Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence Hospitals

Citations: 409 S.C. 514; 763 S.E.2d 200; 2014 WL 3844059; 2014 S.C. LEXIS 327Docket: Appellate Case 2012-213231; 27427

Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina; August 6, 2014; South Carolina; State Supreme Court

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Patricia Brouwer appealed a circuit court order that dismissed her medical malpractice case against Sisters of Charity Providence Hospitals and associated medical professionals for failing to file an expert witness affidavit with her Notice of Intent to File Suit (NOI), as required by South Carolina Code section 15-79-125. Brouwer argued she was exempt from this requirement because her claim involved an incident (an allergic reaction during surgery) that fell within common knowledge and experience, per section 15-36-100(C)(2). The Supreme Court of South Carolina agreed, referencing a prior ruling (Ranucci v. Crain) that confirmed the incorporation of the common-knowledge exception into the affidavit requirement. The Court concluded Brouwer successfully invoked this exception, thus reversing the circuit court's decision and remanding the case for further proceedings. The relevant statutory provisions indicate that the requirement for an expert affidavit does not apply when the allegations of negligence are comprehensible without specialized knowledge.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss Brouwer's Notice of Intent (NOI) and Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Brouwer's failure to include an expert witness affidavit violated section 15-79-125. Although Brouwer opposed the motion, she acknowledged that her Complaint was prematurely filed since mediation had not yet occurred. The circuit court denied the dismissal of the NOI, citing the common-knowledge exception in section 15-36-100(C)(2) but dismissed the Summons and Complaint without prejudice. Respondents then sought to alter or amend this ruling based on the Court of Appeals decision in Ranucci I, which clarified that section 15-79-125(A) references only certain provisions of section 15-36-100 regarding affidavit requirements. The court found that the common knowledge exception did not apply to prelitigation procedures mandated by section 15-79-125 and granted the motion to dismiss the NOI. Brouwer's subsequent Rule 59(e) motion was denied, leading her to appeal. 

On appeal, the standard of review aligns with that applied in the trial court, requiring a favorable construction of the complaint for the nonmovant. Brouwer argues that the court erred in dismissing the NOI for lack of an expert affidavit, asserting that section 15-79-125(A) incorporates all related affidavit requirements from section 15-36-100, including the common-knowledge exception. She contends that interpreting these statutes separately would create an illogical scenario where prelitigation requires an expert affidavit while litigation does not, which she argues would hinder access to the legal system. Additionally, Brouwer claims that any insufficiency in the NOI became moot upon the parties engaging in mediation, as Respondents were made aware of the specifics of the medical malpractice claim.

The Court overruled the Court of Appeals' decision in Ranucci I, affirming that section 15-79-125 incorporates section 15-36-100 entirely, allowing the common-knowledge exception to potentially negate the requirement for an expert witness affidavit when filing a Notice of Intent (NOI). The circuit court incorrectly determined that Brouwer could not invoke this exception; however, Brouwer's argument lacked sufficient authority and was not addressed by the circuit court, leading the Court to conclude that this issue was not preserved for review. 

To prove medical malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate a doctor-patient relationship, recognized medical standards, negligence deviating from those standards, that such negligence caused injury, and that an injury occurred. Expert testimony is typically needed to establish the standard of care and the defendant's breach, unless the case falls under common knowledge. Brouwer’s claims involved medical malpractice, necessitating expert testimony or evidence that the alleged negligent act was common knowledge. The Court found that the claim regarding allergic reactions to latex exposure was within common knowledge, indicating that no specialized expertise was required to evaluate the defendant’s conduct in this instance.

The court references several precedents establishing that certain medical malpractice claims fall within common knowledge, thereby not requiring expert testimony. In Green v. Lilliewood, it was determined that the ineffectiveness of certain birth control methods is common knowledge. Similarly, in Thomas v. Dootson, the court ruled that a claim regarding a surgical drill burning skin did not necessitate expert testimony, as it was within lay understanding. In Hickman v. Sexton Dental Clinic, the jury was able to infer a breach of duty from the patient’s testimony without expert input. 

Consequently, the court concludes that Brouwer did not need to file an expert witness affidavit with her Notice of Intent (NOI) to satisfy pre-litigation requirements under section 15-79-125(A). The NOI was sufficient, and the statute of limitations was tolled during the appeal, keeping her lawsuit viable. The court overruled previous decisions and affirmed that Brouwer could invoke the common-knowledge exception in her filings. The circuit court's dismissal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Justice Pleicones dissents, suggesting the circuit court's dismissal should be upheld based on his previous dissent in Ranucci v. Crain.