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Quinton Lamont Giles v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 01-08-00410-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; May 27, 2010; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Quinton Lamont Giles was convicted of murder by a jury, which also found true an enhancement for a prior aggravated assault conviction, resulting in a 60-year prison sentence. Giles raised four issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred by allowing the complainant's father to testify despite him having witnessed the trial after "the Rule" was invoked; (2) the evidence supporting his conviction was factually insufficient; and (3) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of cocaine found in his pocket, claiming the search was illegal and the evidence irrelevant. The court modified and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

The case background indicates that the complainant, Tommy Lee Harris, owned a clothing store, "The Throwback Kings," which Giles alleged was a front for drug sales. Witnesses, including Harris's employees, provided conflicting testimonies regarding Harris’s involvement in drug trafficking. Several witnesses had criminal backgrounds, including Giles, who had a felony conviction. Prior to the shooting, Harris had purchased a new firearm at a gun show, and on the day of the incident, Giles went to a townhouse where he had previously cooked drugs for Harris. He arrived after repeated calls from Harris and Celestine, who were present at the townhouse, and became suspicious upon overhearing a conversation involving Turner. Celestine and Giles reportedly smoked a drug-enhanced substance that afternoon.

Giles acknowledged smoking marijuana with Celestine but denied it being "wet" or "hydro" and admitted to having cocaine in his pocket. Celestine claimed to have sold marijuana to Turner that day, noting that Turner's presence made Giles agitated. Turner stated he only used codeine syrup. Celestine described a scene where Giles became upset and cried after a phone call with his girlfriend and mentioned that Giles's foot was on a gun left by Harris, which Celestine moved to prevent accidental firing. 

After the arrival of Harris, Dean, and Alexander, conflicting accounts arose about the events that followed. Witnesses Dean, Celestine, Alexander, and Turner testified that Harris was displaying his new gun and asked Giles for it back. They claimed Giles, without provocation, shot Harris multiple times until the gun was empty, also hitting Dean and Celestine in the process. Celestine then retrieved the hidden gun and returned fire at Giles. The group felt trapped inside the townhouse due to locked burglar bars but eventually escaped through the back, taking Harris with them, who later died in the hospital.

Giles provided a differing account, claiming that Harris threatened him with a .40-caliber gun over drug transportation and shot him first, prompting Giles to return fire with a gun taken from Turner. After the incident, Houston Police Officer S. Grant arrived to find Giles bleeding, holding a knife and a marijuana cigar, and initially compliant but later becoming combative. Officer S. Delacruz also responded, handcuffing Giles after witnessing his aggressive behavior. During a subsequent search, Delacruz found cocaine in Giles's pocket. He accompanied Giles to the hospital due to concerns for the safety of the paramedics.

Officer D. Shorten investigated a shooting incident involving Giles, who admitted to having a criminal history, working for Harris, and using marijuana on the day of the shooting. Giles claimed that Harris had been displaying a new gun and that he shot Harris after claiming Harris reached for his weapon. The investigation revealed 15 spent shell casings and two firearms: a Kel-Tec 9-mm and a Smith and Wesson 9-mm, with forensics linking the casings to these weapons. During the trial, Tommy Lee Harris, Sr., the victim's father, was allowed to testify after the prosecutor argued that he had only learned of Harris's gun habits during the trial. This testimony included finding Harris's gun in his car post-incident. Ultimately, the jury rejected Giles's self-defense claim, convicting him of murder with a 60-year sentence. Giles later contested the trial court's decision to allow Harris, Sr.'s testimony, arguing it violated the Texas Rule of Evidence 614, which aims to prevent witness influence. The court's decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion, focusing on whether Giles was harmed by the violation and the nature of Harris, Sr.'s testimony in relation to other witnesses. The discussion highlights two categories of violations under "the Rule": witnesses who hear other testimony and those not initially intended as witnesses who become essential due to trial developments.

In Green v. State, the court established that a witness not connected to either party's case and lacking personal knowledge about the offense cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion if allowed to testify. The court evaluated Harris, Sr.'s testimony, finding he was not connected to the State's case and had no personal knowledge of the shooting, thus affirming the trial court's decision to permit his testimony.

Giles contested the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's rejection of his self-defense claim. The court outlined the criteria for reviewing factual sufficiency, stating that a verdict can only be overturned if the evidence is weak enough to be "clearly wrong" or "manifestly unjust," or if it contradicts the great weight of the evidence. The court emphasized that mere disagreement with the jury's resolution of evidence conflicts does not warrant a new trial and that juries should be afforded deference in credibility assessments. The appellate review process requires a discussion of the evidence that the appellant argues undermines the verdict, underscoring the jury's unique position to evaluate witness credibility.

The jury has the discretion to believe or disbelieve various testimonies. Giles was charged with the murder of Harris, alleged to have been committed by shooting him with a firearm. Four eyewitnesses testified that Giles shot Harris at close range without provocation using Harris’s 9-mm Kel-Tec gun, emptying its magazine. Evidence included an empty gun and ten spent shell casings found at the scene. Officer Shorten recounted that Giles claimed he shot Harris to prevent being shot himself. Testimonies indicated that Harris left his .40-caliber gun in his truck and did not fire it during the incident. 

Giles argued that the jury improperly dismissed his self-defense claim, asserting that Harris was a drug dealer, supported by evidence of Harris's associates having drug convictions and other circumstantial evidence. However, the eyewitnesses contradicted Giles by asserting that Harris was not involved in drug dealing. Furthermore, it was noted that Harris did not possess a key to the burglar bars at the townhouse where the shooting occurred. The jury's decision relied heavily on witness credibility, and since all witnesses, including Giles, had prior felony records, their testimonies were not deemed significantly reliable in establishing self-defense. The evidence was found factually sufficient, leading to the rejection of Giles’s claims.

In a separate issue, Giles contested the admission of cocaine found in his pocket, arguing it violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, he did not provide specific arguments regarding the Texas Constitution, so the court focused on his Fourth Amendment claims without addressing state constitutional issues.

In the case of Giles, the trial court conducted a pretrial hearing regarding a motion to suppress evidence, specifically cocaine found in Giles's pocket. Officer Delacruz testified that he handcuffed Giles after responding to a shooting scene where Giles was behaving erratically and threateningly while wielding a knife. Despite initial refusals to comply, Giles was eventually placed on a stretcher, displaying combative behavior, and making threats against officers and paramedics. During a second pat-down while he was being loaded into the ambulance, Delacruz discovered a bulge in Giles's pocket, which contained a plastic bag of cocaine.

Giles contested the legality of the search, claiming violations of constitutional protections against unreasonable searches. However, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, affirming the officer's testimony regarding the bulge and asserting that the search did not constitute an illegal discovery of evidence.

The review process for such motions involves a bifurcated standard, where the trial court’s factual determinations are given deference, particularly regarding credibility and demeanor, while other legal applications are reviewed de novo. The ruling is supported if reasonable inferences from the record align with applicable legal theories. Additionally, law enforcement can detain individuals suspected of criminal activity with less information than required for probable cause.

To stop or detain an individual, an officer must have more than a vague suspicion; they require "reasonable suspicion" of unlawful activity, supported by specific, articulable facts. This standard is based on the totality of circumstances, disregarding the officer's subjective beliefs. A valid investigative detention allows for a protective pat-down, under which an officer may seize items that are immediately recognizable as contraband through the "plain feel" doctrine. However, if this requirement is not met, the officer needs probable cause to search for non-weapon contraband. In the case at hand, Officers Grant and Delacruz had reasonable suspicion to detain Giles due to his erratic behavior, including brandishing a knife and threatening the officers. Although they could conduct a pat-down for safety, the subsequent search where Delacruz reached into Giles's pocket and retrieved cocaine was deemed illegal; Delacruz only felt "bulkiness" without immediate recognition of it as contraband, failing the plain-feel doctrine. The State argued that the search was justified as incident to an arrest, citing Giles's observable offenses. The State contended that these offenses provided probable cause for an arrest, thus legitimizing the search.

A search incident to arrest is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, requiring the search to occur contemporaneously with the arrest. In this case, Giles's subsequent search was invalid as he voluntarily surrendered days after the incident rather than being arrested at that time. Therefore, the search of his pocket was not justified either under the plain-feel doctrine or as a search incident to arrest, leading to the conclusion that the trial court erred in denying Giles’s motion to suppress.

Following this determination, a harm analysis was conducted to ascertain if the error warranted reversal of the judgment. The analysis focused on whether the denial of the suppression motion and the admission of the evidence were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Factors considered included the nature of the error, its emphasis by the State, and its potential impact on the jury. Testimonies established Giles's intoxication and drug use, with multiple witnesses corroborating his cocaine involvement. Although the State referenced the cocaine found in Giles's pocket during closing arguments, it did not emphasize it significantly.

Given the overwhelming evidence of Giles’s drug-related activities and the minimal impact the erroneous admission of the cocaine evidence would likely have had on the jury, it was concluded that there was no reasonable possibility that this error contributed to his conviction. Therefore, the trial court's error in denying the motion to suppress was deemed harmless.

Giles argues that the trial court erred by admitting the cocaine found in his pocket, claiming it was irrelevant and that its probative value was significantly outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. The court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard to evaluate such rulings. Evidence from Officer Delacruz, who testified about discovering the cocaine, was not objected to, and Giles himself admitted to having cocaine in his pocket, which further supported the evidence. Established precedent indicates that the improper admission of evidence does not warrant reversible error if the same facts are corroborated by other unchallenged evidence. Consequently, the court overruled Giles's objection.

Additionally, the trial court's judgment did not accurately reflect Giles's plea of true regarding the enhancement in the indictment. Appellate courts possess the authority to amend judgments to ensure they accurately represent the record. In this case, the court modified the judgment to include the enhancement and confirmed that the jury found the enhancement true, affirming the judgment as modified.