Dean Kenneth Rockmore v. State of Florida

Citations: 140 So. 3d 979; 39 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 372; 2014 WL 2516361; 2014 Fla. LEXIS 1807Docket: SC12-577

Court: Supreme Court of Florida; June 5, 2014; Florida; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Dean Kenneth Rockmore petitions the Supreme Court of Florida for review of a Fifth District Court of Appeal decision that conflicts with a Second District decision regarding the necessity of a special jury instruction in a robbery case. The conflict arises from differing interpretations of whether Rockmore abandoned stolen property before allegedly threatening a loss prevention agent with a firearm, which is central to his defense against the robbery charge.

The State charged Rockmore with robbery with a firearm after he was observed stealing merchandise from Walmart. During the chase initiated by the loss prevention agent, Stephen Arnold, the two provided conflicting accounts of the events. Arnold testified that Rockmore displayed a gun and threatened him, prompting Arnold to retreat. Rockmore, on the other hand, claimed he abandoned the stolen items and did not threaten Arnold, asserting that he was not armed.

The trial court denied Rockmore's motion for judgment of acquittal, which argued that his abandonment of the merchandise negated the continuity of actions required for a robbery conviction. The Supreme Court of Florida ultimately affirms the Fifth District's decision, upholding Rockmore's conviction based on the presented evidence and the interpretation of the law regarding robbery.

Rockmore requested a special jury instruction on abandonment regarding his robbery charge, referencing a precedent set by the Second District in Peterson. The Peterson case allowed for a defense if the stolen property was abandoned before any force was used. The trial court granted Rockmore's request but modified the instruction to require that the abandonment be voluntary and that the victim was aware of it. The jury, following this modified instruction, convicted Rockmore of robbery with a firearm, leading to a life sentence due to his status as a prison releasee reoffender. On appeal, the Fifth District affirmed the conviction, rejecting Rockmore's arguments about the trial court's modification of the jury instruction and the denial of his acquittal motion. The Fifth District's decision conflicted with Peterson's interpretation of the necessity for a special instruction on abandonment. To address Rockmore's claims, the document outlines Florida's robbery statute and the evolution of the legal standards regarding the use of force in robbery, highlighting that prior to 1987, robbery required that force must occur before or simultaneously with the taking of property. The 1987 amendment expanded the definition of robbery to include force used in fleeing after the taking.

Robbery, as defined by Florida law, involves the unlawful taking of money or property from another person, with the intent to deprive them of it, while employing force, violence, or fear. The statute specifies that acts related to the taking can occur before, during, or after the act itself, as long as they form a continuous sequence. If a defendant uses force after abandoning stolen property, they may not be convicted of robbery, as the taking and use of force must form a continuous series of events. This principle was illustrated in State v. Baker, where the defendant abandoned stolen goods before using force to flee, leading to the dismissal of the robbery charge. Similarly, in Simmons v. State, the defendant's conviction was overturned because the force used was not related to the taking of the property. Other cases, including Kimbrough v. State and Garcia v. State, reinforced this standard by concluding that the defendants abandoned the property prior to using force, thus lacking the necessary connection between the taking and the force required for a robbery conviction. Additionally, the robbery statute enhances penalties if a firearm is carried during the commission of the robbery.

The Second District ruled that a defendant cannot be convicted of robbery if the security guard was not placed in fear during a continuous series of acts related to the theft. In cases like Peterson, it was determined that when facts are disputed regarding the abandonment of stolen property before using force, a special jury instruction is necessary to clarify that if property was abandoned before force was used, these actions do not constitute a continuous series. However, the Fifth District disagreed with the need for such instructions in Rockmore's case. Rockmore argued that the abandonment defense applied to him, claiming his threat to Arnold with a firearm was too remote from the theft to qualify as robbery. Alternatively, he sought a new trial, asserting that the trial court wrongly modified his special instruction to require the victim's awareness of the abandonment, which he argued was a harmful error. 

The court reviewed both issues de novo and concluded that Rockmore was not entitled to relief. Sufficient evidence supported his conviction for robbery with a firearm, as the victim testified that Rockmore threatened him with a gun while fleeing with stolen items. Despite Rockmore's differing account, the victim's testimony constituted competent evidence for the jury's conclusion. Regarding the modified jury instruction, the court noted that defendants must demonstrate that a special instruction is supported by evidence. Rockmore failed to do so, as he admitted to fleeing with the stolen goods, unlike the situation in Peterson, where the defendant left the property behind. The incident with the victim occurred during the chase, and thus, Rockmore's actions were deemed a continuous series under Florida's robbery statute, negating the applicability of the abandonment defense.

Abandonment of property as a defense in robbery cases requires evidence that the thief abandoned the property, severing the connection between the theft and any subsequent use of force. Case law examples include Peterson, where a defendant argued he abandoned stolen goods inside a store; Garcia, where a defendant left stolen items behind when fleeing from security; Simmons, where a shoplifter's use of force followed an attempt to return stolen goods; and Baker, whose robbery charge was dismissed after he placed stolen goods on the ground without attempting to flee. In Lemus, the court determined that the jury should assess whether the defendant's actions constituted continuous acts related to robbery. In Rockmore's case, evidence did not support the abandonment defense, and the trial court's erroneous instruction on abandonment was deemed harmless as it benefited the defendant. The court affirmed Rockmore's conviction, stating the abandonment defense is not applicable to his case, leaving its potential application to future cases. Justices Lewis, Quince, and Perry concurred, while Chief Justice Polston partially concurred and dissented, arguing that a new trial is warranted due to the erroneous jury instruction. Polston highlighted that the majority's analysis disregarded Rockmore's testimony, which suggested he abandoned the stolen items during the pursuit.

Rockmore was entitled to assert an abandonment defense against his robbery charge, arguing that abandoning the stolen property severed the link between the theft and the required use of force under Florida's robbery statute (Fla. Stat. 812.13(1), 3(b)). Case law, including Peterson v. State and Garcia v. State, supports this defense, indicating that abandoning property before using force negates the robbery charge. The trial court instructed the jury that Rockmore could be found not guilty if he took the merchandise without using force and fully abandoned it prior to any forceful action. However, the court added a requirement that the victim must be aware of the abandonment, which Rockmore objected to. This modification was deemed erroneous, as no precedent conditions the abandonment defense on victim awareness. The appellate court must assess whether this error was harmless, placing the burden on the state to demonstrate that the error did not influence the verdict or that there was no reasonable possibility it affected the conviction. The evaluation involves a thorough review of the record and the evidence available to the jury.

The trial court's error in providing a legally inaccurate jury instruction on the defense of abandonment was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, directly impacting Rockmore's conviction for robbery with a firearm. A reasonable juror could have found that Rockmore abandoned the stolen property before threatening the victim, especially given the circumstances of the chase occurring at night across several parking lots. The victim's belief that Rockmore still possessed the stolen items does not negate the possibility that a juror could have reasonable doubt regarding this matter. The erroneous jury instruction likely influenced the juror to convict Rockmore of robbery instead of a lesser offense, such as aggravated assault with a firearm. 

Rockmore, serving a life sentence for this conviction, presented evidence of abandonment during his defense, which warranted a legally accurate special jury instruction on this defense as per Florida law. The majority's conclusion, which disregarded Rockmore's evidence and relied solely on the State's account, was flawed. The conflicting testimonies necessitated an accurate instruction on abandonment so the jury could properly evaluate the defense. The trial court's modification of the jury instruction, which incorrectly added a victim awareness requirement not recognized in Florida law, further compounded this error. Therefore, Rockmore is entitled to a new trial, as the trial court's error in jury instruction was not harmless.

Approval of the Second District’s decision in Peterson is warranted as it established that a special jury instruction on abandonment is necessary when a defendant presents evidence supporting abandonment as a defense to robbery. The trial court's denial of the defense's motion for acquittal is concurred with, yet the majority’s failure to resolve the conflict regarding the need for a special instruction on abandonment leaves ambiguity for future cases. The majority distinguishes the facts of the current case from Peterson, suggesting that trial courts must determine the appropriateness of a special instruction based on specific circumstances. However, the trial court had found that such a special instruction was warranted based on the evidence. The majority incorrectly concluded that abandonment had no application in Rockmore’s case despite acknowledging disputed facts regarding whether his actions constituted robbery. Rockmore's defense included testimony that he abandoned the stolen property before any threats were made, highlighting the need for a legally accurate jury instruction on abandonment. The Second District's rationale for requiring a special instruction is that the standard instruction inadequately addressed scenarios where abandonment occurred prior to the use of force, which is crucial for determining if the acts constituted a continuous series necessary for a robbery conviction. Under the robbery statute, the definition of “in the course of the taking” includes actions that are part of a continuous series with the taking of property, emphasizing the importance of properly instructing the jury on abandonment as a defense.

A defendant cannot be convicted of robbery if they abandon the property before using or threatening force. The standard jury instruction does not clarify that if a defendant abandons stolen property prior to any force, they have not committed robbery, as the taking and force must be a continuous series of actions. For a defendant to receive a special jury instruction, three criteria must be met: 1) the special instruction must be supported by evidence; 2) the standard instruction must inadequately cover the defense theory; and 3) the special instruction must be a correct and clear statement of the law. In this case, while it is agreed that two requirements were met regarding the special instruction on abandonment, the majority opinion claims that the third requirement was not satisfied based on a selective interpretation of the evidence, favoring the State's version. This interpretation overlooks the jury's role in resolving factual disputes, particularly when properly instructed on the law. The majority also fails to address the legal conflict regarding the necessity of the special instruction, as identified by the Fifth District Court of Appeal. The dissent argues for clarity in the law and supports the need for a special instruction when a defendant presents evidence of abandonment, as Rockmore did. His testimony warranted a special instruction because it indicated he abandoned the property before any force was threatened. Therefore, the trial court's modification of the instruction was misleading and legally inaccurate, justifying a new trial for Rockmore.

A new trial is warranted for Rockmore, whose life sentence for robbery was determined under the Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) statute, which mandates life imprisonment for certain felonies, including robbery with a firearm. The court suggests that the jury should have been properly instructed on the law regarding the defense of abandonment, which could impact the resolution of the conflicting evidence presented. If Rockmore had been convicted of lesser offenses, such as petit theft or resisting a merchant, the PRR statute would not have applied, allowing for a different sentencing outcome. Notably, if charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon instead, Rockmore would have faced only a five-year sentence, highlighting the significant disparity in potential prison time based on the specific charges. The document references the application for review and the parties involved in the case.