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Alan Winters and Janet Winters v. Lance Parker, A/K/A MacBo, Inc., and Patrick Flinn, A/K/A Currentsonline.com

Citation: Not availableDocket: 01-03-01334-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; June 16, 2005; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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On June 16, 2005, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in a case involving appellants Alan and Janet Winters against appellees Lance Parker and Patrick Flinn, officers of ProEducation International Inc. The appellants claimed damages following the cancellation of their health insurance, alleging that the cancellation, communicated via a letter from Flinn, led to stress that caused Alan Winters to suffer a ruptured aneurysm and subsequent hemorrhagic stroke.

The trial court had previously granted the appellees' no-evidence motions for summary judgment and Flinn’s special exceptions, which argued that the appellants had failed to properly plead their claims. The appellants, in their response, cited Winters’s affidavit, asserting that the stress from the insurance cancellation was a significant factor in his medical condition. However, the court found that the appellants did not adequately plead the elements of their claims, including fraudulent transfer, conspiracy, or a recognized cause of action for personal injury, nor did they substantiate their claim of "willful intent to injure" with legal precedent or definitions.

Consequently, the trial court dismissed the case against Flinn with prejudice and granted summary judgments for both Parker and Flinn. The appellants' subsequent motion for a new trial was denied, leading to the appeal.

Appellants argue they sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in their third amended petition. Under Texas law, a party can face summary judgment for pleading deficiencies if they fail to amend after special exceptions are sustained. The trial court granted special exceptions to Parker and Flinn, allowing appellants to replead, but subsequent no-evidence motions for summary judgment from Parker and Flinn claimed appellants did not adequately plead a cause of action. 

The elements required for intentional infliction of emotional distress include: (1) intentional or reckless conduct by the defendant, (2) extreme and outrageous behavior, (3) causation of emotional distress, and (4) severe emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff. However, appellants failed to demonstrate that the cancellation of their health insurance policy constituted extreme or outrageous conduct as defined by Texas law, which necessitates behavior that goes beyond all bounds of decency. The Texas Supreme Court allows some latitude for conduct that may cause emotional distress, such as terminating a contract or sending a bill.

After reviewing the third amended petition, the trial court's grant of summary judgment was deemed appropriate, as appellants did not present a valid cause of action, nor did they provide evidence or legal authority supporting their claims of extreme behavior. Consequently, the trial court's dismissal of the case against Parker and Flinn was affirmed, rendering appellants' additional points of error unnecessary for consideration. The judgment of the trial court is upheld.