Thomas Robins v. Spokeo, Inc.

Citations: 742 F.3d 409; 2014 WL 407366; 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2136Docket: 11-56843

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; February 4, 2014; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal by the district court of Thomas Robins's lawsuit against Spokeo, Inc. for alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The panel concluded that Robins had established Article III standing to sue due to the publication of inaccurate personal information about him. The district court had previously dismissed the case, asserting that Robins did not sufficiently allege an actual or imminent injury, noting that his claims were based on concerns about potential future harm related to employment and credit. The appellate panel clarified that the district court was not bound by its previous ruling on standing, as it retained jurisdiction and had not yet submitted the case to a jury. Legal counsel for both parties presented arguments, with Robins represented by Edelson LLC and Spokeo defended by Mayer Brown LLP. Amicus briefs were submitted in support of Spokeo by Experian Information Solutions, Inc. and the Consumer Data Industry Association.

Robins filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleging willful violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), claiming that a website inaccurately portrayed him as having a graduate degree and being wealthy, both of which he contests as false. Robins, currently unemployed, asserted that this misinformation harmed his employment prospects, causing him financial loss and emotional distress. Spokeo moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Robins lacked standing under Article III. On May 11, the district court denied the motion, finding that Robins had sufficiently alleged an injury in fact stemming from Spokeo’s dissemination of inaccurate consumer information, which was traceable to Spokeo’s actions and redressable by the court.

Subsequently, on September 19, after Spokeo sought to certify an interlocutory appeal, the district court reversed its earlier ruling, determining that Robins did not adequately plead an injury in fact and that any injuries claimed were not traceable to Spokeo’s alleged violations, resulting in the dismissal of the case. Robins appealed, arguing that the law-of-the-case doctrine should prevent the court from revisiting its prior decision. However, precedent established in United States v. Smith clarified that this doctrine does not apply when a court has not been divested of jurisdiction. The district court had not lost jurisdiction nor submitted the case to a jury, allowing it to reconsider its ruling.

On appeal, Robins contended that the FAC sufficiently established Article III standing and that the May 11 decision was correct. He cited various statutory provisions from the FCRA that he claimed were violated, asserting that these create enforceable rights allowing him to seek legal recourse. He maintained that the injury required for standing could arise from the violation of these statutory rights alone.

The district court determined that subject-matter jurisdiction hinged on Robins' standing, referencing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno. Spokeo's assertion that the First Amended Complaint (FAC) lacked facts supporting willfulness was rejected. 'Willful' violations under 15 U.S.C. 1681n encompass reckless disregard for statutory duties, as established in Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr. Robins' allegations suggest Spokeo acted with such disregard by being aware of inaccuracies in its reports while still marketing them for FCRA-covered purposes, despite disclaiming those uses.

The district court identified three standing elements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent; (2) the injury must be traceable to the defendant's actions; and (3) it must be likely that a favorable decision would redress the injury. General factual allegations may suffice at the motion to dismiss stage, as noted in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.

In cases involving statutory rights, two main propositions apply: (1) the creation of a private cause of action implies that Congress intended to establish a statutory right; and (2) a violation of such a right typically constitutes a sufficient injury for standing, as established in Fulfillment Servs. Inc. v. United Parcel Serv. Inc. and Edwards v. First Am. Corp. Spokeo argued that Robins needed to demonstrate actual harm to sue under the FCRA, but the statute allows for claims of willful violations without showing actual harm, as outlined in 15 U.S.C. 1681n(a). Courts have supported the idea that the FCRA permits recovery even without identifiable actual damages.

The statutory text does not limit liability to cases of overcharging, thus confirming that Robins has demonstrated an injury sufficient for Article III standing. Spokeo's interpretation, suggesting the FCRA would present constitutional issues, was not convincing to the court.

The analysis of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) indicates that constitutional issues regarding congressional standing are not problematic. The court references *Lujan*, emphasizing that while Congress cannot create individual rights from general public interests, it can elevate certain concrete injuries to legally cognizable status. The court evaluates whether violations of FCRA rights constitute such injuries. Citing the Sixth Circuit's decision in *Beaudry*, the court identifies two key requirements for standing: the plaintiff must be among those injured by the violation and the statutory right must protect against individual harm. Robins satisfies both conditions by alleging personal violations of his statutory rights. His individual interests in the management of his credit information are deemed concrete, allowing for Congress to elevate them as actionable injuries.

The court further notes that standing also requires causation and redressability, which are typically satisfied when a statutory right is violated. The alleged breach by Spokeo is directly linked to the statutory provision, and remedies such as monetary damages under the FCRA address the violation. Consequently, Robins has sufficiently established causation and redressability, leading to the conclusion that he has adequately asserted Article III standing. The ruling is reversed and remanded, affirming Robins's standing based on alleged statutory violations, without addressing additional potential injuries or the merits of the case regarding Spokeo's status as a consumer reporting agency or the actual violation of the FCRA.