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Ned Chiodo v. the Section 43.24 Panel Consisting Of: Secretary of State Matthew Schultz, Auditor of State Mary Mosiman and Attorney General Thomas Miller

Citation: Not availableDocket: 14–0553

Court: Supreme Court of Iowa; April 15, 2014; Iowa; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

Narrative Opinion Summary

In the Supreme Court of Iowa case No. 14–0553, the court addressed the eligibility of a candidate for the Iowa Senate who had a prior conviction for a second offense of Operating While Intoxicated (OWI). The appellant challenged the decision of both the state elections panel and the district court, which had ruled that the conviction did not disqualify the candidate from holding public office. The court analyzed whether a second OWI conviction constituted an 'infamous crime' under Article II, Section 5 of the Iowa Constitution. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that a second OWI offense, classified as an aggravated misdemeanor, does not meet the criteria for 'infamous crimes,' traditionally associated with felonies or crimes threatening democratic governance. The review considered the distinction between the nature of the crime and its punishment, adhering to the principle that constitutional interpretation is guided by the framers' intent. The ruling emphasized that legislative definitions could inform but not alter constitutional provisions. The court's decision allowed the candidate to remain on the ballot, with a concurring opinion highlighting the potential for future litigation due to the plurality's criteria for determining 'infamous crimes.'

Legal Issues Addressed

Definition of 'Infamous Crime' under Iowa Constitution

Application: The court determined that a second OWI conviction does not constitute an 'infamous crime' under the Iowa Constitution, thus not disqualifying an individual from holding public office.

Reasoning: The court examined whether a second OWI conviction constitutes an 'infamous crime' under Article II, Section 5 of the Iowa Constitution, ultimately affirming the lower court's ruling that it does not disqualify an individual from office.

Judicial Review Standards for Agency Decisions

Application: The court applied Iowa Code 17A.19(1) to affirm that judicial review of agency decisions is permissible when the agency action prejudices the petitioner’s substantial rights.

Reasoning: Judicial review of agency decisions in Iowa is governed by Iowa Code 17A.19(1), which allows for review if the agency action prejudices the petitioner’s substantial rights.

Role of Legislative Definitions in Constitutional Interpretation

Application: The court emphasized that while legislative definitions can inform constitutional interpretation, they do not replace the constitutional definitions, particularly regarding voter qualifications.

Reasoning: The term 'infamous crime' was defined by the Iowa legislature in 1994 as a felony. However, while legislative definitions can aid in interpreting constitutional language, they must align with constitutional principles.

Stare Decisis and Overruling Precedent

Application: Although stare decisis typically dictates adherence to past rulings, the court recognized its authority to overturn precedents deemed erroneous, focusing on the nature of the crime rather than its punishment.

Reasoning: The judicial principle of stare decisis generally dictates adherence to past rulings, but courts are permitted to overturn precedents deemed erroneous.