Arnold v. the Islamic Republic of Iran

Citation: Not availableDocket: Civil Action No. 2006-0516

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; May 31, 2011; Federal District Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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U.S. servicemen and their families filed a lawsuit against the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security for their involvement in the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. This case, originally based on the "state-sponsored terrorism" exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) at 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7), was consolidated with similar actions and re-filed under the updated exception at 28 U.S.C. 1605A. The court previously determined that the defendants were responsible for the deaths and injuries of American servicemen and liable for emotional damages suffered by their families.

Currently, the court is addressing the plaintiffs' motion for payment to Special Master Susan Meek, who assisted the court by reviewing numerous documents and depositions. The request raises two issues: payment for Dr. Meek's work prior to the lawsuit and for work conducted after the suit was filed but before the establishment of 1605A, which is the only statute allowing for reimbursement of special master expenses under the FSIA. The court has already resolved the first issue and is now focusing on the second.

The background highlights the evolution of the state-sponsored terrorism exception, initiated in 1996, which faced challenges due to a ten-year statute of limitations and difficulties in compensating special masters. To address these issues, Congress enacted the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, which introduced 1605A, allowing for a federal cause of action against state sponsors of terrorism, punitive damages, compensation for special masters, and improved judgment enforcement mechanisms. The new provision specifically authorizes U.S. courts to appoint special masters for damage claims under this statute.

The Attorney General is mandated to transfer funds from the Victims of Crime Act to the Administrator of the United States district court for covering costs associated with special masters in state-sponsored terrorism cases. Payments made to special masters are classified as court costs. The NDAA retroactively applies the state-sponsored terrorism exception, allowing pending cases at the time of the Act's passage to be treated as if originally filed under the new exception, and enabling related actions to be pursued under section 1605A. This has led to instances where plaintiffs previously under section 1605(a)(7) refiled under 1605A. A legal question arose regarding compensating a special master for work completed before the 2008 Amendments when the case was later refiled under 1605A. While the Court suggested special masters could be compensated for prior work, the government has opposed this view. In the procedural history, a suit initiated in 2006 was amended in 2009 to include claims under 1605A, leading to the appointment of Dr. Susan Meek as a special master. The Court appointed her retroactively to when she began her work, but ultimately ruled it lacked authority to order payment for work done in cases involving different parties prior to the FSIA action's filing.

The Court declined to consider any time billed by Special Master Meek prior to March 10, 2006, the filing date of the case. However, it did not address the time billed during the period between the case's filing and the enactment of the NDAA, inviting the government's input on this issue. The government argued against compensation for pre-NDAA work in cases converted from 1605(a)(7) to 1605A, presenting three main points: (1) compensation under 1605A(e)(2) is limited to special masters appointed under 1605A(e)(1), which did not exist before the 2008 Amendments; (2) courts lack authority to direct payments without statutory authorization, which would infringe upon Congress’s control over treasury funds; and (3) the Court’s nunc pro tunc Order cannot retroactively apply where the statute does not permit it. In contrast, plaintiffs contended that the Court had the authority to appoint Dr. Meek prior to the 2008 Amendments and argued for the retroactive application of the entirety of 1605A, including its special master provisions. The Court concluded that the 2008 Amendments do permit payment for special masters' pre-NDAA work in cases transitioned from 1605(a)(7) to 1605A under 1083(c)(2) of the NDAA, but not under 1083(c)(3). Consequently, it ruled that Dr. Meek is not entitled to payment for work performed prior to the Amended Complaint. The analysis focused on congressional intent regarding the retroactive application of the special master compensation provision, employing a two-step methodology to determine whether the statute applies to pending cases at enactment, considering both express commands and the potential retroactive consequences.

The NDAA establishes a retroactive application for certain claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Specifically, it allows claimants under section 1605(a)(7) to request their cases be treated as if originally filed under section 1605A, provided the cases were pending as of the NDAA's enactment. The NDAA outlines procedures for both pending actions and related cases, allowing plaintiffs to seek the application of 1605A retroactively. The government contends that the special master provision in 1605A(e)(1) limits compensation to those appointed under this section, arguing there was no authority for such appointments before 2008. However, this interpretation overlooks the NDAA's retroactive provisions. The NDAA clearly permits plaintiffs from future cases involving incidents prior to the 2008 amendments to apply 1605A. Unlike statutes with mixed retroactive language, the NDAA distinctly allows for the retroactive application of its new state-sponsored terrorism exception, thus enabling plaintiffs to utilize either the prior case procedures or the related case procedures for retroactivity. Under the prior case procedures, cases converted to 1605A suits are treated as if they were originally filed under that section.

The 2008 Amendments to the state-sponsored terrorism exception, specifically 1605A, are directed to apply retroactively to ongoing litigation under the previous exception, 1605(a)(7). Courts are required to treat cases re-filed under 1605A as if they were originally filed under this provision, thereby allowing for punitive damages and the addition of claims under 1605A(d), which were previously unavailable. Courts have permitted plaintiffs to enforce execution measures available only under 1605A, reinforcing the retroactive application mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 1083(c)(2). This includes the appointment of special masters for cases converted to 1605A, who may rely on compensation provisions only if the case is brought under 1605A. The interpretation aligns with congressional intent and does not infringe upon the government’s control over treasury funds, as compensation must follow statutory limitations. The court's role is to uphold the distinct provisions of 1605A, ensuring that the intent of Congress is respected without undermining the statutory framework.

The Court has determined that Congress authorized courts to direct payment for pre-NDAA work in cases initially filed under 1605(a)(7) but later re-filed under 1605A. As a result, these consolidated cases remain under 1605(a)(7), making the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1605A(e) inapplicable since that section only applies to cases established under 1605A. Although plaintiffs may be unable to assert new claims under 1605(a)(7), legislative history shows Congress intended for all provisions of 1605A to apply retroactively. The NDAA’s 1083 section permits private claims and allows U.S. courts to appoint special masters for these claims, including those pending at the time of the NDAA's enactment. Despite the House Report's insights regarding retroactive application, concerns over liability issues with Iraq led to the veto of a predecessor bill, but the identical nature of the bills supports the intent for retroactivity in the NDAA. The statutes 1605A and 1083(c)(2) explicitly authorize payments for pre-2008 work, distinguishing this situation from OPM v. Richmond, where compensation was not authorized by federal law. The NDAA also specifies that related suits consist of an original case under 1605(a)(7) and a new case under 1605A, with no provision for converting a pending suit into a 1605A action, emphasizing that plaintiffs may initiate a new action based on the same incident as a prior timely suit.

1605A and 1083(c)(3) create a cause of action against state sponsors of terrorism for new actions under the NDAA, not for refiled old actions. Any case filed under 1605A must be initiated after the NDAA's enactment, thus avoiding retroactivity issues since related case procedures apply only to actions filed post-2008 Amendments. In this instance, Dr. Meek’s case originated under the earlier state-sponsored terrorism exception, allowing plaintiffs to seek conversion to a 1605A action under 1083(c)(2), but they failed to meet the 60-day deadline stipulated by Congress. Although the plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint in November 2009, which resembled re-filing under the NDAA, the Court acknowledged this as invoking related action procedures of the NDAA. The Court concluded that there was no justification to penalize the plaintiffs for amending rather than filing a new action, especially considering the inefficiencies of having simultaneous litigations. Consequently, the Court permitted the case to proceed under 1605A despite the plaintiffs not fitting the prior action procedures. However, the Court noted that it lacks a clear congressional mandate for retroactive application of the statute, as statutes apply to pending cases only with explicit congressional direction. Without such a directive, the Court must assess whether applying the statute would yield a retroactive effect, adhering to the presumption against retroactivity. If a retroactive effect exists, the statute would not apply to the conduct involved.

Relevant conduct by Dr. Meek occurred before the 2008 Amendments, and allowing payment under a later statute without explicit retroactive provisions would conflict with established legal principles and Congress' intent regarding the temporal scope of new laws. The language of 1083(c)(3) indicates that Congress aimed for plaintiffs to initiate new suits based on prior events rather than convert existing actions, a process outlined in 1083(c)(2). Consequently, the Court interprets the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint as initiating a "new" suit, limiting reliance on 1605(e) to conduct after this new action's initiation. Due to the plaintiffs' untimely invocation of prior action procedures, the Court rules it cannot authorize payment for Dr. Meek's work before the Amended Complaint was filed. The 2008 Amendments sought to address deficiencies in the handling of state-sponsored terrorism victims' claims, providing remedies intended for retroactive application where applicable. However, the Court determines that while 1605A(e)(2) permits payment for work performed prior to the 2008 Amendments in cases re-filed under 1605A, it does not apply to cases converted under 1083(c)(3). The plaintiffs did not seek the retroactive treatment as allowed by the NDAA, limiting any payment to Dr. Meek for work conducted after November 30, 2009. A corresponding Order will be issued. Signed by Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth on May 31, 2011.