Tatiana Dixon v. Patti Wachtendorf

Citations: 758 F.3d 992; 2014 WL 3397678; 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13304Docket: 13-3193

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; July 14, 2014; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Tatiana Michelle Dixon appeals the dismissal of her 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Dixon was convicted in 2003 of first-degree felony murder based on her firing shots that resulted in one death and another injury. At her bench trial, the prosecution needed to prove only her intent to cause serious bodily injury. She received a life sentence. On direct appeal, Dixon contended that the state did not demonstrate she acted without justification and that her attorney was ineffective in not challenging the use of willful injury as a qualifying felony for the murder charge. The Iowa Court of Appeals denied her appeal in 2004, and the Iowa Supreme Court denied further review in 2005.

In 2006, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled in State v. Heemstra that willful injury could not serve as the predicate felony for felony murder if the act causing the injury also caused death, but this ruling was not retroactively applicable. Following this change, Dixon filed for relief in state court, which was denied in 2010, and her appeal was subsequently denied in 2011. 

Dixon filed her current federal petition in December 2012, claiming it was submitted on December 11, 2012. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), noting that her conviction was final in June 2005. The court also found that she had not exhausted her state court remedies and that her claims did not establish a violation of her federal due process rights. The potential applicability of the Heemstra decision as a new factual predicate for her claims was discussed, but the court concluded that even under that interpretation, her petition remained time-barred unless the timeline began with the issuance of the procedendo in September 2006.

In Iowa, "procedendo" functions similarly to a federal court's "mandate," terminating the jurisdiction of the issuing court once issued (In re M.T., 714 N.W.2d 278, 281-82). The district court did not address Dixon's Equal Protection Clause claim, and it is conceded by the state that this matter should be remanded to the district court for initial consideration. The statute of limitations for Dixon's post-conviction relief began on August 25, with her filing on September 5, which paused the limitation period under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2). After her state post-conviction petition ended on December 20, 2011, she delayed filing her federal habeas corpus petition until December 17, 2012, making it untimely. Dixon's assertion that the limitation clock did not start until the issuance of the procedendo is misleading, as her state motion was filed before this date.

Legal decisions are typically not considered a "factual predicate" for tolling the statute of limitations. Relevant case law (E.J.R.E. v. United States, 453 F.3d 1094, 1098; Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1089) supports that legal rulings do not toll the statute because they do not constitute factual events that can be proven or disproven. The discussion around when to start counting this event highlights the complexities of defining legal decisions as factual predicates, but the petition's untimeliness obviates the need for a definitive ruling on this point.

The government contends that Dixon cannot benefit from the Prison Mailbox Rule for a December 11, 2012 filing date due to insufficient evidence of pre-paid first-class postage. Even if this date were accepted, 368 non-tolled days would have elapsed, still resulting in an untimely petition. The statute (Section 2244(d)(1)(D)) states that the clock begins when a factual predicate is or could have been discovered, which in this case refers to the Heemstra decision, discoverable on August 25, 2006. The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that its decisions take effect upon issuance unless specified otherwise (State v. Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1, 9-10 n.2), and nothing indicated that Heemstra should not be effective immediately. Therefore, Dixon "discovered" Heemstra on August 25, 2006.

While the circumstances of Dixon's case resemble that of the Heemstra defendant, the Iowa courts ruled that Heemstra would not apply retroactively, which federal courts must respect. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) does not limit state courts' authority over retroactivity issues. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of Dixon's petition as untimely is affirmed.