Nathan Bernard Guillory v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 01-05-00076-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; October 20, 2005; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Nathan Bernard Guillory was indicted for the felony offense of murder after he fatally shot Lamont Hollie. The charge was enhanced by a prior felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Guillory pleaded not guilty to the murder charge but admitted to the enhancement. A jury found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to 60 years in prison.

On appeal, Guillory raised several arguments: (1) the evidence was factually insufficient to support his conviction, (2) out-of-court statements were improperly admitted as hearsay, (3) those statements violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause, and (4) evidence of gang affiliation was wrongly admitted as character evidence. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.

The case background revealed that on September 18, 2003, Hollie died from a gunshot wound after an altercation involving Guillory. Witness Delia Rubio testified that she had observed the fight and the shooting, stating she delayed reporting it due to threats. During the trial, it was established that Guillory called Hollie outside before the fight ensued, culminating in the shooting when Hollie fell. The appellate court applied a factual-sufficiency standard, emphasizing the deference owed to the jury's assessment of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence presented.

In *Cain v. State*, the court emphasizes that the fact-finder, typically the jury, is solely responsible for determining the credibility and weight of contradictory testimonial evidence. The appellant argues against the jury's verdict by highlighting the poor credibility of the State's main witness, Delia Rubio, an eyewitness to the murder, citing inconsistencies in her testimony and character issues. However, the court notes that any evaluation of these inconsistencies is within the jury's purview, and it is not erroneous for the jury to favor the State's interpretation. The appellant asserts that the absence of physical evidence linking him to the murder undermines the conviction; however, the court clarifies that a single eyewitness's testimony can suffice for a felony conviction, regardless of physical evidence. Regarding hearsay, the appellant contends that three out-of-court statements were improperly admitted. The court explains that evidence admission is reviewed for abuse of discretion, defining hearsay as statements offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted. The statements made by witnesses Tijerna and Lerma, as relayed by Officer Parrie, and Rubio's account of a third party's statement are analyzed, with the potential classification of the statements as non-hearsay depending on their intended purpose in the trial.

Gabriel Lerma witnessed the victim shortly before the shooting and testified about observing two black males involved in a verbal confrontation with a young black female. He noted the males were drinking beer and making aggressive remarks. Lerma recounted that the victim asked the female for a cigarette, which she declined, leading to the victim calling her derogatory names and suggesting that trouble was brewing. 

Appellant challenged the admissibility of Officer Parrie's testimony regarding Lerma's statements, claiming it constituted hearsay. The court overruled this objection, allowing the testimony to illustrate the context of the officer's investigation. However, the appellant properly preserved his objection only for the first part of Officer Parrie's testimony, failing to do so for the second part regarding Lerma. Consequently, the review of error is confined to the first response.

The State argued that Officer Parrie's testimony was relevant to the investigation's context rather than to prove the truth of the statements made. While officers can testify to information that informs their actions, they should not recount hearsay statements that do not aid the jury's understanding of their actions. In this case, Officer Parrie's recounting of comments made by Tijerna and Lerma was unnecessary for the jury's comprehension of subsequent actions taken, leading to the conclusion that the trial court erred in admitting this testimony.

The document further addresses the potential impact of this error, indicating it is a non-constitutional error requiring a harm analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). Such an error must be disregarded unless it significantly influenced the jury's verdict, as established in relevant case law.

Errors in trial testimony are deemed harmless if they minimally influenced the verdict. The appellant claimed that certain testimony bolstered a witness's credibility by implying additional witnesses were present. However, the court found that this testimony did not significantly impact the jury's decision, as it did not identify the appellant or detail the shooting events. The statements provided context but did not affect the appellant's rights.

Regarding a statement made by a woman named Latasha during the trial, the court ruled that it was admissible to illustrate what she said rather than to assert its truth, thus not constituting hearsay. The appellant's objection on hearsay grounds did not preserve a Confrontation Clause argument for appeal, as he did not raise this specific objection at trial. Consequently, the appeal on this matter was waived.

Additionally, the appellant contested the admission of his gang affiliation as improper character evidence. However, this objection was also not raised at trial; the appellant only questioned the relevance of the testimony. For this reason, the appellate court concluded that this issue was waived as well.

Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment, with the panel consisting of Justices Nuchia, Jennings, and Higley.