United States v. Brandon Burgess

Citations: 759 F.3d 708; 2014 WL 3519090; 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13774Docket: 13-3571

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; July 17, 2014; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Brandon Burgess was indicted for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He sought to suppress evidence of the firearm, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop of the vehicle in which he was a passenger. The district court denied his motion, and Burgess appealed following a conditional guilty plea. 

The relevant events occurred late on a Sunday night in October 2011, shortly after multiple 911 calls reported gunshots in a Chicago neighborhood. Police were dispatched to investigate, and within two minutes, received a report of shots coming from a black car traveling south. Officers, responding to the call, stopped a black car after making a U-turn, approximately a mile from the initial gunfire reports. A revolver was found on Burgess's seat, with five rounds spent. 

During the suppression hearing, the district court reviewed police testimony and recorded dispatches. Officers claimed familiarity with Burgess and the driver as gang members and noted Burgess's furtive movements. However, inconsistencies in their testimony led the judge to reject some of their assertions. Despite these discrepancies, the court concluded that the totality of circumstances—including the timing and location of the stop, along with the nature of the reported crime—provided reasonable suspicion justifying the stop, thereby denying the motion to suppress the evidence.

Burgess does not dispute the district court’s findings regarding the officers' knowledge before the stop but argues that this knowledge was insufficient for reasonable suspicion. This legal issue is reviewed de novo. His first argument is that the officers did not witness the shooting and questioned the reliability of hearsay from the dispatcher. This argument is dismissed, as multiple independent 911 callers reported shots fired in the same vicinity, providing corroboration that surpasses the reliance on a single anonymous tip.

Burgess's second argument posits that the officers acted solely on a hunch based on the color of his car, which he contends was insufficient given the prevalence of black cars in Chicago and the direction of travel inconsistent with the shooter’s reported movements. He likens his situation to United States v. Bohman, where a stop was deemed unreasonable due to a lack of specific suspicion beyond general proximity to drug activity. However, the officers had more than mere proximity; they were responding to a dangerous situation, as multiple callers had reported gunfire in the area, creating heightened suspicion of ongoing serious crime.

The evaluation of reasonableness considers the totality of circumstances. The apparent danger faced by officers and the public allows for lower thresholds of suspicion, drawing parallels to United States v. Brewer, where a stop was deemed reasonable due to the immediate threat following a shooting. In contrast to Bohman, the ongoing threat, specific reports linking a black car to the shooting near Karlov and Wabansia, and the close temporal proximity of the reports supported the officers' decision to stop Burgess’s vehicle.

Officers observed a black car traveling away from the area shortly after reports of gunfire, approximately one mile from the incident location. Given the late-night light traffic, the presence of this vehicle raised suspicions that it may be connected to the shooting. The car's opposite direction did not diminish these suspicions, as it is plausible for a shooter to flee in a different direction post-incident. The combination of the violent nature of the crime, the brief time elapsed since the shots were fired, the proximity of the vehicle to the reported incident, and the vehicle's color justified the stop. The officers acted reasonably to prevent the potential loss of an opportunity for investigation, as the standard for reasonable suspicion does not require certainty. Thus, the stop of the vehicle was deemed appropriate for further inquiry. AFFIRMED.