Brown v. Carlton Harley-Davidson, Inc.

Citation: 2013 Ohio 4047Docket: 99761

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; September 19, 2013; Ohio; State Appellate Court

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In Brown v. Carlton Harley-Davidson, Inc., the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed and remanded a judgment from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas regarding a civil case involving multiple complaints filed by plaintiffs Bruce Andrew Brown and B. Andrew Brown, Associates, L.L.C. against defendants Carlton Harley-Davidson, Inc. and Jane Carlton. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants improperly sold a 2008 Harley-Davidson motorcycle, transferring the sale proceeds to Brown's former wife, Suzanne Charlton, instead of the legal owner, B. Andrew Brown, Associates, L.L.C.

The case history includes three overlapping complaints filed by the plaintiffs, with the first leading to a motion for summary judgment by the defendants based on res judicata, which was initially granted but later reversed by the appellate court. The appellate court found that res judicata did not apply and that there were unresolved factual issues regarding the authority of Brown's former wife to sell the motorcycle under a power of attorney.

While the first case was pending appeal, the plaintiffs filed a second complaint alleging similar claims, which resulted in the cases being consolidated. Ultimately, the trial court dismissed the claims brought by Brown in his personal capacity for lack of standing, and the jury found in favor of the defendants in the remaining claims by B. Andrew Brown, Associates, L.L.C. The appellate court's decision to reverse the trial court's judgment underscores the complexities in the procedural handling of the overlapping lawsuits and the implications of standing in civil claims.

On April 19, 2012, appellees filed a third complaint (Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-780833) in common pleas court, reiterating claims from previous complaints related to the same transaction. Appellants counterclaimed, seeking to label appellees as vexatious litigators and to recover attorney fees. Appellees moved to dismiss this counterclaim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), arguing it lacked a cognizable claim. While this motion was pending, appellants sought partial judgment on the pleadings, asserting that Brown did not have standing in the third complaint. On August 31, 2012, the court granted this motion, dismissing all claims by Brown personally, leaving only those from B. Andrew Brown, Associates, L.L.C., which were later voluntarily dismissed by that entity on September 17, 2012.

On March 20, 2013, the trial court granted appellees' motion to dismiss appellants' counterclaim due to failure to meet the statutory requirements of R.C. 2323.52, dismissing it with prejudice. Appellants appealed, claiming reversible error in the dismissal of their counterclaim. They contended that they had sufficiently pled their case for vexatious litigation under Ohio law. The appellate court's review of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal is de novo, with the presumption that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and that any reasonable inferences favor the nonmoving party. To grant such a motion, it must be clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts supporting their claim that would entitle them to relief. The vexatious litigator statute under R.C. 2323.52 enables individuals subjected to persistent vexatious conduct to seek a declaration against the alleged vexatious litigators in common pleas court.

A court must determine that a person has engaged in vexatious conduct habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds before designating them a vexatious litigator. Vexatious conduct is defined as actions intended to harass, lacking legal basis, or solely for delay. The statute aims to prevent abuse of the judicial system, which burdens courts and wastes taxpayer resources. Upon review, the court found that the trial court improperly dismissed the appellants’ counterclaim under Civ. R. 12(B)(6), which alleged a basis for vexatious litigation stemming from multiple overlapping lawsuits initiated by the appellees since April 2010. The appellants detailed that the appellees filed successive complaints while the initial complaint was unresolved and after dismissals for lack of standing. The counterclaim asserted that the appellees engaged in vexatious conduct aimed at harassing the appellants, which caused significant emotional distress and required costly legal defense. Additional examples of vexatious conduct against unrelated parties were noted but deemed irrelevant to the specific analysis of the appellants' claims.

Appellants' allegations are accepted as true, leading to the conclusion that their counterclaim presents facts that could support a ruling in their favor. The complaint establishes the elements of a vexatious litigator under R.C. 2323.52, citing appellees' repeated and allegedly unwarranted complaints against appellants. The court finds the complaint sufficient to withstand a Civ. R. 12(B)(6) motion, emphasizing that they must presume the truth of all alleged facts without commenting on the merits of the counterclaim itself. The court sustains the appellants' assignment of error, reverses the trial court's judgment, and remands the case for further proceedings on the substantive merits of the vexatious litigation claim. Appellants are awarded costs, and the court mandates the common pleas court to execute this judgment, with a certified copy serving as the mandate.