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Sherrod v. Breitbart
Citations: 843 F. Supp. 2d 83; 40 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1422; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19106; 2012 WL 506729Docket: Civil Action No. 2011-0477
Court: District Court, District of Columbia; February 15, 2012; Federal District Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Shirley Sherrod, a former Georgia State Director for Rural Development, has initiated a defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress lawsuit against bloggers Andrew Breitbart and Larry O’Connor. The defendants filed a joint Motion to Dismiss under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act of 2010 on April 18, 2011, despite the statute not being effective when the suit was filed in February 2011. The Court held oral arguments on July 19, 2011, and subsequently dismissed the motion on July 28, 2011. Following this, the defendants appealed, and on February 6, 2012, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for a statement of reasons regarding the dismissal. In addressing the defendants’ motion, the Court identified three key reasons for denial. First, the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act became effective on March 31, 2011, after the complaint was filed, and no legal precedent supports its retroactive application. The D.C. Court of Appeals has determined that only purely procedural statutes may be applied retroactively, and the Anti-SLAPP Act is considered substantive, as confirmed by its legislative history. Second, even if the statute were procedural, the Erie doctrine prohibits its application in federal court, as federal courts must apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. The defendants' reliance on a statute not effective at the time of filing has created a dilemma: if the statute is substantive, it cannot apply retroactively; if procedural, it is inapplicable in federal court under the Erie doctrine. Defendants' attempt to utilize the D.C. Anti-SLAPP statute for a special motion to dismiss is barred by the statute's explicit language. The statute mandates that such motions must be filed within 45 days of service of the claim. In this case, the complaint was served on February 12, 2011, giving defendants until March 30, 2011, to file their motion. However, defendants filed their motion on April 18, 2011, which is more than two weeks past the deadline, rendering it untimely and procedurally defaulted. As a result, the Court denied the defendants' Motion to Dismiss under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act. The judge expressed concern that the defendants may continue to pursue their motion, potentially wasting judicial and litigant resources.