Datz v. Dosch

Citations: 2014 ND 102; 846 N.W.2d 724; 2014 N.D. LEXIS 104; 2014 WL 2208995Docket: 20130364

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court; May 28, 2014; North Dakota; State Supreme Court

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Kurt G. Datz appeals an amended judgment from the District Court of Burleigh County, which awarded primary residential responsibility to Helen A. Dosch, denied Datz's motions to vacate, strike, and recuse, and granted attorney’s fees against him. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 

The Court previously addressed this matter in Datz v. Dosch, 2013 ND 148, finding that the district court's findings on primary residential responsibility were insufficiently detailed for review. After the Court's initial decision, Dosch filed amended findings and the district court entered an amended judgment before the mandate was issued. Datz contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the amended judgment until after the mandate was issued, while Dosch argued that the court had jurisdiction based on procedural rules. 

Datz raised four main arguments on appeal: 1) the district court lacked jurisdiction for the amended judgment, 2) the merits of the amended judgment should not be examined due to its alleged void status, 3) the court erred in denying his motions to vacate and recuse, and 4) the award of attorney’s fees was erroneous. The Court noted the timing of the mandate and jurisdictional issues, indicating that if jurisdiction was lacking, it could temporarily return it to the district court for re-entry of its amended findings and judgment.

Challenges to a district court's subject matter jurisdiction in North Dakota are reviewed de novo when jurisdictional facts are undisputed. Once a notice of appeal is filed, the district court typically loses jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction begins. Any trial court order issued after an appeal is filed is generally void for lack of jurisdiction unless a mandate from the Supreme Court returns jurisdiction to the district court. 

Rule 41 of the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure governs mandate issuance, requiring that it be issued within 21 days of judgment or 7 days after a rehearing petition is denied, though the court may extend these timeframes. The mandate is effective only upon issuance, indicating that the timelines are not automatic. The district court lacked jurisdiction until the mandate was issued on October 1, 2013. Consequently, any amended judgment entered by the district court prior to the issuance of the mandate is void.

As the issues on appeal are interrelated and require further examination, the court remands the case to the district court for detailed findings consistent with prior opinions. The district court had jurisdiction for its subsequent order denying various motions and awarding attorney’s fees on October 1, 2013. 

The district court denied Datz’s motion to vacate the amended judgment, which Datz argues was an abuse of discretion due to lack of jurisdiction. Dosch contends that Datz failed to demonstrate how the district court abused its discretion and that the court reaffirmed its previous findings in denying the motion.

In Vann v. Vann, the court established that the standard of review for a district court's denial of a motion to vacate a judgment is for abuse of discretion. The appellate court does not evaluate the substantive correctness of the original judgment but assesses whether the district court acted arbitrarily, unconscionably, or unreasonably, or misapplied the law. The district court failed to provide a rationale for denying Datz's motion to vacate, only stating that other issues raised were without merit. Datz correctly argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the amended judgment before the appellate mandate was issued. Consequently, the denial of the motion to vacate was deemed a misapplication of the law, leading to a reversal of that order.

Additionally, the district court denied Datz's motion to strike certain exhibits, which Datz conceded he would no longer contest, thus the appellate court did not address this matter. Regarding Datz's demand for recusal, the district court also denied this request, with Datz claiming bias due to the court's actions without jurisdiction and lack of opportunity for input, among other reasons. Dosch, in response, argued that the denial was justified based on Datz's lack of credibility with the court.

A judge's recusal decision hinges on whether a reasonable person could question the judge's impartiality based on all relevant facts, as established in State v. Murchison. The law assumes judges are unbiased, and previous adverse rulings do not automatically indicate bias necessitating disqualification. Recusal is not required in response to vague accusations. A judge must adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct but is equally obligated not to recuse themselves in the absence of just cause, per State v. Jacobson. A district court's recusal decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, meaning the court's choice must not be arbitrary or unreasonable. In this case, without a hearing or detailed findings, it is unclear what factors influenced the district court's denial of the recusal request. Assertions of bias based on the judge's prior rulings or procedural decisions, such as adopting proposed findings without input from the opposing party, do not constitute sufficient evidence of bias. The district court's failure to provide a comprehensive explanation for its recusal decision does not indicate bias, as Datz's claims were deemed vague and unsubstantiated. Courts are not required to engage with inadequately supported arguments.

Datz claimed that the district court's award of attorney's fees indicated bias due to his demand for recusal. The court's rationale for awarding fees was not explicitly stated, but it suggested that Datz's claims lacked merit, the fee request was reasonable, and Datz could afford to pay. An erroneous opinion on case merits does not equate to bias. The court found Datz's allegations of bias vague and speculative, affirming the denial of his recusal demand. 

The district court granted Dosch attorney's fees totaling $873.62, justifying this amount as reasonable for responding to Datz’s motions. However, neither Dosch nor the court specified the legal basis for the fee award. The court's discretion in awarding attorney's fees is only overturned if deemed arbitrary or unreasonable. Datz argued that the court erroneously labeled his motions as frivolous without proper explanation and failed to follow procedural requirements for fees under N.D.C.C. 14-05-23, which necessitates specific findings on financial conditions and needs. The court only considered Datz's ability to pay, potentially constituting an abuse of discretion. Dosch defended the fee award by stating that Datz's motions were frivolous and made in bad faith, but the district court's reliance on relevant statutes was not evident in the record, so this argument remained unaddressed.

Under N.D.C.C. 28-26-01(2), a court is mandated to award reasonable actual and statutory costs, including attorney’s fees, to the prevailing party if a claim for relief is found to be frivolous. A claim is considered frivolous if it lacks actual facts or legal basis such that no reasonable person would expect a favorable judgment. The district court has discretion in determining the frivolity of a claim and the appropriateness of attorney’s fee awards. In this case, the district court awarded attorney’s fees to Dosch after deeming Datz's claims "without merit," although it did not explicitly label them as frivolous. The court referenced previous case law indicating that a claim without merit lacks supportive reasoning or legal citation.

Datz's motion to vacate was not deemed frivolous because the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend the judgment until a mandate was issued. Consequently, the denial of Datz's motion to vacate was viewed as a misapplication of law, and awarding attorney’s fees in this context was seen as an abuse of discretion. The court found insufficient information to evaluate the appropriateness of the awarded attorney fees and thus reversed the district court's fee award, remanding for further findings on the recoverability of fees related to Datz’s motion to strike and demand for recusal. Additionally, the court reversed the district court's amended judgment due to a lack of jurisdiction, remanding for detailed findings in line with a prior mandate. The court affirmed the denial of the recusal demand and did not address the motion to strike.