Ganoe v. Metalclad Insulation Corp.

Citation: Not availableDocket: B248941

Court: California Court of Appeal; July 21, 2014; California; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The appellate court case involves Rose Marie Ganoe and others appealing a summary judgment granted to Metalclad Insulation Corporation in a wrongful death lawsuit. The decedent, Mark Ganoe, diagnosed with mesothelioma, had alleged asbestos exposure while working at the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. Metalclad's summary judgment motion was based on the plaintiffs' inadequate discovery responses, a co-worker's testimony indicating ignorance of Metalclad, and a declaration from Metalclad asserting no work was performed at the Goodyear plant. However, Metalclad later produced documentation indicating it had indeed worked at the site. The plaintiffs amended their discovery responses to provide specific links between Metalclad and the asbestos exposure. Despite this, the trial court ruled in favor of Metalclad. The appellate court found that Metalclad did not meet the burden of proof required for summary judgment and that triable issues of material fact existed, thereby reversing the lower court’s decision.

On December 19, 2012, Metalclad revealed a document during Trueblood’s deposition indicating insulation work on steam piping at the Goodyear plant in 1974. Trueblood admitted that Metalclad had not searched its records in response to plaintiffs’ discovery requests, relying instead on a previous case involving Goodyear, which yielded no relevant documents. The newly found document surfaced only during a search for an unrelated case. Following this, plaintiffs amended their discovery response to Metalclad's interrogatory, detailing facts about Ganoe's work in Department 132 from 1968 to 1979, including the installation of a new Banbury machine that necessitated new steam pipes and insulation, and the removal of old insulation, which released asbestos dust that Ganoe inhaled. The plaintiffs asserted that outside contractors conducted the insulation work, with Ettress confirming that the only insulation work in 1974 pertained to the new machines and piping. On January 9, 2013, plaintiffs opposed Metalclad's summary judgment motion, introducing the amended discovery response, depositions from relevant witnesses, and expert declarations. Ganoe noted that the insulation on steam lines was dusty and that he inhaled this dust during repairs. Ettress corroborated the timeline and details of the construction and insulation work. Metalclad objected to Ettress’s declaration on various grounds, but the court overruled these objections. Expert Charles Ay asserted that insulation materials used before 1972 likely contained asbestos, particularly in industrial contexts, and stated that the work done in 1974 at the Goodyear plant likely involved asbestos-containing materials.

Metalclad claimed it was entitled to summary judgment based on testimony from Ettress, who could not identify any work performed by Metalclad near Ganoe, and the plaintiffs' initial boilerplate responses to discovery requests. Metalclad argued that the plaintiffs did not raise a triable issue of fact with their amended discovery response, asserting it was speculative to suggest Metalclad had conducted insulation work in Department 132 or removed old insulation. The court granted summary judgment, concluding that Metalclad met its burden of proof and that the plaintiffs failed to establish a triable issue of fact for several reasons: the belatedly produced document did not demonstrate work in Ganoe's vicinity, Ettress testified he lacked information about Metalclad, he did not identify Metalclad among outside contractors performing insulation work, and Ay's conclusions were deemed speculative since he lacked personal knowledge of Metalclad’s activities.

The plaintiffs appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that Metalclad had shifted the burden of proof and that they had not raised any triable issues of material fact. The appellate review of summary judgment is de novo, requiring the evidence to be viewed favorably toward the plaintiffs while strictly scrutinizing the defendant's claims. A defendant must make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of fact, relying on evidence rather than merely pointing out the plaintiff’s lack of evidence. Circumstantial evidence can support a defendant's motion, but the burden should not shift without careful consideration of all evidence. The appellate court noted that the trial court did not analyze the evidence presented by Metalclad and did not clarify whether it considered the plaintiffs’ amended discovery response. It emphasized that it would be inequitable for Metalclad to withhold relevant discovery and then claim to meet its burden on summary judgment without considering newly disclosed evidence and the plaintiffs' responses.

A motion for summary judgment serves to expedite cases lacking sufficient evidence for a party to prove its claims, rather than to benefit limited discovery efforts. The trial court struck evidence supporting the motion that conflicted with recently disclosed documents, specifically upholding the plaintiffs' objection to Trueblood’s claim of ignorance regarding Metalclad’s work at the Goodyear plant. It is presumed the court properly considered the plaintiffs’ amended discovery response in assessing Metalclad's burden as the moving party. Metalclad contends that the plaintiffs' insufficient responses to discovery requests and Ettress’s assertion of unfamiliarity with Metalclad indicated a failure to demonstrate the decedent's asbestos exposure from Metalclad's operations. 

Metalclad references the case of Andrews, where the plaintiffs provided minimal factual responses to interrogatories about asbestos exposure, leading the court to conclude that they had no additional information. In contrast, the plaintiffs here provided specific facts in their amended response, asserting that Metalclad exposed Ganoe to asbestos in 1974 by removing asbestos insulation in his presence. This detail counters the inference that they could not prove causation. Regarding Ettress’s claim of never having heard of Metalclad, Metalclad likens it to McGonnell, where similar testimony negated causation. In McGonnell, the plaintiff was unable to connect the defendant's products to his workplace, which shifted the burden to the plaintiffs to provide evidence of exposure. However, the plaintiffs in this case did not merely offer boilerplate answers but included specific details, indicating a stronger basis for establishing causation against Metalclad.

Metalclad's submission of a brief excerpt from Ettress’s deposition, where he claimed to have "never heard of" Metalclad, was insufficient to establish a lack of exposure to Metalclad's products. Unlike in McGonnell, where the court found a failure to establish a prima facie case due to a plaintiff's inability to recall the defendant's name or identify related products, this case parallels Weber v. John Crane, Inc. The court in Weber determined that an inability to recall a defendant's product did not imply non-exposure or inability to prove exposure through other means. Metalclad similarly failed to present evidence that Ettress could identify other contractors who performed insulation work at the Goodyear plant or that he recognized Metalclad’s branding.

The trial court incorrectly concluded that Metalclad shifted the burden of proof. Even if Metalclad had met its initial burden, summary judgment should still have been denied because plaintiffs raised triable issues of material fact. Metalclad contends that plaintiffs' evidence merely suggests a remote possibility of Metalclad's involvement in insulation work, akin to the situation in McGonnell, where evidence led only to speculation about asbestos exposure. The court found that merely producing some evidence is inadequate; it must be of sufficient quality to allow a favorable finding for the opposing party. Here, plaintiffs' evidence suggested only a series of speculative possibilities regarding potential exposure to defendants' products without a concrete link, failing to create a genuine triable issue of material fact.

The case distinguishes itself from McGonnell by presenting substantial evidence of causation rather than mere speculation. Unlike McGonnell, where the connection to asbestos was uncertain, evidence indicates that Metalclad performed insulation work on steam piping at the Goodyear plant in 1974, specifically in Department 132 during the installation of new machinery, which required the removal of old insulation. Ganoe, who worked in that department, was present during the insulation repair and inhaled dust from the process. Plaintiffs' expert, Charles Ay, asserted that it was more likely than not that the removed insulation contained asbestos. 

The trial court had deemed Ay’s conclusions speculative due to his lack of presence during the exposure period and personal knowledge of Metalclad's work. However, Ay's qualifications as an expert witness were established, with over 100 asbestos-related cases and 25 years of relevant experience, providing a solid foundation for his opinion. He concluded that the removal of insulation was necessary for new machine installation and that the old insulation likely contained asbestos, particularly from "chalky" hot pipes in industrial settings. 

The judgment was reversed, with the plaintiffs awarded costs on appeal, as the trial court erred by finding no triable issue of fact. The court modified the opinion for publication without altering the judgment.