MacKinney v. City of Tucson

Citations: 231 Ariz. 584; 299 P.3d 1282; 2013 WL 980013; 2013 Ariz. App. LEXIS 38Docket: 2 CA-CV 2012-0125

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; March 13, 2013; Arizona; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Thomas MacKinney initiated a personal injury lawsuit against the City of Tucson after sustaining injuries from a fall while playing golf at a city-owned course in November 2009. He alleged that the walkway to the seventh tee was dangerously designed and maintained. The City of Tucson sought summary judgment, claiming immunity under Arizona's recreational-use immunity statute, A.R.S. 33-1551. However, the trial court denied this motion, reasoning that the golf course did not qualify as a 'premises' protected by the statute, and questioned whether the fee MacKinney paid to access the course was 'nominal.'

Following a trial, the jury awarded MacKinney $180,000 in damages but found him 70% at fault, reducing the judgment against the city to $54,000. The City of Tucson appealed, challenging the denial of its summary judgment motion. The appellate court noted that while summary judgment denials are generally not reviewable post-trial, the trial court's ruling involved a legal determination regarding the definition of 'premises' under the immunity statute. Consequently, this issue was relevant to the final judgment, allowing it to be addressed in the appeal. Ultimately, the appellate court vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, allowing the moving party to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In negligence cases, summary judgment is generally disfavored but can be granted if all material facts are undisputed and only one inference can be drawn. The trial court's initial belief regarding a factual question about MacKinney's status as a recreational user does not hinder appellate review since the ruling was based on a legal issue concerning "premises." Courts may review the denial of summary judgment if it is based strictly on a legal point, as the losing party may be precluded from presenting evidence later. The applicability of the recreational-use immunity statute is a legal question subject to de novo review, not bound by trial court conclusions. Statutory interpretation aims to reflect legislative intent, requiring a strict construction to prevent unintended immunity that would undermine rights of action. For the immunity statute to apply, the location of the injury must qualify as "premises," and the injured party must be deemed a recreational user as defined by A.R.S. 33-1551(A). The court must consider whether a golf course qualifies as a "premises" under this statute, which states that property owners are not liable to recreational users unless there is evidence of willful or grossly negligent conduct directly causing the injury.

MacKinney's claim against the city is based solely on negligence, lacking allegations of willful, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct. Consequently, if the criteria of A.R.S. 33-1551 are met, the city may be immune from liability. A.R.S. 33-1551(C)(3) defines "premises" to encompass various types of lands, including parks and recreational areas, but does not explicitly mention golf courses. The city contends that a golf course is comparable to a park, thus falling under "other similar lands" in the statute. Historical case law supports this view, indicating that golf courses are considered recreational facilities akin to parks. The legislature is presumed to be aware of existing legal interpretations when amending statutes, which bolsters the city's argument that golf courses should be included in the definition of "premises." Additionally, prior court rulings, such as Walker, highlighted that earlier definitions did not cover certain recreational areas that lacked characteristics typical of the lands specified in the statute. However, the 1993 amendment expanded the definition to include a broader range of recreational spaces, suggesting an intent to encompass golf courses within the statutory framework.

The 1993 amendments to A.R.S. 33-1551 repudiate aspects of the court's reasoning in Walker by broadening the definition of "premises" to include park lands and various types of recreational properties. This legislative change indicates an intent to provide immunity to property owners, regardless of the size or location of the land. The amendments clarify that lands previously considered "natural" or "undeveloped" are no longer the only types of properties covered under the statute.

Specifically, the inclusion of phrases such as "wherever located" and the addition of "paved or unpaved multi-use trails" and other improvements suggest a wider interpretation of what constitutes "other similar lands." Consequently, the court must now determine if a golf course is similar to these newly defined lands, recognizing that golf courses, characterized as recreational areas, align with the definition of parks. 

Since golf courses are not explicitly listed but share characteristics with park lands, they fall within the scope of the recreational-use immunity statute. Thus, injuries sustained on a golf course do not negate the application of this immunity. However, for the city to claim immunity, it must also establish that the injured party, MacKinney, was a recreational user. As the trial court did not address this issue due to its ruling on premises, the judgment must be vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings. In the interest of judicial efficiency, the court addresses potential recreational-user questions that may arise on remand.

A 'recreational user' is defined under Section 33-1551(C)(4) (1998) as someone who has permission to enter premises for activities like hunting, fishing, or hiking without paying an admission fee. The purchase of a state hunting, trapping, or fishing license is not considered payment under this definition. Additionally, a nominal fee charged by a public entity or nonprofit to cover costs does not constitute an admission fee. Golf is classified as an outdoor recreational activity under this definition. 

In the case of MacKinney, the city argues he is a recreational user because he personally did not pay a fee to play golf; instead, his son paid. However, it is clarified that the payment of a fee by another party does not disqualify someone from being a recreational user. The city also contends that since MacKinney's fee was paid to GolfNow, a third-party service, he should be considered a recreational user. This argument is countered by referencing a prior case where participants were deemed recreational users despite fees being paid by a sponsor. In MacKinney's situation, he was required to pay a fee to enter the golf course on the day of his injury, indicating he does not qualify as a recreational user. 

Lastly, the city claims the fee was nominal and thus exempt under the statute. However, the definition of 'nominal fee' in the 1998 amendment specifies that fees meant to offset costs by public entities or nonprofits do not count as admission fees, but this does not apply here as MacKinney was still required to pay a fee.

MacKinney's fee for using the golf course may not automatically qualify as 'nominal' under the recreational-use immunity statute, which requires that fees be both 'nominal' and intended to offset the costs of providing recreational services. The city's interpretation conflating these two criteria fails to recognize the necessity of distinguishing between them, as doing so would render the term 'nominal' superfluous and grant broader immunity than the legislature likely intended. The term 'nominal' is typically understood to mean 'insignificantly small' or 'token,' and no definitive legal standard for its application in this context exists, necessitating a fact-specific inquiry. The trial court's ruling that the golf course was not a 'premises' under the statute prevented the determination of whether the fee could be classified as 'nominal.' Consequently, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings to resolve this issue, affirming that a golf course is indeed considered a 'premises' under Arizona’s recreational-use immunity statute.