Cecil Henderson v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 01-05-00499-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; June 29, 2006; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Cecil Ray Henderson was convicted of capital murder, for which the trial court imposed a life sentence since the State did not pursue the death penalty. Henderson raised five points of error on appeal, challenging the admission of graphic photographs, the denial of his motion to suppress a videotaped statement, and the effectiveness of his trial counsel for failing to object to victim character testimony and hearsay documents. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

The case involved a robbery and subsequent murder of a complainant known as "Mr. Barry," who was attacked while working in his ice cream truck. Witnesses Natalie Reyes and Carmen Flores informed Officer M. Garcia that firearms were used in the robbery, and the complainant's truck was taken by three suspects. After the robbery, the complainant's truck was found burned, with his body inside. Additional witness testimonies described the events leading to the robbery, including the presence of a blue Oldsmobile and sounds of struggle and gunfire. Evidence indicated the fire was intentionally set. Witness John Robinson testified that Henderson and others sought assistance for a malfunctioning blue car shortly after the incident, during which Henderson attempted to hide a bag he claimed contained money, further linking him to the crime.

Robinson reported criminal activities to Crimestoppers after learning about them the next morning. John Bradford testified that on December 3, 2002, after appellant and others arrived at his father’s house, he went to get gas and found them hiding upon his return. Gooden brandished a gun and claimed to have killed someone. Bradford observed boxes of snacks packed in their car. After starting their vehicle, appellant retrieved an item from under Robinson's porch before they left.

Houston Police Officer B. Harris, acting on a Crimestoppers tip, interviewed Robinson and Bradford, leading to an arrest warrant for Gooden. Upon arresting Gooden, police discovered the complainant's credit cards and driver’s license in his jacket, and found items belonging to the complainant in the recovered blue Oldsmobile. When officers arrested Thomas and Terry, they found the murder weapon at Thomas's girlfriend's residence.

Appellant later surrendered to Deputy Constables and provided a videotaped statement to Officer Harris, where he inconsistently admitted to participating in the robbery and identified Gooden as the shooter. Appellant recounted that after Gooden shot the complainant initially, he urged Gooden to "finish him," resulting in two more shots.

Appellant's first point of error claimed that the trial court improperly admitted gruesome photographs into evidence, arguing they were irrelevant and biased the jury. He objected to several crime scene photographs showing the complainant's charred body and truck, asserting they were excessively graphic. The State contended that the photographs were relevant to the defendants' actions, including evidence destruction, and provided insight into appellant’s mental state. The trial court excluded one photograph but upheld the admission of others, determining their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, as they depicted the crime's context and the complainant’s injuries.

Arson investigator Wood utilized photographs during his testimony to illustrate the fire's origin and the damage to the truck and its contents. The appellant objected to the admission of seven autopsy photographs (State's Exhibits 88-94), arguing their improper admission since he did not contest the complainant's death from gunshot wounds. The trial court upheld the objection to Exhibit 88, a close-up of the complainant's head, but allowed the admission of the remaining photographs depicting various views of the wounds. The admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with crime scene photographs generally deemed relevant as they reflect the offense's reality. Autopsy photographs are typically admissible unless they depict mutilation caused by the autopsy itself. Under Texas Rule of Evidence 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value, though there is a presumption favoring admissibility. Factors for a Rule 403 analysis include the evidence's probative value, potential for irrational jury impression, development time, and necessity for the evidence. The prejudicial effect of photographs is assessed based on factors such as quantity, size, detail, gruesomeness, and condition of the body depicted. Photographs serve as powerful visual evidence, and the trial court's discretion in admitting them is not considered abused solely due to their gruesome nature. The admitted exhibits, including close-ups of the complainant's gunshot wounds and various angles of the crime scene, were found to be probative of the crime and the complainant's injuries.

Photographs from the crime scene and autopsy were deemed relevant and not overly gruesome by the trial court, as they only depicted the victim's injuries without showing mutilation from the autopsy. The court determined that the probative value of these images outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice, leading to the overruling of the appellant’s first point of error regarding their admissibility.

In the second point of error, the appellant alleged that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress a videotaped statement, asserting he requested a lawyer prior to the statement. The third point contended the absence of an express waiver of rights in the videotape, claiming it should have been recorded before the waiver. The court reviews motions to suppress for abuse of discretion, giving deference to the trial court's credibility assessments. While generally limited to evidence from the suppression hearing, the court noted that since the suppression issues were re-litigated during the trial without objection from the appellant, it was appropriate to consider trial testimony in reviewing the ruling.

An accused has the right to legal representation prior to and during questioning, as established by Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22(2)(a)(3). If an accused requests an attorney, all questioning must cease, as affirmed in Edwards v. Arizona and Cobb v. State. During the motion to suppress hearing, testimonies from Lafeshe Coleman, appellant's girlfriend, and Marsha Henderson, his mother, indicated that both instructed appellant not to speak without a lawyer present, and that these instructions were heard by the deputy constables. However, multiple law enforcement officers testified that appellant did not request an attorney after his surrender. Officer B. Harris, who conducted a preliminary interview, stated that appellant acknowledged his rights and chose to waive them, expressing a desire to make a videotaped statement. Officer B. McDaniel confirmed that appellant understood his rights and did not request an attorney during the process. Deputy Constable Barnett, who could not testify at the motion hearing but did so later, also stated that appellant never asked for a lawyer. The trial court ultimately denied the motion to suppress the videotaped statement, confirming that appellant was read his rights multiple times, which included his right to remain silent, the use of statements against him, and the right to legal counsel prior to and during questioning, among others.

Appellant acknowledged his rights, including the potential use of his statement against him, and voluntarily waived these rights in his videotaped statement. The court found credible testimonies from McDaniel, Harris, and Lofland, confirming that appellant did not request a lawyer, while deeming Coleman and Henderson not credible, particularly rejecting Henderson's claim that appellant asked for legal counsel. Testimony from officers present during appellant's surrender supported that he received legal warnings multiple times, understood them, and did not request an attorney. The only contrary evidence came from appellant's mother and girlfriend, whose testimonies were also found not credible. Deputy Barnett testified that he recalled the events and confirmed that appellant never asked for a lawyer. 

The trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress the videotaped statement was upheld, as it was found that appellant had intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his rights. Furthermore, the law does not require an express statement of waiver on the recording for admissibility. Appellant's argument that the absence of an express waiver invalidated the statement was rejected, as implied waiver through continued participation in the interview suffices under Texas law. The trial court's ruling on both points of error raised by appellant was affirmed.

Appellant claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to object to inadmissible victim-character testimony and hearsay documents. The testimony from the complainant's wife included personal details about the complainant's family life and background, which appellant argues should have been excluded. Additionally, evidence regarding the ownership of the murder weapon, including a document from the ATF and police testimony, was also challenged. The standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel, established in Strickland v. Washington, requires a two-step analysis: (1) whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) whether the outcome would likely have been different absent the errors. Appellant carries the burden of proof and must demonstrate that the claim is firmly supported by the record.

The court noted that no motion for new trial was filed, leaving the rationale for counsel's decisions unrecorded. The State argued that the wife's testimony was admissible and did not constitute impermissible victim impact evidence, referencing case law to support this view. It was suggested that trial counsel might have deemed the testimony admissible or believed objections would be futile. Regarding the hearsay, the State indicated that ownership of the weapon could have been established through other means, potentially exposing appellant to more prejudicial evidence. The court concluded that isolated failures to object do not typically indicate ineffective assistance. Ultimately, the court found no evidence that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and affirmed the trial court's judgment.