Maverick Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Does 1 - 1,000

Citations: 276 F.R.D. 389; 80 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 883; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105494; 2011 WL 4351354Docket: Civil Action No. 2010-0569

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; September 19, 2011; Federal District Court

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Frank Digiovannangelo sought to intervene in Maverick Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Does 1-2,115 to quash a subpoena issued to his ISP or to dismiss the case, but his motion was denied on June 17, 2011. Following this, Maverick filed a motion for sanctions against Digiovannangelo’s attorney for allegedly frivolous filings, which was also denied. The background of the case involves Maverick's complaint against unnamed individuals for copyright infringement via BitTorrent, leading to an amended complaint listing 4,350 defendants identified only by IP addresses. The court initially granted Maverick permission to subpoena ISPs for identifying information of these defendants, with the stipulation that ISPs must notify defendants of their rights to challenge the subpoenas. Many defendants attempted to contest the subpoenas on various grounds, but the court found their motions premature, as no defendants had yet been formally named in the case.

In *Maverick Entm’t Grp. Inc. v. Does 1-2,115*, the court ruled that the anonymity of defendants involved in BitTorrent activity does not supersede the plaintiff's right to conduct limited discovery to identify copyright infringers. Frank Digiovannangelo, referred to as "the Movant," filed a motion to intervene to quash a subpoena directed at his ISP concerning IP address 173.59.37.2, claimed to be associated with him. He also sought to dismiss the case against him on grounds of misjoinder and lack of personal jurisdiction. The court denied these motions, reiterating its reasoning from a prior decision on May 12, 2011, which addressed similar motions from individuals identified by IP addresses in the complaint. Subsequently, the plaintiff sought sanctions against the Movant's attorney, asserting that the intervention motion was duplicative of previous filings that had been denied and constituted frivolous attempts to bypass court orders. The court clarified its denial of the Movant’s intervention, stating that while he filed timely, he failed to demonstrate a legally protected interest in the action, thus not meeting the criteria for intervention as a matter of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. The court also found permissive intervention unnecessary.

The Movant does not qualify for intervention as a matter of right under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) because he fails to demonstrate a "significantly protectable interest" in the litigation. A legally protectable interest must be established, not just any interest the Movant claims. The Movant argues for a right to confidentiality regarding identifying information requested by subpoenas, invoking a due process interest. However, the Court finds that privacy interests of the Movant are outweighed by the plaintiff’s need for discovery to protect copyrights, as established in previous rulings. 

The Movant's claim lacks sufficient legal standing because he is not a party to the lawsuit nor the subject of the subpoenas. Previous case law, such as in Maverick Entertainment Group and Arista Records, supports the notion that First Amendment rights to anonymity do not shield individuals from copyright infringement allegations in this context. The Court concludes that the Movant's interest in anonymity does not constitute a legally protected interest warranting intervention.

Additionally, the Movant's due process rights are not compromised, as he has not established a legitimate basis for claiming an opportunity to defend himself against the subpoenas. Thus, the request for intervention is denied.

Intervention is denied for the Movant based on several critical points. Firstly, the Movant is not named as a defendant in the case, meaning he is not subject to the Court’s jurisdiction and has no obligation to respond to potential copyright infringement claims. Consequently, personal defenses raised by the Movant are not appropriately before the Court at this stage. Should the plaintiff later proceed against him, he will have the opportunity to present a complete legal defense, including challenges to jurisdiction. 

Secondly, the assertion that the Movant's due process rights are violated by the denial of intervention is incorrect. The Court allows putative defendants to file motions to quash or dismiss without formal intervention, meaning the Movant can still raise personal jurisdiction defenses without intervening. 

Lastly, permitting intervention would undermine the plaintiff's right to choose defendants. Even if the Movant were allowed to intervene, the Court would still deny motions to quash or dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) since he is not formally accused of copyright infringement. Therefore, the Movant's attempt to intervene is deemed unnecessary and without practical effect. The Movant's reliance on the Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle case is misplaced, as that involved significant property interests related to regulatory decisions, which are not applicable here. In this instance, the Movant lacks a legally protected interest sufficient to justify intervention against the plaintiff's copyright claims.

Movant's due process rights remain intact, and permissive intervention under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) is deemed unnecessary. The court retains discretion in intervention matters, requiring the movant to establish an independent jurisdictional basis, timely motion, and common legal or factual issues with the main action. In this instance, the Movant lacks a legally protected interest justifying intervention, and their involvement would not aid in case resolution. The court has previously allowed potential defendants to participate without formal intervention, indicating that intervention would serve no practical purpose.

Additionally, the plaintiff's motion for sanctions is denied. Under Rule 11(b), attorneys must certify that their motions are not for improper purposes and are legally tenable. The court assesses whether a reasonable inquiry would reveal a lack of basis for the claims. The analysis considers that sanctions are severe and their impact on judicial proceedings. In this case, Mr. Menhart's motion to intervene to protect client confidentiality largely reiterated arguments previously made, but there is no indication of improper intent behind the motion, nor was it deemed unreasonable enough to merit sanctions. Therefore, the plaintiff's motion for sanctions against Eric J. Menhart is denied, with an order to be entered consistent with this opinion, dated September 19, 2011, by Judge Beryl A. Howell.