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Rice v. District of Columbia
Citation: Not availableDocket: Civil Action No. 2009-0310
Court: District Court, District of Columbia; June 17, 2009; Federal District Court
Original Court Document: View Document
On April 23, 2008, police officers John Stathers and Derek Starliper entered a residence in Northeast Washington, D.C., commanding occupants to “freeze.” Plaintiff Larry Rice, hearing this command while in a back room, attempted to escape through a window. Officer Stathers stopped him, leading to a struggle during which Officer Stathers shot Rice in the abdomen. Following the incident, Rice was arrested and charged with interfering with a government official, but the felony charge was dismissed by the prosecutor on January 21, 2009. Rice subsequently filed a Complaint against the officers and the District of Columbia, alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various torts, primarily focusing on excessive use of force and malicious prosecution. The defendants moved to dismiss the negligence and malicious prosecution claims, which Rice opposed. The court granted the motion for partial dismissal. The narrative provided by Rice in the Complaint contrasts with an affidavit from the officers, which claims Rice was hiding and assaulted Officer Stathers, leading to the discharge of the weapon during their struggle. Counts in the legal document include multiple allegations against Officers Stathers and Starliper, and the District of Columbia, encompassing battery, negligence, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent training and supervision, and violations of constitutional rights (14th and 4th Amendments). Defendants are seeking dismissal of Counts IV (negligence) and V (gross negligence), arguing they do not provide a separate cause of action from the battery claims. They also seek dismissal of Counts IX, X, and XI (malicious prosecution) due to the absence of a favorable termination in the underlying criminal case for Mr. Rice. The court has jurisdiction over the case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allowing federal district courts original jurisdiction for civil actions under federal statutes (28 U.S.C. § 1331) and supplemental jurisdiction over common law claims (28 U.S.C. § 1367). In applying the District of Columbia’s choice of law rules, the court will consider factors such as the location of the injury, the conduct, and the residency of the parties, confirming that D.C. law governs the common law claims as the relevant events occurred within its jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) addresses whether a complaint adequately states a claim, as mandated by Rule 8(a), which requires a short, plain statement demonstrating entitlement to relief. Complaints must provide fair notice to defendants of the claims, and while detailed factual allegations are not necessary, mere labels or formulaic recitations of elements are insufficient. Courts must accept factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, but these must raise a right to relief above the speculative level, with specific circumstances surrounding the claims being necessary. In this case, the defendants seek to dismiss Counts IV (negligence) and V (gross negligence), arguing they lack distinct causes of action separate from battery claims in Counts I, II, and III. For negligence claims to proceed, they must be distinct from battery allegations and supported by sufficient evidence. The precedent set in District of Columbia v. Chinn emphasizes that negligence cannot coexist with battery claims if the negligence is inherent in the battery itself. In Chinn, the court concluded that the plaintiff's allegations did not support a separate negligence claim, as the actions described constituted battery. While it is possible for a single course of conduct to support both intentional tort and negligence claims if there is a breach of a recognized duty, the complaint at hand fails to allege any such breach by the defendants. The allegations of excessive force leading to injury and reckless indifference do not constitute a separate negligence claim, as they do not identify a distinct recognized duty owed to the plaintiff. The trial court determined that a plaintiff's vague characterization of an action using terms like "carelessly and negligently" does not adequately establish a claim of negligence, as indicated in Chinn, 839 A.2d at 708. Mr. Rice's claims in Counts IV and V, based on Officer Stathers' alleged failure to act reasonably and to comply with regulations, were deemed insufficient to demonstrate a breach of a recognized duty of care. As a result, these counts will be dismissed, as a plaintiff cannot reframe a battery claim as negligence. For the malicious prosecution claim, Mr. Rice failed to meet the necessary criteria, particularly the requirement that the underlying criminal proceeding must have terminated in his favor. The dismissal of the underlying case did not address the merits and therefore was not considered favorable for a malicious prosecution claim, as established in Brown v. Carr, 503 A.2d 1241 (D.C. 1986). Additionally, Officers Stathers and Starliper were not liable for malicious prosecution since they did not initiate the charges against Mr. Rice, which were signed by another officer. Mr. Rice's motion to strike the Defendants' reply brief was deemed withdrawn after he recognized his error regarding its timeliness. His request to file a surreply was denied due to a lack of justification. Consequently, the court granted the Defendants' motion for partial dismissal, dismissing Counts IV, V, IX, X, and XI, while also denying Mr. Rice's motions regarding the reply brief and surreply. A formal order accompanies this opinion.