State v. Young

Citation: 2014 Ohio 1715Docket: 26725

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; April 23, 2014; Ohio; State Appellate Court

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Steven Young appeals his convictions from the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, which include aggravated burglary, safecracking, two counts of aggravated robbery, and additional charges for having a weapon while under disability, participating in a criminal gang, and two counts of kidnapping. The jury found him guilty on all counts, resulting in a 22-year prison sentence. 

The case arose from a robbery on April 9, 2012, where Tocarra Varner and Tyeshia Shellman were present when two men entered Varner's home. Varner recognized one of the robbers as Anthony Shellman, Tyeshia’s brother, while the other man was unidentified at the time. Following the incident, Varner identified Young as the second robber based on a Facebook picture after being informed of his potential involvement by an acquaintance. 

Young's appeal includes four assignments of error, with a specific challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the criminal gang charge and claims that the convictions overall are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court reviews the sufficiency of evidence de novo, determining if the evidence, when viewed favorably to the prosecution, could convince a rational juror of Young’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Mr. Young contends that the State did not provide adequate evidence for the jury to conclude that he participated in a criminal gang under R.C. 2923.42. This statute prohibits active participation in a criminal gang with knowledge of its criminal activities, which includes promoting or engaging in criminal conduct as defined in R.C. 2923.41. The definition of "criminal conduct" encompasses various offenses, including felonies and violent crimes. Notably, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and kidnapping are classified as violent offenses under R.C. 2901.01.

Testimony from Ms. Varner indicates that on April 9, 2012, she lent $25 to Ms. Shellman, who later returned to smoke marijuana. During this visit, Ms. Varner observed Ms. Shellman unlocking the side door to her home. Subsequently, two men entered, one of whom was partially masked. Ms. Varner identified one man as Mr. Shellman, who brandished a gun and forced her boyfriend, Mr. Moore, to open a safe, while the other man, whom Ms. Varner later recognized as Mr. Young, restrained her and her children.

After the incident, Ms. Varner’s son called 911, leading to a police investigation. Initially, she could only identify Mr. Shellman, but later recognized Mr. Young via Facebook. Ms. Shellman corroborated that she had visited Ms. Varner's home twice that day, first to borrow money and then to smoke marijuana, and she observed Mr. Young entering the house and ordering them to lie down.

Ms. Shellman observed her brother, Mr. Shellman, descending the stairs with Ms. Varner's children while armed with a gun. Mr. Shellman subsequently forced Mr. Moore into a bedroom after retrieving him from the bathroom, during which Ms. Shellman exited. On April 9, 2012, Ms. Shellman received a Facebook message from Mr. Young, which she interpreted as an apology related to the robbery at Ms. Varner's house. On April 11, she received texts from Mr. Young inquiring about how Ms. Varner had learned his name.

Mr. Shellman testified that he had previously offered Mr. Young a ride, and they conspired to rob Mr. Moore due to his drug dealings. Mr. Shellman stated they agreed Mr. Young would bring a gun, but he took it to prevent violence. During the robbery, Mr. Moore disclosed he had money and drugs, leading Mr. Shellman to find $500 and various drugs in Mr. Moore's pants. After the robbery, they divided the loot. Mr. Shellman later claimed Mr. Young wanted him to assume full responsibility for the crime as Mr. Young had recently been released from prison.

Detective Garro investigated the robbery and subpoenaed Mr. Young's phone records, confirming they were registered to him. Officer Criss provided testimony on gang dynamics in Akron, specifically regarding the Bloodline gang, which Ms. Shellman and Mr. Shellman identified Mr. Young as a member. Mr. Shellman acknowledged his affiliation with the South Bronx Gangsters, asserting it was not a criminal gang, a claim contradicted by Officer Criss, who characterized it as an umbrella gang. Following the robbery, Mr. Young changed his Facebook profile picture to one featuring money on a red bandanna, further implicating his gang association.

Mr. Young acknowledges sufficient evidence for the jury to determine his membership in the Bloodline gang and awareness of its criminal activities but contests his conviction for participating in a criminal gang under R.C. 2923.42(A). He argues he did not assist any fellow gang member in criminal conduct, claiming a lack of evidence regarding Mr. Shellman and Ms. Shellman's gang affiliation. However, Mr. Shellman's testimony indicated that he committed robbery with Mr. Young's assistance while being a member of the South Bronx Gangsters, which is affiliated with the Bloodline gang. Furthermore, the statute includes a provision that gang members cannot engage in criminal conduct, a point Mr. Young does not contest regarding his involvement in aggravated robbery and kidnapping. Testimonies from multiple witnesses confirmed Mr. Young's participation in an armed robbery, providing sufficient evidence for his conviction under R.C. 2923.42(A).

Regarding the manifest weight of the evidence, Mr. Young's defense involved denying involvement in the robbery and asserting he had been with others later that day. He claimed a Facebook message he sent referred to an argument and expressed surprise at being wanted for robbery. He admitted failing to turn himself in after becoming aware of his wanted status. The appellate court must weigh all evidence and witness credibility to determine if the jury's decision was a miscarriage of justice, but Mr. Young's conflicting statements and the testimonies presented suggest the jury acted within its discretion.

Micah Mosley testified for the defense, stating that while incarcerated with Mr. Shellman, Shellman admitted Mr. Young was not involved in the robbery but planned to implicate him to potentially reduce his own prison sentence. In contrast, Ms. Varner and the Shellmans testified that Mr. Young was indeed the second robber. Mr. Young argues this testimony should be disregarded due to Ms. Varner's background as a drug dealer and the Shellmans' plea deals. However, the jury had access to this information and was able to assess the credibility of the witnesses. The State also introduced phone records indicating Mr. Young texted Ms. Shellman about the robbery, further supporting her testimony. The court concluded the jury did not err in finding Mr. Young guilty, as their decision to credit the State’s witnesses over the defense was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Young claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his attorney failed to move to suppress Ms. Varner’s identification of him and did not present a closing argument. For such a claim to succeed, a defendant must demonstrate deficient performance by counsel and show that this performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial, referencing the standards set in Strickland v. Washington.

Mr. Young claims his trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress Ms. Varner's identification of him, arguing it was suggestive. However, he fails to show how this alleged deficiency impacted the trial's outcome, as required by App.R. 16(A)(7). Both Mr. and Ms. Shellman identified Mr. Young as a participant in the robbery, and evidence such as text messages from his Facebook account and phone records further implicated him. Consequently, even if counsel was deficient, there is no reasonable probability that this affected the trial's result.

Additionally, Mr. Young argues his counsel was ineffective for not making a closing argument, which is acknowledged as a troubling omission. While closing arguments are vital for pleading a case, the absence of one does not equate to a reasonable probability of affecting the trial's outcome, especially given the substantial evidence against Mr. Young. Multiple witnesses testified against him, and his own testimony did not convince the jury. The court emphasizes that the absence of a closing argument does not automatically imply ineffective assistance, particularly in light of the strong evidence presented. Therefore, Mr. Young's first assignment of error is overruled. 

Furthermore, he raises a separate assignment of error regarding the admission of gun evidence and expert testimony, claiming it constituted plain error that caused substantial prejudice and denied him due process.

Mr. Young contends that the trial court incorrectly allowed the State to introduce evidence of firearms found during his arrest and that Officer Criss's expert testimony on gangs was improperly admitted due to lack of qualifications and an expert report. The court typically reviews evidence admission for abuse of discretion but, due to Mr. Young's failure to object to the testimony, it assesses for plain error. To establish plain error, there must be an obvious deviation from legal standards that affected substantial rights and the trial's outcome. The court emphasizes that plain error should be recognized only in exceptional circumstances to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

Officer Criss provided extensive testimony on gang activities, particularly in Akron. However, Mr. Young did not articulate how any errors in admitting this testimony impacted the trial's outcome. Consequently, the court found no plain error since he failed to demonstrate that any alleged errors affected substantial rights.

Regarding the firearms, although their relevance was questionable—given Mr. Young's arrest at a residence associated with Richard Martin, who had no clear gang affiliations—the trial court admitted the guns as evidence related to the Bloodline gang's current status. Even if the firearms were improperly admitted, the court determined that the error did not affect Mr. Young's substantial rights, as he had previously acknowledged his involvement with the Bloodline gang and had been implicated in a robbery through witness testimony and text messages. Therefore, the court overruled Mr. Young's third assignment of error.

In his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Young argues that the imposition of multiple and consecutive prison terms violated due process and double jeopardy protections; however, the State did not address this part of his argument.

Mr. Young contends that all his convictions should merge, asserting that the trial court improperly ordered some sentences to be served consecutively and wrongfully considered a post-trial letter when imposing its sentence. He argues that the trial court applied a "bright line" rule regarding multiple victims, leading to a misclassification of offenses as non-mergable. However, the review of this issue is de novo, and Mr. Young failed to provide sufficient argument against the trial court's decision not to merge certain offenses, which is his burden to demonstrate under R.C. 2941.25.

Regarding gang specifications, Mr. Young claims that the trial court could not impose a prison sentence for the gang specification associated with kidnapping since all convictions should merge. However, since he has not proven that his offenses should merge, this argument is not addressed further due to being outside the stated assignment of error.

On firearm specifications, Mr. Young argues against the trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences for aggravated robbery, referencing R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b), which prohibits multiple prison terms for felonies from the same transaction. Nonetheless, R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) mandates consecutive terms when specific serious felonies are involved, which applies to his case. Mr. Young did not articulate reasons why R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g) should not apply. Therefore, his arguments concerning the firearm specifications are deemed without merit.

Mr. Young's arguments are twofold regarding his sentencing: first, he contends that the trial court improperly considered a letter submitted by the State; second, he asserts that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated during the sentencing hearing. The letter, discovered in a vehicle owned by an Akron University Safety Officer, was sent by Mr. Young from jail and detailed his request for the letter's recipient to provide false alibi testimony on his behalf during the trial. 

Under R.C. 2929.19, the trial court has broad discretion to consider relevant information when imposing a sentence, allowing both the state and the defendant to present such information in a less formal manner than an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Young's counsel did not object to the letter's consideration, nor did he cite legal authority to support his claim that its inclusion led to an unlawful sentence. 

Regarding the Fifth Amendment claim, the court found it unmeritorious, noting that Mr. Young failed to clarify how his rights were engaged, as he was not compelled to discuss the letter. Finally, Mr. Young challenges the imposition of consecutive sentences, invoking the standard set forth in State v. Kalish, which requires an examination of the trial court's compliance with relevant rules and statutes before applying an abuse-of-discretion review.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) allows a court to impose consecutive prison sentences for multiple offenses if it determines that such sentences are necessary to protect the public or to adequately punish the offender, provided that they are proportional to the severity of the offenses. The court must find one or more of the following: (a) the offender committed offenses while awaiting trial, under sanctions, or under post-release control; (b) at least two offenses were part of a course of conduct causing significant harm; or (c) the offender's criminal history necessitates consecutive sentences for public safety. While trial courts are not required to provide detailed reasoning for their findings, they must document these findings on the record during sentencing. In Mr. Young's case, he does not contest the court's findings but argues for more detailed reasoning, which is not mandated. Therefore, the court's decision to impose consecutive sentences was upheld, and all of Mr. Young’s assignments of error were overruled, affirming the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. Costs were assessed to the appellant, and the court issued a mandate for execution of the judgment.