheld the jury's verdict regarding the 2004 will's admission to probate but reversed the denial of Lena’s request for attorney's fees, remanding for further proceedings on that issue. Background details noted Anna Lee's health struggles, her move to assisted living, and Dorothea's management of Anna Lee's finances, including significant funds received from a property condemnation, which Dorothea used to purchase a ranch, further complicating the family dynamics, particularly with Lena, who had become estranged from her mother.

Anna Lee executed her final will on May 12, 2004, after multiple discussions with her attorney about its contents. She explicitly chose not to include her daughter Lena in the will, citing a lack of communication and emotional connection. The attorney believed Anna understood her property, the implications of creating a will, and had the mental capacity necessary for this decision, despite some medical records indicating disorientation and dementia during her later years. Friends and family, however, attested to her articulate and intelligent demeanor in 2003 and 2004, and her physician affirmed she did not suffer from progressive dementia.

Following Anna's death in June 2005, her other daughter Dorothea sought to probate the 2004 will but Lena contested it, alleging undue influence by Dorothea and later sought a constructive trust regarding property transfers. In January 2008, Lena expanded her opposition to include claims related to earlier wills. The trial court initially granted summary judgment on all of Lena's claims except for the testamentary capacity issue. It then bifurcated the proceedings, allowing the jury to first address the testamentary capacity of Anna Lee concerning the 2004 will. The jury concluded that Anna had testamentary capacity at the time of the will's execution, rendering the other will applications moot.

Regarding the procedural aspects, Dorothea's motion for summary judgment was reviewed de novo, with the court required to determine whether any genuine issues of material fact existed. The summary judgment order did not specify grounds, but under the traditional standard, the burden was on Dorothea to demonstrate that no material facts were in dispute, with all evidence viewed in favor of Lena as the nonmovant.

Traditional summary judgment requires the movant to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law per Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c). The motion must specify the grounds for summary judgment. A defendant must conclusively negate an essential element of the plaintiff’s claims or establish each element of an affirmative defense. After discovery, a no-evidence summary judgment motion can be filed if there is no evidence supporting essential elements of a claim or defense for which the opposing party bears the burden of proof. The trial court must grant this motion unless the nonmovant presents evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. More than a scintilla of evidence exists if reasonable people could differ in their conclusions.

Lena argues the trial court incorrectly granted summary judgment regarding her claim that the 2004 will lacked due formality. Under Section 59 of the Texas Probate Code, valid wills must be in writing, signed by the testator, and attested by credible witnesses. The 2004 will includes a self-proving affidavit, which, once admitted, establishes a prima facie case of proper execution. Lena contends that Dorothea did not prove the witnesses determined the testator's sound mind; however, Texas law does not require this, and Lena fails to present evidence raising a factual issue. Thus, the trial court's summary judgment on this claim is upheld.

Regarding undue influence, Lena claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her assertions that Anna Lee executed the wills under Dorothea's undue influence. To contest a will on these grounds, one must prove the existence and exertion of influence that overpowered the testator's decision-making, resulting in the execution of a will the testator would not have otherwise made. Lena indicates that certain factors suggest Dorothea had the opportunity to exert influence but does not provide evidence demonstrating that such influence was actually exerted regarding the wills. The presence of opportunity alone is insufficient; evidence must show that undue influence affected the making of the testament. Therefore, the summary judgment stands.

Evidence did not establish a factual dispute regarding undue influence in Anna Lee's execution of the 1999 or 2004 wills, leading the trial court to grant summary judgment on those claims. The legal and factual sufficiency of evidence supporting the jury's finding of testamentary capacity was reviewed. The standard of review involves evaluating whether reasonable and fair-minded individuals could arrive at the jury's verdict, with the fact-finder having sole discretion over witness credibility and testimony weight. Testamentary capacity requires the testator to understand their actions, know their relatives, and possess sufficient memory to connect relevant elements during will execution. 

The jury evaluated conflicting testimony about Anna Lee's mental capacity, considering evidence from her attorney, physician, relatives, and friends, which collectively supported the finding of her testamentary capacity for the 2004 will. Lena did not provide specific evidence to dispute this finding and failed to preserve her evidentiary objections for appellate review. The evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to uphold the jury's determination of testamentary capacity. Additionally, Lena challenged the trial court's decision to bifurcate proceedings, addressing Anna Lee's testamentary capacity for the 1999 and 2004 wills first, with the 1983 and 1989 wills to be addressed later if necessary.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 174(b) grants trial courts significant discretion to sever or bifurcate proceedings, which will not be overturned unless deemed arbitrary or unreasonable. Lena argues that the trial court erred in bifurcating the trial, citing section 83(a) of the Probate Code, which mandates that multiple applications be heard together. However, the court found that bifurcation was appropriate as it allowed resolution of specific issues without unnecessary complexity. The trial court’s approach minimized confusion while maintaining the applications within the same proceeding. Lena's concerns regarding the exclusion of evidence related to familial affection were dismissed, as such considerations do not affect the determination of testamentary capacity, the sole issue for the jury regarding the 2004 will. 

Regarding the trial court's refusal to submit a jury question about attorney’s fees, Lena's claim was reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Dorothea contended that Lena waived her attorney’s fees claim, which prompted an examination of Texas's "fair notice" standard for pleadings. This standard requires that pleadings provide sufficient detail for the opposing party to understand the nature of the claims and prepare a defense. If no specific objection to the pleadings is raised, courts are inclined to interpret them liberally in favor of the pleader.

Contestant/Applicant Lena is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs from either the Applicant/Defendant or the Decedent’s estate, asserting that her actions benefit the estate. Under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 37.009, Lena claims further entitlement to costs and fees deemed equitable and just. Her jury question aligns with Texas Probate Code § 243, which allows for attorney’s fees for individuals defending or prosecuting a will in good faith. Dorothea contends that Lena waived her right to fees under this section by (1) seeking fees exclusively under § 37.009 and (2) failing to plead good faith or specifically invoke § 243. However, the language in Lena's pleadings indicates that § 37.009 is an additional basis for her claim, countering Dorothea's first argument. Dorothea's reliance on case law (Fletcher v. Harris and Kirby v. Brown) to support her second argument misinterprets the pleading standard required for fee claims under § 243, as neither case strictly addressed the specificity needed for fair notice. The analysis ultimately hinges on whether Lena's claim—asserting fees for actions benefiting the estate—sufficiently invokes § 243 to notify opposing counsel of her fee recovery theory. Texas precedent indicates that the common law prior to the Probate Code allowed for such fee recovery, with § 243 reinforcing this legal principle. The Texas Supreme Court has established that an executor may recover fees if they act in good faith with probable cause to employ attorneys for will-related actions.

The term "for the benefit of the estate" is associated with section 243 requests for attorney's fees in Texas probate law. In Miller v. Anderson, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that an executor is entitled to section 243 fees without independent findings of good faith and just cause, as the benefit to the estate is established upon the will's admission to probate. In Weatherly v. Martin, it was noted that the threshold for attorney's fee awards under section 243 is the reasonable value of services rendered for the estate's benefit. Lena’s request for attorney’s fees, stated as "for filing and prosecuting" actions beneficial to the estate, was deemed sufficient to alert a competent opposing attorney of her intent to seek fees under section 243.

The trial court's denial of Lena's jury question regarding good faith and just cause was evaluated next. Section 243 allows specific persons, including executors and beneficiaries, to recover attorney's fees incurred in will-related proceedings. Executors are entitled to fees as a matter of right, while beneficiaries may only receive fees upon demonstrating good faith and just cause, leaving the court discretion to deny requests. Lena, as a daughter of the deceased and a named beneficiary and co-executor in the wills, qualified her request under the first group of section 243. Her strategy aimed at probating the 1989 will, justifying her entitlement to have the jury consider her good faith and just cause. The trial court's refusal to submit this question was determined to be an error.

Legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that Anna Lee had the capacity to execute the 2004 will. Lena, not an executor or beneficiary of this will, lacks standing to bring claims on behalf of the estate, as defined by Texas Probate Code. Her lack of standing necessitates the dismissal of her claims for breach of fiduciary duty, constructive trust, and resulting trust, making further review of her challenges to the summary judgment on these claims unnecessary.

The trial court appropriately granted summary judgment on claims of lack of due formality and undue influence due to the jury's sufficient evidence supporting its verdict. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in bifurcating the proceedings. However, it erred by not submitting Lena's proposed jury question regarding good faith and just cause. Consequently, the judgment denying Lena's request for attorney's fees is reversed, and the case is remanded for trial on good faith and just cause relating to the 1983 and 1989 wills, while affirming the remainder of the trial court's judgment. The panel includes Chief Justice Radack and Justices Bland and Massengale. Relevant case law is cited regarding the preservation of issues for review and the limitations on attorney's fee reimbursement under Texas law for will contests.