Catalina Foothills Unif. Sch. Distr. No. 16 v. La Paloma

Citation: Not availableDocket: 2 CA-CV 2011-0166

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; May 30, 2012; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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In an eminent-domain action, the Court of Appeals of Arizona dismissed La Paloma Property Owners Association, Inc. (LPPOA)'s appeal of a trial court's "Partial Judgment" from August 29, 2011, due to lack of jurisdiction. The Catalina Foothills Unified School District No. 16 sought to condemn an easement over Campo Abierto, a private drive owned by LPPOA, to facilitate access to a new early childhood learning center. The trial court initially dismissed the complaint, ruling the district lacked authority to condemn a private roadway but allowed an amendment to seek condemnation in fee simple, subject to a perpetual easement for LPPOA and other property owners.

In March 2008, the court granted the district immediate possession of the property while preserving LPPOA's access rights. LPPOA sought special-action relief, which was denied by the appellate court. During ongoing litigation, the district moved to exclude testimony from LPPOA’s expert on severance damages, and the trial court granted this motion, citing that the expert's assumptions were legally flawed. Subsequently, LPPOA proposed a partial judgment, which the trial court signed, asserting no just reason for delay, but failing to clarify the claims resolved. LPPOA filed a timely notice of appeal following this judgment.

Jurisdiction over the appeal must be independently assessed by the court, regardless of whether the parties raised the issue. LPPOA asserts jurisdiction based on A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) and Rule 54(b), or alternatively, under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(6) and Bilke v. State. A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) allows appeals from final judgments in superior court actions, with appeals generally permitted only from final judgments that resolve all claims and parties, in line with public policy against piecemeal litigation. Rule 54(b) permits appeals from judgments that dispose of fewer than all claims or parties if the trial court explicitly states there is no just reason for delay and directs entry of judgment. A Rule 54(b) determination is reviewed de novo, but certification does not confer jurisdiction if the judgment is not final. The order must completely dispose of at least one claim to be appealable. The examined “Partial Judgment” does not grant relief to either party and merely incorporates previous court orders, necessitating an analysis of those orders to determine if any are independently final and appealable.

The March 19, 2008, minute entry grants the district immediate possession of disputed property, but such an order is not directly appealable as it is not a final judgment, as established in Arizona case law (Rogers v. Salt River Project, Cordova v. City of Tucson, and Bailey v. Myers). A special action is the only available remedy against an order of immediate possession, which is not final as further proceedings are anticipated before a final judgment can be entered (A.R.S. § 12-1116(O)). Consequently, the court lacks jurisdiction to review the order or its findings, regardless of any Rule 54(b) certification by the trial court.

In a July 2011 minute entry, the trial court found that the district could acquire the property in fee simple and grant an easement to LPPOA, asserting this would not substitute for monetary compensation required by Arizona's constitution. These findings do not resolve any claims and the minute entry is not a final judgment.

In August 2011, the court granted the district's motion in limine to exclude LPPOA's expert testimony on severance damages, as the expert's assumptions were based on the incorrect premise that the district could not convey an easement. The court determined that such testimony would not aid the fact-finder under Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 but allowed LPPOA to obtain a revised valuation. The court's ruling was deemed a pretrial, interlocutory order that does not dispose of any claims, thus it cannot be classified as a final judgment. Consequently, neither the judgment nor any incorporated orders are final, making the Rule 54(b) certification unnecessary, and the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(6) permits appeals from certain non-final judgments, allowing appeals from interlocutory judgments that define party rights and mandate further proceedings to ascertain damages. LPPOA asserts that jurisdiction exists due to a partial judgment that resolves all issues except damages, referencing Bilke v. State, which clarified that appeals under A.R.S. § 12-2101(G) can occur if a trial judge's order indicates a final determination of rights, with only the recovery amount pending. The court noted that the appealability hinges on the finality of the liability decision rather than the judgment's overall finality, and suggested that Rule 54(b) certification could confirm this finality.

The district concurs that jurisdiction is conferred by A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(6) and argues that Bilke implicitly overrules Cordova, which stated that orders of immediate possession are non-appealable under former A.R.S. § 12-2101(G). However, neither party addresses Rogers v. Salt River Project, which upheld Cordova’s ruling against appealability of immediate possession orders, indicating that appellate courts lack authority to permit such appeals before a final judgment. Despite Bilke being a more recent case, the court affirmed that Rogers remains controlling, as it explicitly addresses immediate possession orders, contrasting with Bilke's focus on summary judgment.

Ultimately, the court determined that neither the July nor August 2011 orders constitute final determinations of party rights sufficient to invoke A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(6), leading to a conclusion of lacking jurisdiction over the partial judgment as an interlocutory judgment. LPPOA's request for remand to rectify perceived technical deficiencies in the judgment was denied, as the court found the deficiencies to be substantive rather than merely technical.

Special-action jurisdiction may be assumed in cases where appellate jurisdiction is lacking, contingent on specific established factors. These include the availability of an adequate remedy by appeal and whether the case presents a significant legal question of statewide importance. Although both parties requested the court to assume special-action jurisdiction, they did not adequately demonstrate compliance with the required criteria. The court previously declined a special-action petition on the same issue four years prior, weighing heavily against the current request. Additionally, since review of the motion in limine can occur through an appeal from a final judgment, the court found no extraordinary circumstances to justify special-action jurisdiction. The issues raised did not demonstrate statewide importance and failed to warrant the exercise of such jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the case was remanded to the superior court for further proceedings.