In Re: Conservatorship of Maurice M. Acree, Jr.

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2013-02588-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; June 11, 2014; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the probate court's approval of the final accounting for the Maurice Acree Trust and the closure of the conservatorship following the death of Dr. Maurice M. Acree, Jr. The case involved ongoing litigation since 2006 regarding trust assets, with substantial depletion of funds attributed to prior disputes. William Q. Acree, Dr. Acree’s son, appealed several decisions: 

1. The approval of the final accounting without requiring the recovery of funds previously deemed wrongfully disbursed, despite prior rulings instructing rectification.
2. The approval of accounting that included attorney's fees disbursed under previously ruled improper orders, with the probate court asserting these were final and beyond appeal, contrary to the definition of final judgment under Rule 54.02, T.R.C.P.
3. The refusal to revise past court orders under Rule 60.02, T.R.C.P., which the Court of Appeals had previously indicated were entered in error and warranted correction.

The court treated the appeal as lacking merit and upheld the lower court's decisions. The ruling was issued as a memorandum opinion, indicating it would not establish precedent.

The probate court's refusal to apply Rule 60.02 to amend orders made by mistake raises concerns about adherence to the constitutional principle that "where there is a right, there must always be a remedy." William argues that the trial court incorrectly approved the final accounting of the MAT without requiring repayment of attorney’s fees that had been authorized before the court's decision in Acree I. This argument parallels his claims regarding the Clara Carter Acree Trust in Acree II, where the court reiterated that Acree I did not mandate revisiting previously litigated attorney’s fees. The orders approving those fees were deemed final and not subject to appeal, thus applying the same principles to future orders. The issues raised in William's appeal were similarly addressed in Acree II, which is res judicata, and the court declined to overrule Acree I, which remains the law of the case following the denial of permission to appeal.

William also contends that the trial court erred in denying his August 2013 Rule 60.02 motion for relief from orders considered final by the Court of Appeals. He argues that, based on Acree I, no attorney’s fees should have been paid from the MAT, and the trial court should have set aside its previous orders under Rule 60.02(5), which allows for relief from final judgments for reasons including mistake or fraud. The rule stipulates that such motions must be filed within a reasonable time, specifically within one year for certain reasons. While a motion does not disrupt the finality of a judgment, the court may suspend its operation pending the motion's hearing. The rule also affirms the court's authority to independently relieve a party from a judgment, abolishing previous procedures for similar relief.

The trial court's handling of a Rule 60.02 motion for relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion, which occurs when incorrect legal standards are applied, illogical conclusions are reached, or evidence is assessed erroneously, causing injustice. An appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court and will uphold a ruling as long as reasonable minds can disagree on its propriety. In his August 2013 motion, William argued that the trial court improperly awarded attorney's fees to Nancy Acree, citing a previous case, Acree I, which he claimed mandated repayment of fees not payable from the assets of the MAT. However, it was determined that Acree I did not require a reexamination of prior fee awards and that there was no basis for William to receive fees under the relevant trusts or statutes. While Nancy Acree’s personal fees were not payable from the conservatorship, fees incurred in her capacity as conservator were allowable under Tennessee law. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision, affirming the denial of William’s Rule 60.02 motion and the award of $90,000 in fees to Nancy Acree from July 15, 2013. Costs on appeal were imposed on William and his surety, and requests for damages for a frivolous appeal were denied. The case was remanded for enforcement of the judgment and collection of costs.