Dennis Antoine Andrus v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 01-08-00738-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 16, 2009; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Dennis Antoine Andrus was convicted of capital murder for the death of his 16-month-old daughter and sentenced to life in prison. He appealed, arguing that the evidence was factually insufficient to support his conviction and that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. The case details that on December 4, 2006, Andrus’s wife, Ashley Burnett, left for work around 1:40 p.m., after playing with their children, Aja (2.5 years old) and the complainant, who were napping on the living room floor. During the time that Andrus was alone with the children, he stated that after they woke up, he noticed the complainant needed a diaper change. After searching for a fresh diaper and returning, he found her unresponsive on the floor. He called Ashley, who returned home shortly after, and they both attempted to revive the complainant before taking her to the hospital. At the hospital, security personnel noticed the child was injured and contacted law enforcement. The court affirmed the conviction.

Living, a security officer, was instructed by Sergeant Covington to monitor for a specific white car and escort its occupants to the emergency room. When the appellant, his cousin, and a child named Aja arrived, Living observed the appellant's lack of concern, noting he did not display typical emotional responses. Sergeant Covington contacted Child Protective Services for an interview with the appellant and the child, Ashley, remarking on the calmness of both during the initial questioning, which seemed inappropriate given the circumstances.

Houston Police Department Officer C. Gallian responded to a report concerning a child with brain swelling. Upon arrival, he was directed to the appellant and Ashley. The appellant claimed the child's symptoms were due to a diaper rash, describing an incident where the child fell back after he changed her diaper. He did not mention any soiling of the diaper or that he had left the child unattended on a couch.

HPD Sergeant R. Parnell from the Child Abuse Unit further investigated the case. During a videotaped interview, the appellant stated he found the child unresponsive after leaving her on the couch to fetch a new diaper. He noted that the child had been inactive since waking from her nap. 

Medical evaluations revealed severe injuries to the child, including skull fractures, brain bleeding, and a broken arm. Dr. Katherine King-Casas, the treating physician, explained that the child's injuries indicated significant trauma typically not associated with a simple fall, as evidenced by multiple retinal hemorrhages pointing to abusive head trauma. The child succumbed to her injuries on December 8, 2008.

HPD Homicide Detective S. Straughter, alongside Detective J.C. Padilla and Sergeant Parnell, visited the appellant’s apartment post-complainant's death to investigate and record a scene video where the appellant described events. Straughter observed that the appellant appeared calm while Ashley was visibly distressed. The appellant recounted picking up the complainant and attempting to revive her with a cold towel. Straughter documented the couch's height as fourteen and a half inches, with an arm height of eighteen to nineteen inches.

Assistant Harris County Medical Examiner Dr. Sara Doyle presented findings on the complainant’s injuries, using twenty-seven autopsy photographs. She detailed four bruises on the right side of the complainant's head, indicative of multiple impacts, and noted a broken left arm. A linear skull fracture aligned with the bruising suggested significant trauma. Dr. Doyle explained that some skull sutures might have separated from swelling rather than direct impact. She identified a severe right angle-shaped fracture of the left parietal bone and a separate fracture at the back of the head, concluding that at least two distinct impacts were responsible for the injuries. 

Dr. Doyle indicated that the injuries were compatible with the complainant's head being positioned against a bed frame while being struck repeatedly. She observed numerous hemorrhages in the complainant's eyes, which were consistent with inflicted trauma rather than an accidental fall. Dr. Doyle determined the cause of death was blunt force head trauma, likely resulting from the head being supported on one side while being struck on the opposite side. She dismissed the possibility that these injuries could result from a fall from the couch, as the nature of the fractures indicated multiple impacts rather than a single event.

Dr. Jennifer Love, Director of Forensic Anthropology at the Harris County Medical Examiner’s office, testified that the complainant had a broken left ulna, which was caused by an axial force that bent the bone outward. While such an injury could occur from a fall, it was inconsistent with falling from a couch onto carpet, suggesting instead that it resulted from an attempt to brace against something, such as a wall. Dr. Love noted the ulna fracture coincided with the complainant's skull fractures, which were consistent with non-accidental blunt force trauma to the right side of the skull while the left side was against a right-angled surface.

Dr. Emanuel Escobar testified that the appellant, a moderate hemophiliac, would not typically suffer spontaneous bleeds, and any medical treatment needed after a punch would depend on the trauma's severity. He could not determine if medical treatment would be necessary for the appellant's hand after hitting a child.

Nelson Wayne May, Jr., the appellant's brother, characterized him as caring and honest, while Ashley testified to his helpfulness with children and household tasks. The appellant claimed he regularly assisted with children and cleaning, attributing any inconsistencies in his statements to panic and varying questioning. He denied being violent, despite needing medical infusions post-fights, and acknowledged previous gang affiliation with the "Bloods." He admitted being the sole adult present when the complainant became unresponsive after Ashley left for work.

In addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellant argued there was insufficient proof to support his conviction for capital murder due to a lack of evidence linking him to the complainant's death and intent to cause such harm. The factual sufficiency review considers evidence neutrally, allowing for the jury's credibility assessment, with a verdict being overturned only if it is clearly unjust or against the weight of the evidence.

A jury has the discretion to accept certain testimonies over others, including the defendant's, and may disregard inconsistencies. While a jury is best positioned to determine facts, appellate courts can act as a "thirteenth juror" in limited circumstances to review factual sufficiency and may order a new trial if the evidence significantly contradicts the jury's verdict. Texas law establishes that if an adult defendant had sole access to a child at the time of injury, the evidence may suffice for conviction for injury to a child or murder if the child dies. The intent required for capital murder of a child under six does not necessitate specific intent to kill; instead, it focuses on whether the defendant acted knowingly while aware their actions were likely to cause harm. Intent can be inferred from the nature of injuries and the defendant's conduct, words, and actions.

In cases where the defendant is the only caregiver at the time of a child's injuries, juries can consider inconsistencies in the defendant's statements alongside medical evidence. In one case, a child was fine before being left with the defendant but later suffered severe injuries attributed to a forceful blow or shaking—not a simple fall, contradicting the defendant's claims. The court upheld the conviction, emphasizing that the jury could weigh the defendant's conflicting accounts against the medical evidence. The appellant in a related case argued against factual sufficiency, highlighting his denial of causing the child's death, his positive relationship with the child, lack of prior abuse, and actions taken upon discovering the child's unresponsiveness. He attributed inconsistencies in his statements to varying circumstances under which they were given, arguing these factors should be considered.

Appellant's account of events leading to the complainant's injuries remained largely unchanged, stating that the complainant was napping and appeared healthy before being left alone with him. After vacuuming, he noticed the complainant had soiled her diaper, removed it, and placed her on the couch before leaving to get a fresh diaper. Upon returning, he found her face down and unresponsive. Unlike a previous case, appellant did not provide significantly conflicting explanations regarding the complainant's condition before or after the incident, claiming he did not inflict the injuries and was unaware of how they occurred. However, his statements varied between interviews, including discrepancies about the complainant's position and condition.

Medical evidence indicated severe blunt force trauma to the complainant's head, with at least two blows required to cause the injuries, contradicting the possibility of an accidental fall from the couch onto a carpeted floor. The medical professionals testified that the injuries and hemorrhaging in the complainant’s eyes were inconsistent with an accidental fall. Although the complainant's arm injury might be consistent with a protective reaction during a fall, the nature of the injuries indicated they could not have resulted from such an incident.

Key facts include the complainant's normal behavior prior to being left alone with appellant and the occurrence of her injuries solely during his care. A reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the complainant's skull injuries that led to her death. The court found the evidence factually sufficient to uphold the conviction, rejecting appellant’s claims of error.

Appellant claims ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to contest the admissibility of gruesome autopsy photographs, specifically State’s Exhibits 37 and 38. To establish ineffective assistance, appellant must demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below reasonable standards and that, but for this error, the trial's outcome would likely have differed, as outlined in Strickland v. Washington. Allegations must be supported by the record, and speculation about counsel's ineffectiveness is not permitted if the record is silent. Appellant argues the photographs were duplicative and prejudicial, asserting that Exhibit 38 provides more graphic detail than Exhibit 37. However, both exhibits depict different sides of the complainant’s skull and are relevant to determining the cause of death, which was contested in the trial. Expert testimony using the photographs was deemed relevant, and an objection would likely have been futile, as trial counsel had reviewed the exhibits and found no basis for objection. The presumption favors counsel's performance as reasonable, and without evidence of deficient conduct, the claim of ineffective assistance fails. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment.