State v. Hough

Citation: 2013 Ohio 1543Docket: 98480, 98482

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; April 18, 2013; Ohio; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Terrance Hough, the defendant-appellant, appealed the trial court's denial of his motions for a new trial and to correct his sentence. Hough contended that the original trial judge exhibited bias against him and asserted that his aggravated murder and attempted murder convictions should merge due to a mass murder specification. The case originated from a 2007 indictment for three counts of aggravated murder and two counts of attempted murder, resulting from Hough shooting at a group of young adults, killing three and injuring two. 

After a jury trial, Hough was convicted on all counts in 2008, receiving a life sentence without parole for each aggravated murder count, ten years for each attempted murder count, and three years for firearm specifications, all to run consecutively. His initial appeal raised issues regarding the sufficiency of evidence for the convictions and the admission of certain evidence, but it was affirmed by the court. Hough's subsequent attempts to reopen his appeal and seek postconviction relief were denied, with the Ohio Supreme Court declining to accept jurisdiction on those matters.

Hough later filed an affidavit of disqualification against Judge Saffold, citing online comments about his case made from her email account on the day she delivered his sentence. Despite these claims, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that Hough did not demonstrate sufficient grounds for a new trial or for the merger of his convictions.

On October 10, 2011, the Ohio Supreme Court granted Hough's affidavit of disqualification, finding he established an appearance of impropriety, and reassigned his case from Judge Saffold to Judge Carolyn Friedland. Hough's affidavit cited online comments made on cleveland.com, linked to Judge Saffold's personal email, on the same day she imposed Hough's sentence. While Judge Saffold claimed her daughter posted the comments without her knowledge, the court noted that the origin of the comments from her email account warranted disqualification based on precedents of similar cases. The court emphasized that the timing of the comments, which occurred after Hough's sentencing and while his postconviction proceedings were pending, did not mitigate the appearance of impropriety. Subsequently, Hough filed motions for a new trial and to correct his sentence, which were ruled on by Judge Friedland, resulting in denials of both motions on May 10, 2012. Hough appealed these decisions, raising three assignments of error: denial of due process due to judicial bias, abuse of discretion in denying the new trial, and error in denying the motion to correct the sentence.

Hough's first assignment of error presents a due process argument regarding the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial, alleging that judicial bias from Judge Saffold compromised the fairness of his trial. He cites three main points: 

1. The Ohio Supreme Court's removal of Judge Saffold from further postconviction proceedings was due to her online comments indicating bias favoring the death penalty for Hough. 
2. Judge Saffold denied Hough’s Crim. R. 29 motion concerning “prior calculation and design” based on her personal bias towards imposing the death penalty. 
3. An unreasonable cap on expert fees set by Judge Saffold was purportedly aimed at achieving a guilty verdict.

Due process mandates that a criminal defendant be tried before an impartial judge, and evidence of judicial bias warrants a new trial. Judicial bias is characterized by a hostile disposition or undue favoritism that prevents fair judgment. Merely forming an opinion based on case facts does not constitute bias unless it reflects deep-seated favoritism or antagonism. Critical remarks made by a judge during trial typically do not indicate bias unless they stem from external sources or exhibit extreme partiality.

The state incorrectly argues that Hough’s due process claim falls under Crim. R. 33, but Hough distinguishes between a constitutional due process argument and one based on the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus warranting separate analyses.

Hough's first allegation of bias involves a comment from Judge Saffold's court-issued email account, made on the day of Hough’s sentencing, which criticized the jury's leniency towards a white defendant compared to a hypothetical harsher treatment of a black defendant. This comment was publicized much later, leading to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision to remove Judge Saffold from postconviction proceedings.

Hough claims that a comment made by Judge Saffold demonstrates her bias in favor of imposing the death penalty on him, arguing that it is unprofessional and inappropriate, especially as it suggests that Hough received leniency due to his race. Judge Saffold denies responsibility for the comment, attributing it to her daughter. The Ohio Supreme Court did not resolve this issue. Although the comment is deemed inappropriate, it does not warrant vacating Hough’s conviction since he was sentenced to life in accordance with the jury’s recommendation, not death. The timing of the comment, being post-sentencing, is relevant; Hough misinterprets the Ohio Supreme Court’s statement regarding the comment's timing, which actually pertains to future proceedings and does not impact the integrity of the trial itself.

The decision emphasizes that claims of judicial bias do not necessarily require a harmless-error analysis, as indicated in a related case (Dean), where bias led to a required retrial despite evidence against the defendant. However, in Hough's situation, Judge Saffold's adherence to the jury's life sentence recommendation suggests a lack of bias that would undermine the trial's fairness. Furthermore, Hough's assertion that Judge Saffold's denial of his Crim. R. 29 motion reflected bias is unsubstantiated due to his failure to provide a necessary trial transcript for review, which is a prerequisite for evaluating such claims. Thus, the court cannot assess this argument due to the absence of the transcript.

Judge Saffold granted all of Hough’s motions for expert assistance, including for a mitigation expert, forensic toxicologist, neuropsychologist, firearms expert, investigator, psychiatrist, and clinical psychologist, applying the court’s standard fee schedule. Although Hough contends the fees were unreasonable, the judge's actions align with standard practices, indicating no bias. Consequently, the court found no judicial bias affecting Hough's trial and overruled his first assignment of error.

In his second assignment of error, Hough claimed the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial under Crim. R. 33, citing newly discovered evidence of bias from Judge Saffold's online comment. The court upheld the denial, affirming that a new trial requires clear evidence of prejudice or unfair trial conditions, which Hough did not demonstrate. 

Crim. R. 33 states that a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must be filed within 120 days of the verdict. Hough's motion, based on the online comment and other decisions by Judge Saffold, was filed well past this deadline. Because Hough did not seek court permission to file his motion beyond the 120-day limit, the court found that the motion was improperly filed.

Hough's motion for a new trial was found to lack merit, even if it had been properly sought and granted. To succeed, Hough needed to demonstrate that newly discovered evidence met several criteria, including a strong probability of changing the trial outcome, being discovered post-trial, and not being merely cumulative or impeaching prior evidence. The court concluded that Hough's evidence of judicial bias did not show a strong probability of a different outcome, as there was no indication of an unfair trial by Judge Saffold, despite her dissatisfaction with the jury's decision. Additionally, the court found no evidence of bias regarding expert fee caps, affirming that the trial court followed its standard fee schedule.

Regarding Hough's claim about merging sentences for aggravated murder and attempted murder, the court ruled that his motion was barred by res judicata, as he failed to raise this issue on direct appeal. The doctrine of res judicata prevents relitigation of issues that were or could have been previously raised. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, ordering costs against Hough and finding reasonable grounds for the appeal. A special mandate was also issued to enforce the judgment.