State v. Yeager

Citation: 2010 Ohio 3162Docket: 10 CA 866

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals; June 28, 2010; Ohio; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Ann Yeager, the defendant-appellant, appeals her conviction for failing to stop at a stop sign, violating R.C. 4511.43(A), a minor misdemeanor. Yeager argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded she was required to stop at the stop sign, asserting that discretion should be allowed when no traffic is present. However, the court determines that R.C. 4511.43(A) mandates a complete stop at a stop sign without discretion, as indicated by the statutory language. 

The incident occurred on December 1, 2009, when Yeager was cited for not stopping at a stop sign on Bacon Road at its intersection with State Route 43. Patrolman Robert Grubb testified that Yeager did not stop and turned right onto State Route 43 at approximately 10 miles per hour. Yeager admitted to not stopping, arguing she exercised due care and that drivers are allowed to turn right on red, implying a similar allowance should apply to stop signs when traffic is absent. The court found her guilty, emphasizing that the statute's use of "shall" indicates no discretion is permitted. Yeager was fined $50, which was suspended pending appeal.

Yeager's primary contention on appeal is that the trial court failed to recognize her due care in the situation. The state maintains that R.C. 4511.43(A) does not allow for such discretion. The appellate court will review this matter de novo, meaning it will interpret the statute without deferring to the trial court's conclusions. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Yeager argues for changing the standard of review from "abuse of discretion" to "Failure to Consider." Under abuse of discretion, a trial court's decision is upheld unless deemed arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. However, the court clarifies it is applying a de novo standard of review, which does not afford deference to the trial court's interpretation of the statute, thus disregarding Yeager's arguments on abuse of discretion. 

The relevant statute, R.C. 4511.43(A), mandates that drivers must stop at a clearly marked stop line or, lacking one, before entering the crosswalk, or at the nearest point where they can view oncoming traffic. The Ohio Supreme Court has established that such stop requirements are specific and mandatory, as demonstrated in a case involving failing brakes, which was not deemed a valid excuse for not stopping. The language in R.C. 4511.43(A) uses "shall stop," which is interpreted as mandatory under statutory rules of construction. There is no indication of legislative intent to interpret "shall" as permissive. While section A allows some discretion on where to stop, it does not permit discretion regarding the obligation to stop at a stop sign. 

Section B of R.C. 4511.43 addresses yield signs and distinguishes between mandatory and discretionary actions, reinforcing that the requirement to stop at a stop sign is non-negotiable. If "shall stop" were interpreted as permissive, it would render stop signs equivalent to yield signs, undermining the legislative intent.

R.C. 4511.43 mandates that vehicles must stop at stop signs, with the term "shall" interpreted as mandatory. The Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (OMUTCD) reinforces this by stating that a STOP sign requires traffic to stop, and although OMUTCD is not legally binding, R.C. 4511.09 mandates its adoption by the Ohio Department of Transportation, making it persuasive authority. Yeager’s argument that R.C. Chapter 4511 allows driver discretion is acknowledged; however, the specific statute regarding stop signs does not include such language, indicating that discretion is not applicable. Yeager's comparison of stop signs to turning right on red is dismissed, as R.C. 4511.13(C)(2) requires a stop at a red light before turning, further supporting the lack of discretion at stop signs. Evidence Yeager sought to admit, showing no traffic was present, was deemed irrelevant since the law does not permit discretion in stopping at a stop sign. Yeager cited various cases to support her position, but they lack binding authority and do not affect the applicability of Ohio law. The court determined that R.C. 4511.43(A) does not allow for discretion in stopping at stop signs, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's judgment finding Yeager guilty. Waite, J. and DeGenaro, J. concurred in the decision.