John R. Wills, Jr. v. The City of Memphis

Citations: 457 S.W.3d 30; 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 488; 2014 WL 3939430Docket: W2013-01861-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; August 13, 2014; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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John R. Wills, Jr., the owner of Lot 94 in the Belle Meade Subdivision, requested a writ of certiorari from the Chancery Court of Shelby County to review the Memphis City Council's denial of his petition to subdivide his lot into two. The trial court reversed the City Council's decision, concluding that Wills met the subdivision requirements of the Uniform Development Code (UDC) and remanded the case for a rehearing before the City Council, which was limited to the existing record. The Court of Appeals affirmed part of the trial court's ruling, vacated another part, and instructed the trial court to remand for reconsideration.

Wills' Lot 94, located at the northwest corner of Poplar Avenue and Belle Meade Lane, is one of the largest within the subdivision at approximately 31,247 square feet, allowing for the division into two compliant lots under R-10 zoning regulations—each requiring a minimum size of 10,000 square feet and 60 feet of street frontage. Proposed Lot 94A would measure 14,004 square feet with 116 feet of street frontage, while Lot 94B would have 16,672 square feet and 104.98 feet of frontage. The UDC, effective from January 1, 2011, to August 27, 2012, governs the application, which was considered a 'major preliminary plan’ and required review by the Planning Director and the Memphis and Shelby County Land Use Control Board, with the possibility of appeal to the City Council.

The Unified Development Code (UDC) grants the Planning Director the authority to review major preliminary subdivision plans, with the option to delegate this responsibility to a staff member. Under Section 9.3.1(B), Mr. Wills was required to attend a pre-application conference with the Planning Director to discuss necessary procedures, standards, and regulations for his application. Mr. Wills was to submit a complete application with sufficient information for the Planning Director to assess compliance with the UDC. Section 9.3.3.E(3) allows applicants to rely on the Planning Director's recommendations regarding the sufficiency of their submitted information. The record shows no indication that Mr. Wills was informed of any deficiencies in his application.

After submission, Section 9.7.7(D) allows the Planning Director to forward the application to the Technical Review Committee for assessment against UDC standards. Upon completing this review, the Planning Director may meet with the applicant to discuss necessary changes and must prepare a report evaluating the application based on the Technical Review Committee's comments and UDC requirements. In this instance, the Planning Director confirmed that Mr. Wills’ proposed re-subdivision met the UDC's technical requirements, allowing the application to proceed to the Land Use Control Board (LUCB).

According to Section 9.7.7(E), the LUCB must hold a public hearing between 35 and 75 days after an application is deemed complete. The LUCB then approves, approves with conditions, or rejects the application. On June 9, 2011, the LUCB voted 1–8 to deny Mr. Wills’ application. Subsequently, on June 15, 2011, Mr. Wills appealed to the Memphis City Council, which, after notifying interested landowners, rejected his resolution to overturn the LUCB's decision by a 3–10 vote on August 16, 2011. On November 4, 2011, Mr. Wills filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Shelby County Chancery Court for a review of the rejections. The Chancellor issued a writ on November 17, 2011, and the City submitted relevant documents, including City Council proceedings and reports, by December 21, 2011. The trial court heard the case on April 22, 2013.

The trial court directed the parties to provide briefs on the admissible evidence, available remedies, and the applicability of Section 3.9.2 of the UDC. Following the submission of these briefs and a hearing, the court issued a Memorandum Opinion on July 10, 2013, ruling in favor of Mr. Wills and remanding the matter to the City Council. The City Council's meeting on the application revealed opposition from neighboring property owners, who argued that the proposed subdivision contradicted the neighborhood's character, emphasizing Belle Meade's large lots and expressing concerns about potential traffic congestion. The objections mirrored those raised in 2000 regarding a similar application. Two City Council members publicly opposed the application, citing their personal connections to the neighborhood and urging their colleagues to join them. 

Despite the opposition, the Office of Planning and Development (OPD) provided a report indicating that the proposed subdivision complied with zoning regulations, clarifying that concerns about future subdivisions were unfounded since most lots in Belle Meade were too small for such division. The transcript of the City Council meeting showed that opposition was based solely on neighbors' fears regarding changes to the neighborhood's character, with no zoning requirements cited to justify the denial of Mr. Wills' application. The City Council did not discuss any evidence supporting their decision, and while the City later contended that the proposed lots did not meet UDC requirements regarding width or frontage, these points were not addressed during the meeting. The OPD report confirmed that the proposed re-subdivision met all technical UDC requirements, indicating that the denial was based solely on unsupported concerns from neighbors.

Community fears and concerns cannot justify the denial of an application that meets all zoning ordinance conditions and technical requirements. The Court finds that the City Council's rejection of Mr. Wills' application lacks substantial evidence and is arbitrary. Mr. Wills' proposal to subdivide his lot adheres to R-10 zoning and the Unified Development Code (UDC). Allowing decisions based on unfounded community fears would undermine established zoning laws. The matter is remanded to the City Council with instructions to grant the permit unless non-compliance with zoning regulations is established. Mr. Wills subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the court's findings, raising questions about the appropriateness of the City’s arguments during judicial review, the evidence that could be considered upon remand, the conduct of opposing Council Members, and the applicability of contextual infill development standards to his application. The trial court's order on October 18, 2013 affirmed that Mr. Wills’ application complies with the UDC, prohibited the City Council from considering new evidence beyond the original hearing record, denied the request for the recusal of specific Council Members, and upheld the earlier opinion. Appellants appealed, presenting six issues for review regarding legal standards, the City Council's decision, the basis of the denial, compliance with the UDC, the application of outdated regulations, and the prohibition on new evidence during remand.

The trial court's Memorandum Opinion outlines the standard of review for common law writs of certiorari, emphasizing that the court's review is confined to determining if the City exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently. A decision lacking substantial and material evidence is deemed arbitrary and capricious. The City Council was functioning in an administrative capacity, applying existing law to reject Mr. Wills’ subdivision application, which characterizes the decision as administrative rather than legislative. 

The common law writ of certiorari serves as the appropriate mechanism for challenging administrative actions by boards or commissions and requires a superior court to review the record from the inferior tribunal. The review is generally restricted to the existing record and aims to ascertain if there is adequate evidence to support a rational conclusion, without re-evaluating the evidence or substituting the tribunal's judgment. 

Illegal, arbitrary, or fraudulent actions in this context include failing to adhere to due process, misapplying legal standards, acting with ulterior motives, or violating constitutional standards. Additionally, the reviewing court cannot consider new evidence when assessing whether the lower tribunal's decision is supported by material evidence, making this a legal question for the court.

A local board's decision is deemed arbitrary only if there is a lack of evidence supporting it. New evidence is permissible in court only to assess whether a board acted beyond its jurisdiction or in an arbitrary manner. The court determined the City Council's rejection of Mr. Wills’ application was arbitrary due to inadequate 'substantial and material' evidence. Appellants argue the trial court misapplied the standard of review under the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), asserting that the correct threshold is 'any material evidence' as established in Davis v. Shelby County Sheriff’s Department. The distinction between the UAPA standard and common law writ of certiorari is significant, with the latter rendering a board's decision void if unsupported by any material evidence. The Supreme Court's definition of 'material evidence' requires it to be relevant and sufficient for a reasonable person to draw a rational conclusion, and it needs to exceed a mere scintilla of evidence but does not require a preponderance. In this case, the distinction between 'substantial and material evidence' and 'any material evidence' is inconsequential because the court decided to remand the matter back to the City Council. The OPD’s report indicated neighbor opposition to Mr. Wills’ subdivision request based on lot size compatibility concerns. While acknowledging the validity of these concerns, the OPD differentiated between lot size and street character compatibility, asserting that Mr. Wills’ proposal aligns with the street character of adjacent lots, which are smaller and were re-subdivided in 2000.

Proposed Lots 94A and 94B are smaller than neighboring lots across the street; however, the Office of Planning and Development (OPD) determined that this size difference would not be perceptible from the street due to matching lot widths and setbacks from Poplar Avenue and Belle Meade Lane. OPD emphasized that the 'street character' is more significant than the lots' overall size, as compatibility is primarily evaluated from the street view. Historical Subdivision Regulations in Memphis and Shelby County allowed for neighborhood character compatibility in applications, but the new Unified Development Code (UDC) has modified this standard. UDC Section 3.9.2 outlines minimum 'contextual infill development standards' for residential projects, aiming to support infill development in existing neighborhoods and maintain traditional character. The section specifies that the minimum lot width must be either the average width of the four closest lots on the same block face or the average of all lots on that block face. Appellants argue that the Land Use Control Board (LUCB) and City Council denied Mr. Wills' application because it did not meet these lot width requirements, asserting that both proposed lots must be at least 117.31 feet wide based on the average width of the four closest lots, which is 117.31 feet. Mr. Wills' Proposed Lots 94A and 94B measure 116 feet and 104.98 feet wide, respectively. Appellants also point out that Mr. Wills did not request a waiver for the lot width requirement and claimed his subdivision was consistent with R-10 zoning, which only requires 60 feet of frontage. Furthermore, the UDC specifies setback standards, stating that structures must be located within the range of front setbacks based on the four surrounding lots.

The new structure must be positioned within the defined setback range, not closer than the narrowest setback and not further than the deepest setback. If a setback on any of the four lots is significantly outside the established range, it can be disregarded. If determining a setback range is unfeasible, a minimum distance of 20 feet from the front property line is required. Appellants claim that the Office of Planning and Development (OPD) and Mr. Wills’ application failed to address the Unified Development Code (UDC) setback requirements. Mr. Wills’ plan proposes a 30-foot front setback, which Appellants argue is not compliant with the compatibility setback requirements for contextual infill standards of the UDC. They reference the Belle Meade Subdivision plat, indicating that all lots on the west side of Belle Meade Lane (except Lot 94) have setbacks exceeding 30 feet, supporting their assertion that the trial court erred in finding Mr. Wills’ application compliant with the UDC.

Conversely, Mr. Wills contends that the Land Use Control Board (LUCB) was compelled to approve his application under UDC Section 9.7.7, noting that the LUCB’s recommendation did not address UDC Section 3.9.2 at all. He highlights four specific omissions regarding the applicability criteria, minimum lot width requirement, range of front setbacks, and other contextual infill standards, arguing that the LUCB’s recommendation was based on outdated regulations rather than the current UDC. Mr. Wills points out that the Appellants only raised concerns about UDC Section 3.9.2 in their trial brief, after the LUCB's decision.

Despite the lack of explicit reference to UDC Section 3.9.2, Appellants assert that the LUCB and City Council implicitly considered it in their decision to deny Mr. Wills’ application, as discussions centered on neighborhood character, which relates to that section. They argue it was not their responsibility to prove non-compliance with UDC Section 3.9.2; rather, Mr. Wills bore the burden of demonstrating compliance, per UDC 9.3.3(E)(2). This section states that an application must contain all necessary information to determine compliance with the development code, further supported by precedent indicating the applicant's burden of proof regarding compliance with applicable ordinances.

The Appellants argue that both the appellate and trial courts are limited to assessing whether material evidence supports the local agency’s decision. They assert that the proposed subdivision fails to comply with UDC Section 3.9.2, urging the Court to evaluate this section even though it was not explicitly cited by the Local Unification Code Board (LUCB) or the City Council. The record reveals minimal guidance for appellate review, with both parties presenting waiver arguments related to the UDC's applicability. Although evidence associated with UDC Section 3.9.2 exists in the record, neither the City Council nor the LUCB referenced it in their decisions. Importantly, the City Council is not mandated to provide findings of fact or conclusions of law, as established in Moore v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals. Thus, the Court does not deem the applicability of the UDC waived by either party.

The Court intends to explore whether the UDC justifies the denial of Mr. Wills’ subdivision application, first requiring a thorough understanding of UDC's approval criteria for Lot 94. The interpretation of zoning ordinances, including the UDC, is primarily a local official's responsibility, with courts exercising restraint in interfering unless absolutely necessary. Courts will not replace local officials' judgments unless their interpretations are arbitrary, capricious, or undermine the ordinance's intent. Clear language in an ordinance will be enforced as written, while ambiguity will prompt courts to apply statutory construction principles. The UDC's introductory section guides property owners on navigating the code based on their intended actions, such as modifying or developing buildings.

Property owners must refer to Article 3 of the Unified Development Code (UDC), specifically Building Envelope Standards, for dimensional standards relevant to their property. UDC Section 3.9 addresses “Residential Compatibility” and contextual infill standards in Section 3.9.2. Subdivision of property must adhere to procedures outlined in Chapter 9.7, which distinguishes between “major” and “minor preliminary plans.” Mr. Wills’ application was classified as a major preliminary plan, which requires compliance with UDC Section 9.7.7(H) criteria, including adherence to applicable plans and public facility availability, both of which are satisfied in this case. The criteria for minor plans expedite approvals but specifically require compliance with Article 3, including Section 3.9.2. The central dispute is whether Section 3.9.2 applies to major plans. The conclusion reached is that Section 3.9.2 is indeed applicable to both minor and major preliminary plans for subdivision, impacting Mr. Wills’ compliance regarding frontage and setback requirements.

UDC Section 3.1.2 mandates that all subdivisions comply with Article 3 of Chapter 9.7, Subdivision Review. The court recognizes the in pari materia principle, which states that zoning ordinances on similar subjects should be interpreted together. Therefore, all subdivision plans, including major preliminary ones, must adhere to Article 3 and UDC Section 3.9.2. Mr. Wills contends that UDC Section 3.9.2 is inapplicable to his property, asserting that his property is not surrounded by qualifying single-family developments established before 1950, as required under UDC Section 3.9.2(B)(1). The Appellants acknowledge that UDC Section 3.9.2 is the only relevant provision that could impede Mr. Wills' subdivision proposal. They assert that any evaluation of the proposal's conformity with neighborhood character must reference this section. The crux of the appeal is the applicability of UDC Section 3.9.2. The Appellants further argue that the City Council should not have its decision reversed, asserting two points: first, the Council had discretion to apply UDC Section 3.9.2 regardless of its stated applicability to Lot 94; second, even if the standards are deemed inapplicable, any misapplication by the Council does not warrant reversing their decision.

Appellants contend that UDC Section 3.9.2's language allows for discretionary application of infill development standards, regardless of whether the criteria are met. However, the court disagrees, emphasizing that statutory construction principles guide the interpretation of ordinances. The primary goal is to ascertain legislative intent from the natural meaning of the text, without altering its provisions. UDC Section 3.9.2 explicitly states that its contextual infill standards apply to residential projects under specific conditions, and the use of "shall" indicates a mandatory requirement. The court notes that there is no provision allowing the local agency to apply these standards outside the specified criteria. Consequently, the court declines to accept the argument that the City Council can impose these standards on a project that does not meet the outlined requirements. Additionally, the Appellants argue that even if the City Council misapplied UDC Section 3.9.2 to Lot 94, this error does not warrant overturning the Council's decision.

Appellants reference the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Yokley v. State, which clarifies that a writ of certiorari is used to evaluate the legality of court proceedings based on jurisdiction or failure to observe essential legal forms, not to assess the correctness of a judgment if jurisdiction is established. The ruling indicates that an error of law does not constitute an "illegal decision" unless it can be shown to be "illegal, arbitrary, or fraudulent," which can arise from misrepresentation or misapplication of legal standards. Consequently, if the City Council misapplied UDC Section 3.9.2 regarding Mr. Wills’ proposed subdivision, that decision could be deemed illegal for certiorari purposes. 

Determining the applicability of UDC Section 3.9.2 is crucial in this case. Mr. Wills' proposed subdivision, being a residential project under two acres, raises a dispute about whether it is surrounded by legally established single-family developments predating 1950, as stipulated in UDC Section 3.9.2(B). Appellants claim that the property is indeed surrounded by several such developments, including the Belle Meade subdivision (established in 1947) and others established in 1938. Mr. Wills counters that the term "development" is ambiguous, suggesting it should refer only to the immediate lots surrounding his property. He supports his position with a 2012 Staff Report from the OPD, which outlines potential amendments to the UDC concerning infill standards.

Clarification is provided on the conditions for contextual infill development standards, which are triggered when a lot is adjacent on two or more sides, rather than being completely surrounded. A reference to the building height section of the Unified Development Code (UDC) is included to ascertain foundation height. Sub-Section 3.9.217 has been revised to allow encroachments in rear yards as well as side yards. Although the UDC was formally amended in 2012, Mr. Wills contends this revision reflects the existing interpretation of “development” in UDC Section 3.9.2(B)(1) and cites legislative history, as permitted by case law (In re Estate of Jenkins, 8 S.W.3d 277). He asserts that the OPD interprets “development” to refer to “lots” rather than larger subdivisions.

The UDC defines “development” in Chapter 12.3 as any man-made change involving construction, mining, or excavation on any lot. The term "lot" is defined as a parcel of land recorded in the Shelby County Register's Office within a subdivision. This definition supports Mr. Wills’ view that development could pertain to changes on a single lot. However, the UDC's definition does not conclusively clarify whether “development” refers to a single structure on one lot or multiple structures across several lots. Appellants argue that “development” equates to “subdivision,” which is not defined in the UDC. When terms are undefined, they are interpreted according to their common dictionary meanings. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a “subdivision” is a parcel within a larger development, while “development” denotes substantial human-created changes to real estate, including construction activities.

The definitions of “subdivision” and “development” suggest that a subdivision consists of multiple lots within a broader “development,” indicating that “development” cannot refer to just a single lot. This creates ambiguity in UDC Section 3.9.2(B)(1) regarding what constitutes the necessary surrounding “development” for the application of contextual infill standards. Mr. Wills contends that since his lot is not surrounded by developments established before 1950, these standards do not apply. Conversely, the Appellant argues that Mr. Wills' property is indeed surrounded by such developments.

Resolving this ambiguity is crucial to determining whether the City Council misapplied legal standards when denying Mr. Wills’ subdivision application. Wills requests the court to interpret the ambiguity favorably, asserting that UDC Section 3.9.2 does not apply to his lot. The City, however, argues that questions regarding the applicability of infill standards should be determined by local decision-makers, who have broad authority over zoning and land use. The court recognizes that while legal questions are typically reviewed without a presumption of correctness, deference is owed to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.

This deference was illustrated in previous cases, wherein the court acknowledged the expertise of agencies in interpreting technical terms within statutes and ordinances. Similar deference is warranted in this case concerning the zoning ordinance, where the Board's expertise should be given significant weight. The common-law writ of certiorari provides limited options for judicial intervention in the review process of these decisions.

Judicial remedies in zoning cases typically involve remanding the matter back to local zoning authorities, allowing them to address the issue appropriately. Courts should not take on the responsibilities of these agencies but rather ensure they perform their duties correctly. In this instance, remand to the City Council is necessary because the council did not adequately consider the interpretation of “development” in UDC Section 3.9.2, which is crucial for determining the legality of their denial of Mr. Wills’ subdivision application. The trial court incorrectly ruled that the City Council's decision was arbitrary and capricious based solely on neighbor concerns, disregarding evidence that the proposed lots may not comply with UDC requirements. The trial court also mistakenly concluded that Mr. Wills’ application complied with all UDC provisions without addressing the applicability of Section 3.9.2. It is essential for the City Council to initially interpret the zoning ordinance and make factual findings regarding the surrounding properties of Lot 94. The judgment affirming compliance with the UDC is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to send it back to the City Council for proper interpretation of UDC Section 3.9.2(B)(1). Depending on the findings regarding the surrounding development, the City Council will then decide on the compliance of the proposed subdivision. The trial court's remand instructions also need to be examined to ensure they do not restrict the City Council from considering additional evidence regarding UDC compliance.

Upon remand, the Memphis City Council is prohibited from considering additional evidence beyond what was presented during the August 16, 2011 hearing regarding Mr. Wills' application, as determined by the trial court. The court clarified that while the City Council cannot introduce new evidence, it is still required to evaluate whether the Unified Development Code (UDC) prohibits the subdivision of Lot 94. The trial court's order does not prevent the Council from addressing this issue; it merely restricts the Appellants from submitting new evidence not already in the record. The ruling aligns with precedent set in Hoover, which emphasizes that local agencies should base decisions on existing records without introducing new factual evidence.

The court found that sufficient evidence exists in the record to assess Lot 94's compliance with UDC Section 3.9.2, based on Appellants' arguments. Although Mr. Wills requested attorney's fees for the appeal, he did not provide legal justification for such a request. The court, exercising its discretion, declined to award these fees. Ultimately, the court affirmed some aspects of the trial court's order while vacating others, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appeal costs are divided equally between the Appellants and Mr. Wills.