State of Iowa v. Justin L. Bunker

Citation: Not availableDocket: 4-029 / 13-0600

Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa; March 12, 2014; Iowa; State Appellate Court

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Justin L. Bunker appeals his conviction for two counts of third-degree sexual abuse and one count of enticing away a child, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and improper sentencing factors. Bunker, 24, met a 12-year-old girl online, engaged in sexual acts with her, and was later arrested after a police investigation involving a detective posing as the child. During a recorded police interview, Bunker admitted to his actions and was subsequently charged. 

At trial, the prosecution presented a redacted version of Bunker’s confession, leading to his conviction. Bunker claims his attorney failed to pursue suppression of his confession, asserting it was improperly induced by a promise. The court requires a demonstration of counsel's breach of duty and resulting prejudice, as established in Strickland v. Washington. Although such claims are typically addressed through postconviction proceedings, the appellate record is deemed sufficient for resolution in this case. The detective’s interrogation approach was highlighted, suggesting potential issues with the voluntariness of Bunker's confession. Ultimately, the court affirmed the conviction and sentencing.

Bunker was questioned by a detective regarding his relationship with a child, during which he was encouraged to be honest for his own benefit. The detective implied that openness would facilitate moving past the situation, likening it to quickly removing a band-aid. Bunker ultimately admitted to having had sex with the child after the detective pressed him on the frequency of his visits to her home.

Bunker argued that the detective’s encouragement constituted a promise of leniency, which the Iowa Supreme Court has ruled can render confessions involuntary if the officer suggests a specific advantage from confessing. However, it was determined that the detective did not cross this line since she did not specify how Bunker would benefit from confessing. This was supported by precedent cases where officers’ statements about helping suspects were deemed permissible as long as they did not explicitly outline advantages for confessing.

In contrast, other cases such as State v. Madsen and State v. Polk demonstrated that when detectives imply direct benefits or leniency in exchange for confessions, it can lead to a finding of involuntariness. Bunker’s situation was distinguished from these cases because the detective’s statements lacked any explicit promises or threats related to leniency or outcomes based on his confession.

A confession was deemed involuntary in State v. Mullin due to an officer's ambiguous statements suggesting that confessing would lead to mercy from authorities, without specifying any concrete benefits. As a result, Bunker's trial attorney was not at fault for not filing a motion to suppress the confession. Regarding sentencing, a court cannot purposely extend a sentence to manipulate the parole system. Bunker argued that the district court's imposition of consecutive sentences totaling 22 years was an attempt to influence the parole board's decisions, especially as the court expressed concern about the timing of potential parole. The court justified the consecutive sentences by citing Bunker's lack of remorse, the escalating nature of his offenses, and the necessity for treatment before release. While referencing parole, the court recognized that the parole board would ultimately decide on release timing, aligning with prior rulings that affirmed the court's discretion without overstepping into parole authority. The court concluded it did not violate any principles in sentencing Bunker and affirmed the sentence.