John E. Cook v. A. Diane Brateng

Citation: Not availableDocket: 43683-3

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; March 25, 2014; Washington; State Appellate Court

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A. Diane Brateng appeals a trial court's award of attorney fees following a previous remand. In Cook v. Brateng, the appellate court vacated an award of attorney fees to John E. Cook and directed the trial court to determine Brateng's reasonable attorney fees for trial and appeal. The trial court subsequently awarded Brateng $53,910.29 in attorney fees against the estate, erroneously concluding that RCW 11.96A.310(10) was not applicable. The appellate court found this conclusion to be an error and remanded the case for a reevaluation of Brateng's fees under the correct statute.

Brateng and Cook are siblings, and following their father's declaration of incompetence in 1997, Brateng became the sole trustee of his estate after his death in 2000. Cook sued Brateng in 2001, leading to mediation and arbitration. After Cook appealed the arbitration decision, the trial court ruled that Brateng had breached her fiduciary duty by failing to inform Cook about her decisions regarding caregiving expenses, awarding attorney fees to Cook and partial fees to Brateng. The appellate court later reversed the breach ruling and vacated the attorney fees awarded to Cook, remanding for a determination of Brateng's reasonable fees.

After the remand, Brateng sought $54,077 for caregiving and trustee expenses, along with $134,000 in attorney fees from Cook personally. The trial court awarded her $38,250 for caregiving expenses and determined her reasonable attorney fees to be $24,716.34 for the trial, $24,193.95 for the appeal, and $5,000 for the remand proceedings.

The trial court ruled that RCW 11.96A.310 was inapplicable and awarded attorney fees to Brateng from Elmer's estate under RCW 11.96A.150, concluding that Cook was not personally liable for Brateng's fees. This decision was based on the finding that penalizing Cook for challenging the trustee's actions would be unjust. Brateng appealed the ruling on attorney fees. Cook contended that res judicata barred Brateng's appeal, claiming that the previous appellate decision mandated the trial court to award fees under RCW 11.96A.150. However, res judicata does not apply as this appeal is part of the same litigation, not a separate lawsuit. The law of the case doctrine, which requires adherence to principles established in prior stages of the same case, also does not preclude Brateng's claim. The court noted that attorney fees can only be awarded if the litigation provides a substantial benefit to the trust. The appellate court determined that the trial court wrongfully awarded fees to Cook since the litigation did not benefit the trust and concluded that Brateng had not breached her fiduciary duties. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the award of attorney fees to Cook and mandated that Brateng be awarded attorney fees for both the trial and the appeal, with the calculation occurring after the estate is revalued and distributed.

Cook's argument that the denial of Brateng's motion for partial reconsideration bars her claim on appeal is rejected. The doctrines of res judicata and law of the case do not apply, as the denial did not articulate a legal principle that must be followed in future proceedings. Brateng contends the trial court incorrectly failed to apply RCW 11.96A.310(10) regarding attorney fees. The appellate court agrees and remands the case for the trial court to determine reasonable attorney fees per this statute. The review of attorney fee awards involves a dual standard: de novo for the legal basis of the award, and abuse of discretion for the reasonableness of the award. An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. The interpretation of statutes requires ascertaining the legislature's intent, starting with the statute's plain meaning, context, and related provisions. RCW 11.96A.310(9) allows appeals for a trial de novo, while subsection (10) mandates that the prevailing party in such cases is entitled to costs, including attorney fees, which are to be assessed against the non-prevailing party in an equitable manner. This subsection takes precedence over conflicting provisions.

RCW 11.96A.150(1) allows courts to award costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, to any party involved in proceedings, either from the parties or from the estate or trust assets. Courts can determine the amount and manner of payment based on equitable considerations. RCW 11.96A.310(10) mandates that a trial court award fees against the non-prevailing party in a trial de novo following an appeal of an arbitrator's decision, taking precedence over RCW 11.96A.150. In this case, Cook appealed an arbitrator's decision and requested a trial de novo, thus invoking the fee provisions of RCW 11.96A.310(10). The trial court incorrectly ruled that Cook was not liable for Brateng's attorney fees, which penalized Cook for exercising a legitimate right to challenge the trustee's conduct. The frivolity of the appeal is not a relevant factor for determining the applicability of RCW 11.96A.310(10). Since Brateng prevailed in the trial de novo, the trial court erred by not awarding her attorney fees under RCW 11.96A.310(10). The court must first determine Brateng's reasonable attorney fees to be awarded against Cook personally before considering any additional fees under RCW 11.96A.150, which may include factors like previously awarded fees. Cook's request for attorney fees for defending a frivolous appeal is denied due to Brateng's success in her appeal. The court's failure to apply RCW 11.96A.310(10) correctly necessitates remand for a determination of Brateng's reasonable fees. Brateng did not request fees related to the current appeal.