State v. Dobbs

Citation: Not availableDocket: 87472-7

Court: Washington Supreme Court; March 13, 2014; Washington; State Supreme Court

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Timothy John Dobbs, also known as Timothy John St. Louis, is a petitioner in a case before the Supreme Court of Washington regarding a personal restraint petition. Under the Sixth Amendment, defendants have the right to confront witnesses against them, but this right can be forfeited if a defendant is responsible for a witness's absence at trial. The court cites previous rulings indicating that allowing a defendant to benefit from their own misconduct—such as threats or intimidation against a witness—would undermine public policy and the purpose of the confrontation clause.

In this case, Dobbs engaged in a campaign of threats and intimidation against his ex-girlfriend, C.R., which included a drive-by shooting at her home and direct threats regarding her cooperation with law enforcement. After Dobbs's arrest, he continued to threaten C.R. via phone calls, warning her that she would "regret" pressing charges. When C.R. did not appear to testify at trial, the trial judge determined that Dobbs's actions were directly responsible for her absence, leading to a forfeiture of his right to confront her. The court upheld this finding, emphasizing that allowing Dobbs to claim a confrontation right after intimidating C.R. would contradict legal principles and societal interests. The facts detail a series of violent actions by Dobbs against C.R. following the end of their relationship, including threats to her life and property damage.

Applebury observed a man resembling Dobbs in a car near C.R.'s residence, followed by gunshots from an adjacent alley. Both Applebury and C.R. called the police, with C.R. expressing her fear of Dobbs, stating she would be found dead if he wasn't apprehended. Police discovered bullet holes at her home, which they traced back to the alley. C.R. played a voicemail from Dobbs that hinted at his involvement in the shooting. Later, Applebury saw Dobbs inside C.R.'s home with a gun; Dobbs fled but was arrested nearby. A handgun was later found in a neighbor's yard. C.R. described Dobbs' harassment over two weeks, including an incident where he forced his way into her home armed. She provided police with a threatening note from Dobbs and described subsequent voicemails and text messages that demonstrated his intimidation. The prosecution charged Dobbs with eight offenses, including stalking and harassment, and the trial began on January 25, 2010. An officer confirmed C.R.'s intention to testify the night before the trial.

C.R. failed to appear at trial, prompting prosecutors and police to attempt contact without success. Consequently, a warrant was issued for her arrest, but she remained unlocated and did not testify. The State argued that Dobbs forfeited his confrontation rights due to his wrongdoing intended to prevent C.R. from testifying. The court agreed, citing clear evidence of Dobbs's conduct, including C.R.'s fear of him due to past threats and harassment, which led to her absence. The judge ruled that Dobbs's actions constituted forfeiture of his confrontation rights and also resulted in a waiver of any hearsay objections, referencing State v. Fallentine as precedent.

Dobbs was found guilty on multiple charges, including stalking and felony harassment. He appealed, but the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, affirming that sufficient evidence supported the finding of Dobbs's misconduct aimed at keeping C.R. from testifying. The appellate court also agreed that the trial judge correctly admitted evidence that would otherwise be considered hearsay due to the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. The Supreme Court granted Dobbs's petition for review on two issues: whether substantial evidence supported the trial judge's ruling regarding C.R.'s absence and if Dobbs waived any hearsay objections through his actions. Constitutional issues are subject to de novo review, while findings of fact are assessed for substantial evidence support, and admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. In this case, the trial court ruled that Dobbs caused C.R.'s absence from trial, thereby forfeiting his Sixth Amendment right to confront her. The forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine allows for the introduction of a witness’s statements if the defendant's actions made the witness unavailable, as established in Mason. The doctrine is founded on equity, asserting that a defendant cannot claim a right to confront a witness they have rendered unavailable.

The court must determine if the defendant's wrongdoing made the witness unavailable based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, without requiring intent to prevent testimony. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that such forfeiture applies only when the defendant intentionally prevents the witness from testifying. 

In this instance, the State demonstrated a pattern of abuse and intimidation by Dobbs towards C.R., establishing it is highly probable that his violent threats, linked to her decision to report him, caused her absence at trial. The trial judge's finding of clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that Dobbs was responsible for C.R.'s absence is supported by substantial evidence. This includes Dobbs's stalking, threats of violence, and actual shootings at her residence, which instilled fear in C.R. and led her to believe her life was at risk. C.R. reported that Dobbs had explicitly threatened her safety and indicated that her cooperation with law enforcement would have severe consequences. Ultimately, the evidence substantiates that Dobbs's actions directly contributed to C.R. feeling compelled to avoid testifying.

Dobbs, after being arrested, left a voicemail for C.R. from jail, urging her not to press charges, which escalated into a threatening message. He had previously shown a pattern of intimidation by appearing at her home with a gun and even firing at her residence, instilling fear in C.R. She repeatedly expressed to the police her fear that Dobbs would kill her, highlighting the growing severity of his threats, including direct intimidation from jail aimed at preventing her cooperation in the criminal proceedings. The trial judge concluded there was clear and convincing evidence that Dobbs's violent behavior and threats were the reasons for C.R.'s decision not to testify. This conclusion was supported by substantial evidence, and the judge referenced the case of Fallentine, which dealt with witness intimidation, recognizing the stronger evidence in Dobbs's case. Unlike the witness in Fallentine, who recanted his fear of intimidation, C.R. did not deny her fear, and the evidence against Dobbs was bolstered by multiple witnesses and documented threats, contrasting with the single social worker's testimony in Fallentine.

Evidence supporting the proposition regarding Clark’s failure to testify was primarily based on hearsay statements to an investigator and social worker. Clark's reluctance to be viewed as a "snitch" indicated potential alternative motives for his inconsistent testimony. Despite Clark’s explicit denial of influence from Fallentine, the court determined there was clear, cogent, and convincing evidence linking his failure to testify to intimidation from Fallentine.

The case involved the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, which does not necessitate a direct statement from an intimidated witness regarding their fear of testifying. Such a requirement would exclude the testimony of nearly all absent witnesses. The court referenced a police officer's testimony about a voicemail from Dobbs threatening C.R. not to press charges, which served to intimidate her from participating in the case. C.R.'s expressed terror of Dobbs and his past violent actions, including shooting at her house, reinforced the likelihood that his threats effectively deterred her from testifying.

The court concluded that Dobbs' threats significantly increased C.R.’s fear, making it irrational for her to risk her safety by testifying. The evidence of Dobbs’ intimidation was deemed substantial enough to support the trial court's finding that he caused C.R.'s absence from court, leading to the forfeiture of his right to confront her. Additionally, it was determined that by forfeiting his confrontation rights through wrongdoing, Dobbs also waived any objections to hearsay evidence. The trial court's findings and application of the legal standard were upheld.

The United States Supreme Court has linked the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule, noting both aim to protect against the misuse of out-of-court statements. When a defendant's actions necessitate reliance on such statements, they cannot object to their use, as established by the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. In the case of Giles, the Court emphasized that wrongdoing by a defendant forfeits both confrontation and hearsay rights, as allowing otherwise would incentivize intimidation of witnesses. The Court affirmed that C.R., a survivor of domestic violence, likely chose not to testify against Dobbs due to his threats. Dobbs's actions to prevent her cooperation with law enforcement resulted in the forfeiture of his rights to object to hearsay evidence. This principle has been adopted by most courts and was codified in Washington's Rules of Evidence effective September 1, 2013, under ER 804(b)(6), which includes exceptions for statements made against parties who engage in wrongdoing that causes a witness's unavailability. The Court upheld this reasoning in the context of Dobbs's campaign of harassment against C.R., which included threats and violent actions, ultimately leading to his conviction.

Dobbs exhibited no further threats against C.R. during his two-month incarceration following his arrest. Prior to his arrest, C.R. had reported Dobbs's threats and attacks to the police. C.R. did not attend the trial two months later, while Dobbs was still jailed. The state failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that Dobbs's actions caused C.R.'s absence from the trial. The majority opinion claims that Dobbs's previous intimidation led to C.R.'s nonappearance, but this conclusion is speculative given that multiple plausible reasons exist for her absence. C.R.'s lack of attendance might stem from a change of heart regarding Dobbs's conviction, intimidation about testifying, or personal reluctance to cooperate with law enforcement, especially since she had not been showing up for police appointments after November 10. There is a significant gap in evidence regarding C.R.'s motivations between her last police statement and her trial absence, making the cause of her nonappearance unclear. Officers and civilian witnesses had no knowledge of any plans C.R. might have had to skip the trial. Notably, Officer Headley confirmed C.R.'s intention to attend the trial just before it began. The majority's conclusion that Dobbs's threats led to C.R.'s absence contradicts the fact that these threats had not previously deterred her from reporting him. Furthermore, it implies that any defendant who threatens a witness could forfeit their right to confront that witness, as the majority claims Dobbs did. However, the majority fails to demonstrate that Dobbs's threats caused C.R. to be unavailable, which is necessary under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.

The "clear, cogent, and convincing" standard of evidence is intentionally stringent, preventing courts from making unfounded assumptions linking a defendant's misconduct to a witness's absence. Adopting a more lenient standard would undermine the rule of confrontation, particularly in domestic violence cases, where threats are often present. The State must provide more substantial evidence than what was presented, as the existing case law, including State v. Mason and Giles v. California, underscores the necessity of clear evidence showing that a defendant's actions directly prevented a witness from testifying. In those cases, the defendants had clearly silenced witnesses through murder, highlighting the serious implications of losing the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The court emphasizes that establishing forfeiture through wrongdoing necessitates proving that the defendant's wrongful conduct caused the witness's absence, which can create a circular dilemma if it requires presupposing the defendant's guilt. To protect against this risk, the prosecution must demonstrate with clear, cogent, and convincing evidence the defendant's intent to prevent the witness's testimony and the actual causation of the witness's nonappearance. While pretrial decisions typically use a preponderance of evidence standard, the high stakes in these situations warrant a higher burden of proof, reinforcing that the right to confrontation should not be easily forfeited. The standard reflects the need for a high degree of confidence in the factual conclusions rather than a specific statistical probability.

The Washington Supreme Court case In re Oet. of Brooks establishes that the "clear, cogent, and convincing" standard of proof is more stringent than the "preponderance of evidence" standard used in most jurisdictions. This standard requires a significant degree of confidence and is particularly relevant in forfeiture inquiries regarding a defendant's confrontation rights. The court cited a precedent from the Fourth Circuit, which allows forfeiture only if the defendant engaged in wrongdoing to make a witness unavailable, and this wrongdoing indeed resulted in the witness's unavailability.

In evaluating the sufficiency of evidence against Dobbs, the court found that while there was enough evidence to suggest Dobbs caused C.R.'s failure to appear, it did not meet the higher threshold of clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The dissenting opinion referenced a similar case, State v. Fallentine, where threats made by Fallentine against a witness, Anthony Clark, were substantiated by extensive evidence of Clark’s fear and his refusal to testify, leading the court to affirm that Fallentine's threats directly caused Clark's absence in court.

In contrast, the dissenting judge argued that the evidence of causation regarding Dobbs's alleged threats was weaker than in the Fallentine case, noting that the State lacked direct evidence and relied solely on circumstantial evidence, which indicated a general atmosphere of fear but did not specifically link this fear to C.R.’s decision not to testify.

C.R.'s failure to appear as a witness raises concerns about presuming forfeiture based on her absence, particularly in light of Dobbs's history of threatening behavior. The majority opinion acknowledges the serious issue of domestic violence, noting that a significant percentage of women experience injuries from intimate partners, and emphasizes the need for protective measures. However, it cautions against undermining constitutional rights in the pursuit of justice in this specific case. 

The dissent argues that the admission of C.R.'s unconfronted testimony constitutes a violation of the confrontation clause, which can only be deemed harmless if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the verdict. This dissent asserts that such error was not harmless regarding Dobbs's convictions for stalking, felony harassment, and intimidating a witness, as C.R.'s testimony was pivotal in supporting these charges. C.R. detailed Dobbs's threats and harassment in her statements to police, which would significantly impact a jury's decision. Although witness James Applebury provided some corroborative testimony, it was insufficient to overwhelmingly support the convictions.

In the case of Dobbs's conviction for drive-by shooting, the dissent finds the evidence more ambiguous but still believes C.R.'s statements likely contributed to the verdict. Applebury's account of seeing Dobbs's car and hearing gunshots was supported by trajectory analysis of bullet holes. However, C.R.'s prior sworn statements directly identifying Dobbs as the shooter and mentioning earlier threats significantly strengthen the case against him.

The court cannot definitively state that Dobbs would have been found guilty of drive-by shooting without C.R.'s unconfronted statements. However, these statements are deemed harmless regarding Dobbs's convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm and obstruction of a law enforcement officer. The unlawful possession conviction required proof of Dobbs's prior serious offense and his possession of a firearm, which was supported by testimony from Officer Applebury. The obstruction conviction stemmed from Officer Woodard's account of Dobbs fleeing upon command, not from C.R.'s statements. When trial evidence is later deemed to violate the confrontation clause, retrial is necessary. Since C.R.'s statements may have influenced the convictions for stalking, felony harassment, intimidating a witness, and drive-by shooting, those charges should be reversed and retried. A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses is forfeited only with clear evidence of intent to procure a witness's absence and causation by wrongful conduct. The dissent argues that Dobbs did not forfeit this right, and C.R.'s statements were admitted in violation of Dobbs's Sixth Amendment rights, constituting a significant constitutional error. Therefore, the dissent calls for a reversal by the Court of Appeals and a remand for retrial on the relevant charges.