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Diffenderfer v. United States of America
Citation: Not availableDocket: Civil Action No. 2008-1338
Court: District Court, District of Columbia; September 22, 2009; Federal District Court
Original Court Document: View Document
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the Pharmacy Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in Reginald L. Diffenderfer's medical malpractice lawsuit due to his failure to comply with the mandatory notice provision of the District of Columbia Medical Malpractice Proceedings Act of 2006 (MMPA). The plaintiff, Diffenderfer, alleged that a tainted solution used during his cataract surgery at the Veterans Administration Medical Center led to complete blindness in his left eye. He filed the lawsuit nearly three years after the surgery but did not provide the required 90-day notice to the Pharmacy Defendants before initiating legal action, as stipulated by D.C. Code § 16-2802(a). The court determined that this noncompliance with the MMPA's notice requirement barred Diffenderfer from proceeding with his claims against the Pharmacy Defendants, ultimately concluding that he had failed to state an actionable claim. The primary issue is whether the MMPA mandates that Diffenderfer notify the Pharmacy Defendants before initiating this lawsuit. Diffenderfer argues that he is not required to notify them for two reasons: (1) he claims that "the court" in § 16-2802(a) of the MMPA refers solely to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, and (2) he asserts that his case is a product liability suit, not a medical malpractice suit as defined by the MMPA. However, these arguments are rejected. The first argument is deemed frivolous, as jurisdiction is established under the federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which necessitates applying District of Columbia law, reinforcing the aims of the Erie doctrine to prevent forum-shopping and ensure equitable law administration. Case law supports this view; in Bledsoe v. Crowley, the D.C. Circuit held that Maryland's pre-litigation arbitration requirement applied in diversity cases, and a more recent ruling in Davis v. Grant Park Nursing Home LP affirmed that the MMPA's notice requirement cannot be avoided by filing in federal court. Additionally, Diffenderfer's claim that the MMPA does not apply because his suit is not medical malpractice is countered by the inclusion of pharmacies and pharmacists as "health care providers" under the MMPA, suggesting that the legislature intended for such actions to fall within its scope. The Pharmacy Defendants are implicated due to their professional services related to Diffenderfer's surgery, and similar statutes in other states indicate that claims involving compounding and dispensing medicine are appropriately categorized under medical malpractice rather than product liability. Diffenderfer has not provided any legal authority to challenge the applicability of the "malpractice" provision to pharmacies and pharmacists involved in harmful compounding and dispensing. The MMPA was designed to manage and reduce costs related to medical malpractice lawsuits, and Diffenderfer's narrow interpretation would allow plaintiffs to bypass MMPA requirements, undermining reform efforts. The court confirms that the MMPA includes pharmacies and pharmacists in its definition of "health care providers," rejecting Diffenderfer's attempt to limit its scope. His noncompliance with the MMPA is decisive for the case against the Pharmacy Defendants. Although Diffenderfer argues for a waiver of the notice requirement based on perceived unfairness, the court finds no justification for this. The interests of justice do not dictate a waiver, especially since Diffenderfer was aware of the Pharmacy Defendants' identities as of August 2005 and could have adhered to the MMPA notice requirements. Consequently, the Pharmacy Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted. An appropriate order will follow.