Klayman v. Zuckerberg

Citations: 910 F. Supp. 2d 314; 41 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1171; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182598; 2012 WL 6725588Docket: Civil Action No. 2011-0874

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; December 28, 2012; Federal District Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Larry Klayman, acting pro se, filed a lawsuit against Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook, Inc., alleging assault and negligence. The case is currently before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, with the defendants seeking dismissal and transfer of the case. The court decided to grant the motion to dismiss, rendering the motion to transfer moot since it was an alternative request. 

Klayman, who is the Chairman and General Counsel of Freedom Watch, maintains a Facebook account and encountered a page titled "Third Palestinian Intifada," which incited violence against Jews and had significant user engagement. After a request from the Israeli Public Diplomacy Minister, Facebook eventually removed the page following initial delays. Klayman originally filed the case in D.C. Superior Court, which was removed to federal court by the defendants. He seeks injunctive relief against the publication of similar content, along with over $1 billion in damages and attorneys' fees. The defendants argue for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), which assesses whether the complaint adequately states a claim for relief.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must include a 'short and plain statement' demonstrating entitlement to relief, as outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). While detailed factual allegations are not necessary, a plaintiff must provide more than mere accusations to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and its grounds. A complaint must state a claim that is 'plausible on its face,' allowing for reasonable inferences of the defendant's liability based on the pleaded facts. Merely consistent allegations with a defendant's liability do not meet the threshold for plausibility. The court evaluates the motion by liberally construing the complaint in favor of the plaintiff and may only consider the facts within the complaint, attached documents, and judicially noticeable matters. Although factual allegations must be accepted as true, conclusory statements are not granted this assumption unless they plausibly indicate entitlement to relief. If material elements of the cause of action are absent, the court may dismiss the complaint without or with prejudice depending on the potential for amendment to cure deficiencies. Special consideration typically afforded to pro se pleadings does not apply to attorneys, who are expected to have familiarity with the legal system. 

The defendants argue that the Communications Decency Act (CDA) mandates dismissal of the complaint, while the plaintiff contends that the CDA does not bar his claims and that raising this as an affirmative defense in a motion to dismiss is inappropriate. The CDA states that no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher of information provided by another.

An 'interactive computer service' is defined under 47 U.S.C. 230(f)(2) as any system or provider enabling multiple users to access a computer server, including Internet access services and those operated by educational institutions. An 'information content provider' is defined as any entity responsible for the creation or development of information shared online (47 U.S.C. 230(f)(3)). The plaintiff argues against the application of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), focusing on public policy and legislative intent. However, the Court emphasizes adherence to the statute's plain language, stating that the CDA protects internet service providers from liability for third-party content (47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1)). To dismiss the case, the Court must affirmatively answer three questions: (1) whether the defendants are providers of an interactive computer service; (2) whether the plaintiff treats the defendants as publishers or speakers of third-party information; and (3) whether the content in question was provided by another information content provider. Courts generally recognize websites as interactive computer services, as confirmed by case law. The defendants operate a website allowing users to create and share information, qualifying them as interactive computer service providers. Lastly, if the plaintiff's claims arise from the defendants' roles as publishers or speakers, CDA Section 230(c)(1) protects them from liability.

Lawsuits that seek to hold service providers liable for actions akin to traditional editorial functions are prohibited. The term 'publisher' is interpreted as one who reviews, edits, and decides whether to publish or withdraw third-party content. In this case, the plaintiff asserts state law claims of assault and negligence. While there is a dispute over whether District of Columbia or California law applies, both jurisdictions share identical definitions and elements for these claims. Assault consists of an intentional attempt to cause physical harm, while negligence requires proving a duty owed by the defendant, a breach of that duty, and resulting injury. The plaintiff alleges the defendants facilitated an assault through their actions on Facebook and breached a duty of care by allowing threatening content to remain. The defendants' potential liability stems from their status as publishers based on their conduct related to the content posted on their platform. The plaintiff contends that their claims arise from breaches of contractual and fiduciary obligations, thus arguing against immunity under the Communications Decency Act (CDA). However, the court notes that the complaint lacks any mention of a contractual cause of action, distinguishing it from the precedent case cited by the plaintiff.

References to a breach of contract are viewed as an unsubstantiated cause of action, as the plaintiff only raised the issue in response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiff, identified as a prominent lawyer, did not include a breach of contract claim in his initial complaint despite the viability of such a claim. The court notes the plaintiff's failure to assert this claim or amend his complaint when given opportunities to do so. Consequently, the court declines to allow the plaintiff to modify his complaint to include a breach of contract claim.

Regarding liability under the Communications Decency Act (CDA), the plaintiff acknowledges that another entity created the contested information but argues that the defendants also qualify as information content providers. The defendants counter that they are not liable as they did not create or develop the offending content. Previous case law suggests that liability as an information content provider hinges on whether a defendant is responsible for the creation or development of the specific content in question. The plaintiff has not demonstrated that the defendants created the content of the postings, which weakens his claims.

The court emphasizes that a defendant cannot be held liable under the CDA unless they contributed to the content in question. The plaintiff's allegations focus on the defendants' failure to remove a Facebook page rather than their involvement in the content creation, which undermines the argument that the defendants acted as information content providers concerning the material in dispute.

Defendants are not classified as information content providers under the Communications Decency Act (CDA). The Court concluded that: (1) defendants provide an interactive computer service; (2) the plaintiff's complaint seeks to hold defendants liable as publishers or speakers of third-party information; and (3) defendants do not qualify as information content providers regarding the contested information. Consequently, they are immune from legal action, leading to the granting of their motion to dismiss. The Court referenced prior cases establishing that merely manipulating third-party information does not reclassify an interactive computer service provider as an information content provider. The Court will issue a related Order following this Memorandum Opinion.