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People v. Dung Dinh Anh Trinh
Citations: 59 Cal. 4th 216; 326 P.3d 939; 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1; 2014 WL 2535253; 2014 Cal. LEXIS 3763Docket: S115284
Court: California Supreme Court; June 5, 2014; California; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Defendant Dung Dinh Ahn Trinh was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted murder, and several firearm enhancements following a shooting incident at the West Anaheim Medical Center on September 14, 1999. The incident occurred shortly after the death of Trinh's mother from cardiac arrest, prompting him to enter the hospital armed with two .38-caliber handguns and over 100 rounds of ammunition. Trinh shot nursing aide Marlene Mustaffa in the head and attempted to shoot nursing supervisor Mila Salvador but missed. Following the shootings, a 'code gray' was announced, prompting hospital staff to respond. Vincent Rosetti was later found dead in a stairwell, having been shot by Trinh. When staff members Norman Bryan and Ronald Robertson approached the scene, Trinh shot Robertson, who later died from his injuries after a struggle ensued, during which Trinh claimed, "They killed my mother." Trinh was apprehended by police, during which he expressed anger towards Americans, blaming them for his mother's death. A search of his vehicle revealed a circled map of another hospital and empty ammunition boxes. The investigation confirmed that one of Trinh's handguns had fired, while the other remained loaded. Trinh's penalty trials resulted in hung juries until a third jury sentenced him to death, a decision that was affirmed on automatic appeal. Defense evidence indicated Trinh admitted to shooting and killing Mustaffa, Rosetti, and Robertson, and attempting to shoot Salvador, but argued that life stressors reduced his culpability to less than first-degree murder. Trinh, who immigrated from Vietnam in 1975, lived with his mother Mot, who collapsed in May 1999 and underwent extensive medical treatment. Trinh cared for her throughout her hospital stays and quit his job to provide full-time care after her discharge. On September 14, he called 911 when Mot stopped breathing; she died from cardiac arrest before they reached the hospital. The defense presented expert testimony addressing Vietnamese family dynamics, distrust of Western medicine, caregiver burnout, and cultural aspects of grief. Trinh faced three counts of first-degree murder with special circumstances and one count of attempted murder, along with firearm enhancements. The court dismissed the lying-in-wait special circumstance before trial. A jury convicted him on all counts and affirmed the multiple-murder special circumstance and firearm enhancements. During the penalty phase, Trinh's first jury could not reach a verdict, and a second jury was similarly deadlocked. In the third penalty trial, the prosecution presented evidence from the crime, including Trinh's earlier testimony, where he expressed no remorse and detailed his premeditated plan to kill upon his mother's death. He indicated that he intended to kill additional individuals at La Palma Hospital after the initial shootings. Trinh requested a death sentence, expressing a desire to reunite with his deceased mother. The prosecution presented victim impact statements from the families of the victims, including Mustaffa's husband and Robertson's family. The defense reiterated expert testimony on Vietnamese cultural issues, including family dynamics, distrust of Western medicine, caregiver burnout, and the immigrant experience. Witnesses described Trinh's limited social circle, his dedication to caring for his mother, and his reliability as a tenant and employee. Trinh testified, admitting to his intent to kill and showing no remorse, asserting he would repeat the act if possible. His statements criticizing American support for genocide were excluded from the jury's consideration. Trinh indicated his actions were motivated by the mistreatment of his mother in the hospital, detailing his premeditated plan to kill specific nurses. However, upon arriving at the hospital where his mother died, he initially refrained from shooting until he recognized Mustaffa and Salvador, whom he targeted. He accidentally shot Rosetti and Robertson while trying to escape, later expressing regret for them but not for his intended victims. Trinh provided testimony during the penalty phase, expressing remorse for taking three lives and acknowledging that nothing he could say would reverse the harm caused. He declared his willingness to accept the death penalty as restitution for his actions, stating, "I owe you my life because of their death." Trinh admitted to misidentifying victims Mustaffa and Salvador during the shootings, which he initially did not intend to commit against innocent individuals but rather against those he blamed for mistreating his mother. At the conclusion of his testimony, he urged the jury to do the "right thing" by sentencing him to death, feeling he deserved it. Following two hung juries, a third jury ultimately convicted Trinh and sentenced him to death. In a related pretrial matter, Trinh sought to recuse the Orange County District Attorney's Office, citing a potential conflict of interest from DA Tony Rackauckas, whose father had recently been hospitalized at the shooting location. The court denied this recusal motion, ruling that there was no actual or perceived conflict that would compromise a fair trial. Trinh's subsequent motions for recusal before his second and third penalty trials were also denied, which he argues constituted an abuse of discretion and violated multiple constitutional rights. The court determined that allowing the Orange County District Attorney’s Office to charge Trinh with capital murder did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Under section 1424, a motion to recuse a prosecutor requires evidence of a conflict of interest that would compromise the defendant's right to a fair trial. This involves a two-part test: establishing a conflict of interest and assessing whether it is severe enough to disqualify the district attorney. The defendant carries the burden of proof, which is heightened when seeking to recuse an entire office rather than a single prosecutor. Trinh argued that a conflict arose from District Attorney Rackauckas’s father being a former patient at the hospital where the shootings occurred, suggesting this created emotional bias. However, most of Trinh's claims about Rackauckas adopting an automatic death penalty policy or acting vindictively lacked evidence of an independent conflict and were considered by the court as potential consequences of his alleged anger regarding the case. The trial court found no reasonable possibility that the DA's office would not act impartially, supported by substantial evidence, including Rackauckas’s declaration denying any connection between his father's hospitalization and his prosecutorial decisions. He asserted that his policy decision was motivated by a duty to deter mass shootings, not by personal emotions linked to his father's prior hospital stay. The trial court's acceptance of Rackauckas's statements and rationale was deemed appropriate, particularly considering his position as a newly appointed district attorney responding to societal concerns about mass violence in public spaces. A distant familial connection to a tragic event does not inherently undermine the fairness of a prosecution. Prior cases illustrate that significant conflicts arise when individuals involved in prosecution or victim roles have direct ties to the case, such as employment by the district attorney's office or being a potential victim. Trinh argues that evidence suggests Rackauckas’ actions were influenced by his father’s hospitalization at the site of a crime, including his concerns about media exposure and a policy shift toward seeking capital punishment for public rampage killings. However, the trial court's discretion in denying Trinh's recusal motion is upheld, as there was no new evidence presented that would alter the evaluation of Rackauckas’ involvement. The standards for recusal under section 1424 aim to prevent constitutional violations, and since the trial court's decision was not an abuse of discretion, Trinh's constitutional rights were not violated. In the guilt phase, Trinh sought a specific jury instruction on provocation and heat of passion, arguing that he acted under provocation that warranted a lesser charge. While the trial court agreed to standard instructions, it denied Trinh’s proposed pinpoint instruction, viewing it as argumentative and duplicative. This denial is claimed to be an abuse of discretion, potentially violating Trinh's due process rights and his right to have the jury instructed on his defense theory. Trinh's proposed instruction regarding provocation and heat of passion was not substantively incorrect and accurately reflected legal standards. The court reaffirmed that for murder to be reduced to manslaughter, provocation must be sufficient to cause an ordinary person to act rashly due to passion rather than judgment, as articulated in People v. Beltran (2013). Provocation can arise from a single event or a series of events and does not require a specific type of provocation, nor must the resulting passion be anger or rage. The court noted that if sufficient time elapsed for reason to return after provocation, or if the provocation was insufficient to arouse passion, the offense could not be reduced to manslaughter. The proposed instruction was not duplicative or argumentative; it clarified that Trinh needed only to prove provocation causing rash action rather than a provocation sufficient to incite killing. Thus, it aligned with Trinh’s defense strategy that previous events could mitigate culpability. Despite being entitled to the instruction, the court concluded that any error was harmless. The People’s special instruction emphasized that heat of passion must stem from provocation by the victim. There was no evidence that Vincent Rosetti or Ronald Robertson contributed to Trinh's mother's care, and even less evidence existed regarding nurses Mila Salvador and Marlene Mustaffa’s involvement. Therefore, there was no reasonable probability that the requested instruction would have altered the verdict. The trial court and parties agreed to instruct the jury with CALJIC Nos. 2.60 and 2.61, which prohibit jurors from inferring significance from Trinh's decision not to testify. Although these instructions were read aloud, they were inadvertently omitted from the written instructions provided to the jury during deliberations. Trinh argues this omission violated his rights under various constitutional provisions and state statutes, including the privilege against self-incrimination and due process. The court determined that no constitutional error occurred, and while the omission constituted a statutory error, it was deemed harmless. The oral instructions were considered sufficient, as neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor California courts have mandated the necessity of written copies to supplement oral instructions. The court acknowledged that providing written instructions is beneficial but not constitutionally required. Trinh’s reliance on People v. Osband was found unpersuasive, as it only affirmed that written instructions can clarify oral errors, not that the absence of written instructions nullifies accurate oral instructions. The omission, although unintentional, constituted a violation of Trinh's statutory rights; however, it did not affect the trial's outcome since the jury received the necessary instructions verbally, and it is presumed they followed them. Trinh failed to provide any evidence indicating that the jury would have been confused or misapplied the instructions without written copies of CALJIC Nos. 2.60 and 2.61, as required to prove a reasonable probability of a better outcome. Trinh's initial two penalty trials resulted in hung juries. Before the third penalty trial, he moved for a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, which the trial court denied. Trinh argued this denial constituted an abuse of discretion, infringing on his due process rights under several constitutional amendments. However, the trial court's decision was within its discretion as outlined in section 190.4, subdivision (b), which mandates a retrial after a hung jury but allows the court to impose a life sentence after a second hung jury without needing to justify its decision. The court's review of the case is limited to determining if the decision was arbitrary. Trinh's motion cited factors like his history and emotional state as reasons for a life sentence, and he argued juror misconduct influenced the final jury division. The trial court acknowledged the difficulty in its decision but ultimately opted for a retrial after weighing the likelihood of a unanimous verdict against the impact on the victims' families. Trinh contended that the court ignored mitigating evidence, yet the record indicates the court considered all relevant factors, including mitigating evidence. Trinh’s legal counsel presented arguments for mitigation both in written briefs and orally, acknowledging that the trial court had reviewed these materials. The trial court's evaluation centered on the probability of achieving a future unanimous verdict, informed by the voting patterns of the previous juries and the overall evidence heard during the trials. Trinh contended that the second jury's 11-to-1 decision for death resulted from juror misconduct, which he argued the trial court overlooked when considering the potential for future unanimity. However, the court recognized Trinh's misconduct allegations and deemed them relevant but not decisive. Its primary focus was whether a future jury, properly instructed, could reach a unanimous verdict, justifying the costs of another trial. The court's conclusion that a unanimous verdict was likely enough to warrant a third penalty trial was not arbitrary. Trinh also raised constitutional objections, claiming that allowing a retrial infringed upon his rights to due process, equal protection, and protection against cruel and unusual punishment, as stipulated in the U.S. Constitution and California Constitution. Although he noted the rarity of legislative authorization for multiple penalty phase retrials, this rarity alone does not constitute unconstitutionality. Precedent established that such rarity does not violate evolving standards of decency under the Eighth Amendment. While Trinh's situation involved two hung juries and a decision from a third jury, this distinction was not deemed constitutionally significant. He failed to demonstrate that the absence of authorization for multiple penalty retrials in other states reflected a moral consensus rather than practical considerations. The Supreme Court has indicated that the Eighth Amendment reflects collective moral judgments, yet these do not prevent state legislatures from making different determinations regarding the societal value of pursuing death sentences, including multiple times. Trinh asserts that the penalty phase retrial statute is unconstitutional as applied to him, arguing that the trial court should have recognized the likelihood of serious errors in a third penalty phase, which he claims occurred. However, specific claims of penalty phase errors are rejected, and no additional errors are identified to support his argument for unconstitutionality. Trinh further contends that the statute allowing a second retrial or imposing life without parole violates equal protection and due process due to a lack of explicit standards for judicial discretion. The court concludes that this absence of standards does not violate state or federal Constitutions, referencing In re Anderson, which found similar challenges without merit. Although the United States Supreme Court has since clarified that standardless selection between life and death is unconstitutional, the court maintains that the retrial statute does not fail constitutional scrutiny. The statute is applied only after a jury has determined death eligibility, ensuring careful consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, which has been deemed constitutionally sufficient. Section 190.4, subdivision (b) allows for judicial discretion in deciding whether to retry death-eligible defendants whose penalty phases have resulted in hung juries or mistrials, but does not guarantee such a right. The Legislature’s approach acknowledges the complexities of justice, allowing trial courts to make decisions based on individual case circumstances rather than a rigid checklist. Trinh's retrial, allowed under section 190.4, subdivision (b), does not violate his rights to equal protection or due process, as he is treated equally under the statute. During jury selection for his third penalty trial, Trinh contested the prosecution's peremptory challenge against a Vietnamese-American juror, N.V., arguing it was racially motivated. The trial court found a prima facie case of discrimination but ultimately denied Trinh’s motion after considering the prosecutor's justifications. The seated jury did not include any Vietnamese-Americans, prompting Trinh to appeal, claiming a violation of his rights to equal protection and a representative jury under the 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and California's Constitution. Legal standards prohibit the exclusion of jurors based on race, establishing that peremptory challenges cannot be wielded to discriminate based on ethnicity. The process requires the defendant to first demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination, after which the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide legitimate, race-neutral reasons for the juror's exclusion. The trial court must then assess whether the defendant has proven that the peremptory challenge was likely motivated by racial bias. The analysis focuses on the genuineness of the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations rather than their objective reasonableness, indicating that even minor but genuine reasons can validate a peremptory challenge. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no error in the denial of Trinh’s motion. In *People v. Jones*, the prosecutor's rationale for striking juror N.V. was based on three factors: N.V.'s middle age without marriage or children, his occupation as a postal worker, and his lack of expressed opinions on the death penalty. The defendant, Trinh, challenged these reasons as pretextual and sought a comparative analysis with seated jurors who shared similar traits. However, the court noted that the trial court's assessment of the prosecutor's reasons must be based on the record at the time of the Batson/Wheeler ruling, and any subsequent developments would require a renewed objection to be considered on appeal. The court highlighted that among the seated jurors, 15 were married, 10 had children, and the only other unmarried, childless juror was significantly younger. The prosecutor did not argue that N.V.'s individual characteristics alone warranted his dismissal, but rather the combination of his demographic factors distinguished him from the others. Additionally, the prosecutor's choice to strike other similar jurors supported the assertion that N.V. was excluded for genuine reasons rather than racial bias. The trial court, while expressing skepticism about using occupation as a criterion for juror exclusion, acknowledged the prosecutor's explanation as bona fide. Ultimately, the court upheld the trial court's conclusion that the prosecutor's reasons for striking N.V. were legitimate and not a cover for ethnic discrimination. In the case of People v. Jones and related precedents, a prosecutor is permitted to challenge potential jurors based on their occupations if the prosecutor believes those jurors may not be ideal for the case. In this instance, no seated jurors had connections to the postal service, although one alternate juror, Alternate Juror No. 4, shared that background. The prosecutor's approach to selecting the main jury involved extensive questioning and the use of 17 peremptory strikes, whereas the selection of alternate jurors was less thorough, with no strikes used. The prosecutor distinguished N.V., a potential juror, from Alternate Juror No. 4 based on several factors: Alternate Juror No. 4 was married with children and supported the death penalty in appropriate cases, while N.V. displayed a lack of opinion on the death penalty in his questionnaire and during voir dire. N.V. consistently provided non-specific answers, indicating he had not considered the death penalty, which the trial court confirmed. The prosecutor's assessment of N.V. as unresponsive regarding his views on the death penalty was deemed a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for the juror's dismissal. Trinh's argument that other jurors were similarly uncommunicative was refuted by the record, which showed that those jurors offered more substantial insights into their views. Juror No. 2 expressed that the death penalty should be automatic for certain crimes, indicating there are cases where it is "absolutely warranted." Juror No. 3 shared that she considered the death penalty a "harsher" punishment than life without parole and would approach it accordingly during deliberations. Juror No. 8 supported the death penalty for heinous crimes, particularly mass murder, and noted that while it is imposed too frequently in Texas, this is not the case in California. Juror No. 12 believed the death penalty should remain an option for juries and discussed the complexities of its application. Alternate Juror No. 1, while having limited responses, affirmed that the death penalty should be an option in certain cases. The prosecutor's vetting of alternate jurors was notably less intensive, and the choice of Alternate Juror No. 1, a married mother of two, did not undermine the prosecutor's nondiscriminatory reasons for striking another juror, N.V. Trinh's argument that N.V.'s ethnicity indicated racial motivation for the strike was insufficient, as the burden of proof regarding racial motivation lies with the opponent of the strike. Trinh did not successfully demonstrate that the trial court erred in accepting the prosecutor's reasons. Additionally, Trinh sought to limit the prosecution's victim impact evidence before the penalty trial. The trial court partially granted this motion, restricting certain questions deemed likely to yield irrelevant or inflammatory responses, but denied other aspects. At the trial, the prosecutor articulated reasons for strikes, and after the trial court suggested the prosecutor had alleviated concerns of discrimination, Trinh declined to provide further arguments against the juror's removal. Nine victim impact witnesses testified, reduced from eleven at the previous penalty trial. Trinh claims the testimony included inflammatory and irrelevant content, violating his due process rights under the U.S. Constitution (5th, 8th, 14th Amendments) and California Constitution (art. I. 15, 17). The review concluded no error occurred, affirming that victim impact evidence is permissible in capital trials under the Eighth Amendment, as established in precedent cases. Such evidence is admissible to illustrate the harm caused by the defendant, specifically the victim's family's suffering, according to California Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a). Limits exist: victim impact evidence is inadmissible if it provokes irrational responses or is unduly prejudicial, rendering the trial fundamentally unfair. The trial court's decision to admit this evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Trinh argued the trial court should have limited the number of witnesses per victim to two, while he preferred only one. The court declined to impose this limit, referencing cases that support the necessity of multiple testimonies to convey the impact of the crime accurately. Additionally, Trinh contended the witnesses’ testimony was excessively cumulative. However, the court noted that presenting a comprehensive history of the victim's life is within the People’s rights, and some overlap in testimony is expected and does not inherently make the trial unfair. Lastly, Trinh argued that testimony should focus solely on the immediate family's effects rather than including friends or the broader community. The United States Supreme Court and the court in question have not established any constitutional or statutory limitations on the scope of victim impact testimony. Relevant cases, including Payne v. Tennessee and others, support the allowance of such testimony, including the impact on the community as a whole. The court rejects Trinh's argument for restricting testimony to experiences known to him at the time of the crimes, as previous rulings have consistently dismissed this limitation. Additionally, Trinh raises concerns about a witness's emotional outburst and her attempt to address him in a foreign language during her testimony. The trial court addressed these issues by sustaining objections and instructing the jury to disregard the statements, which the court presumes the jurors followed. Regarding prosecutorial misconduct, Trinh's motion sought to limit victim impact evidence by excluding certain questions deemed likely to elicit irrelevant or inflammatory responses. The trial court agreed to this limitation; however, the prosecutor ignored it by asking those prohibited questions during the introduction of victim impact evidence. Defense objections to these questions were repeatedly sustained throughout the proceedings. The court sustained multiple objections from defense counsel regarding the form of questions posed during direct examinations concerning the impact of the deaths of loved ones on witnesses. The prosecutor repeatedly asked witnesses to describe the hardest thing they faced after their loved one’s murder, despite the court's previous instructions prohibiting such inquiries due to their potential to elicit improper responses. This pattern of questioning constituted prosecutorial misconduct, as it disregarded the trial court's rulings and created a dilemma for the defense: either interrupt emotionally charged testimonies or allow the questioning of their witnesses to continue, which could lead to irrelevant or inflammatory answers. Although it was acknowledged that the prosecutor's actions were improper, the defense, Trinh, did not demonstrate that this misconduct resulted in prejudice. Generally, sustained objections do not lead to prejudice, as established in relevant case law. The excerpt emphasizes the importance of adhering to procedural rules during testimony to ensure fairness in the trial process. The trial court rejected all objections raised during the proceedings, resulting in no inadmissible testimony being presented to the jury. Trinh's assertion that the prosecutor’s questioning implied undisclosed damaging information was unfounded, as the misconduct did not result in a trial that was unfair enough to violate due process rights, and there was no reasonable likelihood that these questions affected the verdict. Trinh filed for a new trial on several grounds before sentencing, but the court denied this motion, and Trinh has renewed his appeal on three specific grounds. The appeal is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and it was determined that the trial court acted appropriately. Trinh argued that prosecutorial misconduct warranted a new trial; however, the misconduct was deemed non-prejudicial. He also claimed that a third penalty trial was unconstitutional, but it was ruled constitutional both in general and as applied to his case. Furthermore, concerns regarding a potential fourth penalty trial would not rectify any issues present in the third trial. Regarding spectator misconduct, an incident occurred during the testimony of a victim impact witness, where derogatory comments were made by a spectator, Derek Robertson. The trial court noted that Trinh's attorneys failed to object to this comment, which amounted to a waiver of the issue for appeal since appropriate objections could have allowed the court to address the misconduct immediately. Despite the trial court's observations of Derek's behavior, no formal objection or request for remedial action was made by Trinh's counsel, preventing the court from mitigating any potential prejudice to the jury. Trinh argued that the trial court should have independently investigated whether the jury heard a three-word comment made by Derek Robertson, claiming it could prejudice the verdict. The court determined that the remark was too trivial to impact the jury's decision, referencing precedents that require significant spectator misconduct to warrant a mistrial. The court emphasized its discretion in assessing the effects of such misconduct and found the incident inconsequential amidst the totality of evidence presented. Additionally, Trinh filed a postverdict motion to set aside the death sentence and impose life without the possibility of parole, arguing that his testimony had been tailored to elicit a death verdict, rendering the trial unreliable. The prosecution opposed this motion, which the court denied summarily. Trinh claimed this denial violated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. The document cites established case law affirming a defendant's right to testify and advocate for a death sentence without rendering the trial unconstitutional, particularly when jurors are instructed to base their decision solely on the evidence presented. Trinh’s counsel argued that Trinh’s testimony at the third penalty trial aimed to persuade the jury for a death sentence; however, the jury was explicitly instructed to independently evaluate the evidence without succumbing to Trinh’s wishes. The court assumed the jury adhered to this instruction and did not err in its ruling on Trinh's motion, as it was not required to provide detailed reasoning, which is not typically mandated unless specified. Trinh's claim that his testimony was more inflammatory than in previous cases (People v. Webb and People v. Guzman) was rejected, as his request for a death sentence did not constitute a waiver of his right to a fair trial. The trial court effectively managed Trinh's testimony, preventing him from introducing irrelevant or false statements. The court maintained that the trial's integrity was preserved despite Trinh's inflammatory remarks, aligning with precedent that a defendant's request for death does not necessarily compromise the reliability of the penalty phase. Trinh's motivations for his actions evolved over the course of multiple trials, initially citing a desire for revenge against perceived mistreatment of his mother by a hospital and later claiming his actions were a response to U.S. actions in Vietnam. The court ruled that discussions of U.S.-Vietnam issues would be excluded from the trial due to their irrelevance and potential for prejudice, particularly given the pro-military sentiment in the venue. The trial court upheld the jury's death penalty verdict, rejecting Trinh's request for a life sentence without parole. Trinh argued that cumulative errors throughout the trial phases denied him due process; however, the court found no significant prejudice from the alleged errors when considered together or individually. Additionally, Trinh challenged the constitutionality of California's death penalty, but the court reaffirmed its previous rulings, stating that California's special circumstances sufficiently narrow the pool of eligible murderers for the death penalty. The court maintained that the statutory provisions do not allow for arbitrary imposition of the death penalty and that there are no constitutional requirements regarding jury findings or the need for unanimous agreement on aggravating factors. Lastly, the court concluded that established case law does not necessitate a reevaluation of its prior decisions concerning the death penalty's procedural constraints. The determination of penalties in capital cases, particularly regarding first-degree murder, does not involve factual findings that could increase punishment beyond the maximum established. Instead, these determinations represent a normative assessment outside the scope of Apprendi and related cases. The use of specific language in CALJIC No. 8.88, such as "substantial" and "warrants," as well as the omission of a "presumption of life," does not invalidate the instruction. Additionally, CALJIC No. 8.85 is not flawed by including potentially inapplicable aggravating or mitigating factors, as the trial court is not required to exclude these. Constitutional and statutory provisions governing capital punishment in California differ from those for regular felonies, and there is no requirement for intercase proportionality review nor for equal procedural protections for capital and noncapital defendants. The defendant's claim that California's use of capital punishment violates international norms and the Eighth Amendment fails, as the death penalty is strictly limited to first-degree murder under specific circumstances. The argument that the death penalty's application in this case breaches international law is also rejected, as it relies on previously disproven claims of constitutional violations during the trial. The trial court's judgment is affirmed in its entirety. The concurring opinion reinforces the rejection of the defendant's claim regarding discriminatory intent in the prosecutor's jury selection. An independent review of the case reveals that deference to the trial court's ruling is inappropriate. The prosecutor provided credible, race-neutral reasons for dismissing juror N.V., as detailed on pages 27-32 of the majority opinion. However, the trial court's rejection of the defendant's Batson motion was influenced by its own assumption that it was "suspicious" for a Vietnamese individual not to have a special interest in a case involving a Vietnamese defendant. This reasoning, based solely on racial assumptions, would be impermissible if presented by the prosecutor. The document cites precedents, including Batson v. Kentucky and Kesser v. Cambra, to illustrate that such assumptions cannot underpin Batson rulings. This case marks the second instance within a year where a trial court has denied a Batson claim while relying on its own stereotypes regarding a protected group. A reference is made to People v. Williams, where similar generalizations were made regarding Black women and their attitudes toward the death penalty. The trial court's analysis of the prosecutor’s reasons for striking N.V. reflects a series of questionable assumptions, including the notion that N.V.'s lack of interest in a high-profile case was unusual given his demographic background, and that his eagerness to serve on the jury was contradictory. The trial court also expressed concern about the dismissal of jurors based on their occupations, suggesting a broader pattern of bias. The mention of the high-profile "Lisa Peng case" serves to underscore the trial court’s reliance on community interest as a factor in its considerations. The trial court's analysis highlighted concerns regarding N.V., a Vietnamese-American, who did not show significant interest in the defendant's case after reading about it in the newspaper. The court expressed that it found this behavior "very odd" and "suspicious," further asserting—without evidence—that the entire Asian American community was engaged in discussions about the case. Although the prosecutor distanced himself from the court’s observations, these comments appeared to impact the court's evaluation of the prosecutor's credibility regarding N.V.'s views on the death penalty. The opinion emphasizes that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor's motives were racially motivated. Furthermore, it states that appellate courts should not defer to a trial court’s Batson rulings when those rulings are influenced by the court's assumptions about a racial or ethnic group. The text cites relevant case law, affirming that it is incorrect to assume that individuals from the same racial group share identical perspectives, regardless of their diverse backgrounds. The document also includes procedural details about the case, such as the court, judge, and counsel involved.