People v. Sanchez

Citation: Not availableDocket: G047666

Court: California Court of Appeal; January 20, 2014; California; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Marcos Arturo Sanchez was convicted by a jury of possessing a firearm as a felon, possessing a controlled substance while armed, and active participation in a criminal street gang, with a gang enhancement attached to the first two charges. The trial court bifurcated the state prison allegation, and Sanchez admitted to prior prison time. He received a seven-year sentence, which included terms for the drug charge, the gang enhancement, and the state prison enhancement, with concurrent terms for other counts.

Sanchez contested the sufficiency of evidence for the gang crime and enhancements. The Attorney General conceded that the conviction for active gang participation should be reversed due to Sanchez acting alone, referencing the case of People v. Rodriguez. However, the court upheld the gang enhancements, rejecting Sanchez's argument that they should also be reversed based on his solitary actions.

The court published the decision to address Sanchez's claims regarding the admission of certain evidence, including statements in STEP notices, field identification cards, and a police report, which he argued were inadmissible hearsay, excessively prejudicial, and violated his confrontation rights. The court rejected these arguments.

On October 16, 2011, Officers Capacete and Vergara, on patrol in Santa Ana, observed Sanchez acting suspiciously in an area known for drug activity. Upon making contact, Sanchez fled into an apartment after appearing to conceal something. A bystander indicated he did not belong to the apartment, and as officers approached, they heard children inside and ordered Sanchez to the ground from outside the door.

Jesus R., a young boy, witnessed an unknown man enter his apartment and run to the bathroom, followed by police who apprehended the man. Jesus's mother observed Vergara aiming a gun at the intruder. The police searched both the man and the apartment, finding no drugs or firearms inside. However, they discovered a gun and a plastic baggie outside the bathroom window on a blue tarp belonging to Baudencio Castillo, who resided below the apartment. Castillo had not authorized anyone to place items on his tarp but permitted police to retrieve them. The plastic baggie contained 14 bindles of heroin and four Ziploc baggies of methamphetamine, indicating they were packaged for sale.

Gang expert David Stow provided insights into the Delhi gang, which claimed the 1800 block of South Cedar as its territory and had over 50 members involved in drug sales and illegal weapon possession. He referenced previous convictions of gang members, including Jose Ochoa and Yvonne Rodriguez, for drug-related offenses while participating in Delhi. Stow indicated that gangs control narcotics sales in their territories.

Defendant was known to police as an active member of the Delhi gang. In June 2011, he received a STEP notice about Delhi's criminal activities, acknowledging his four-year association with gang members. Stow detailed several incidents involving the defendant, including being present during shootings and being in the company of known gang members during police contacts, reinforcing his status as an active participant in the Delhi gang.

The prosecutor presented a hypothetical scenario related to the defendant's arrest, leading Stow to conclude that the defendant’s actions benefitted the Delhi gang, particularly through the possession of firearms and involvement in drug sales. Stow asserted that the defendant instilled fear in the community by entering a stranger's apartment, which was associated with gang activity, thereby promoting the gang's reputation through intimidation. The parties stipulated that the defendant was a convicted felon at the time of the charged offenses and had personal knowledge of heroin and methamphetamine as controlled substances. 

In the defense case, Vicki Ramirez, the defendant's cousin, testified she spoke with him shortly before his arrest and did not see him with any weapons or drugs. She noted that he was employed at the time. Lacy Aguilera, another witness, stated that she spent time with the defendant before his arrest and also did not observe any illegal items, emphasizing his frequent visits to her apartment.

The discussion section addresses the sufficiency of evidence regarding the defendant's conviction for active participation in a criminal street gang. The defendant argues that the evidence does not support this conviction because he acted alone. The standard of review requires that evidence is viewed favorably to the judgment and must be reasonable and credible enough for a jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Notably, the Attorney General acknowledged that the defendant could not be convicted of active gang participation since the evidence indicated he acted alone, as established in the case of People v. Rodriguez, which clarified that such a conviction requires proof of promoting or assisting gang-related conduct by others.

The court reversed the defendant’s conviction for violating section 186.22, subdivision (a) because evidence indicated he acted alone, which does not support a conviction under that statute. However, the jury affirmed gang enhancements related to his other convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a controlled substance with a firearm. Under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), an enhancement applies if a felony is committed for the benefit of or in association with a gang, requiring specific intent to promote criminal conduct by gang members. The defendant argued that, similar to the active participation conviction, he should not face a gang enhancement since he acted alone. The Supreme Court clarified that for a conviction under subdivision (a), at least two gang members must be involved, but a gang member acting alone can still face enhancements under subdivision (b)(1). This distinction was reinforced by differing views from the justices, with Justice Corrigan emphasizing the necessity of promoting gang conduct for the substantive offense, and Justice Baxter agreeing that the enhancement applies even if the defendant acts alone.

Justice Baxter delineated the distinctions between two subdivisions of California Penal Code section 186.22, emphasizing that the enhancement provision in subdivision (b)(1) does not necessitate the involvement of multiple gang members, unlike subdivision (a). Subdivision (b)(1) allows for enhancement based on an individual's intent to promote gang-related criminal conduct, regardless of whether they act alone, while subdivision (a) explicitly requires joint criminal action by at least two gang members. This indicates that the terms concerning gang 'members' should not be interpreted identically across both subdivisions. 

Additionally, while subdivision (a) necessitates that the defendant's actions directly promote gang member conduct, this direct linkage is absent in subdivision (b)(1), which only requires the defendant to intend to assist gang members without implying that the underlying felony must involve multiple participants. A majority of the Supreme Court has determined that an individual can be subjected to the gang enhancement under subdivision (b)(1) even when acting alone, with dissenting justices acknowledging that subdivision (a) could apply to solitary felons.

Regarding the gang expert's testimony, the defendant challenged its sufficiency as substantial evidence to support the gang enhancement. However, the court found the expert's opinion was grounded in facts substantiated by evidence, thus reinforcing the officer’s conclusions. The defendant's reference to In re Frank S. was noted, where the minor possessed a weapon for protection against rival gangs, but this case did not undermine the expert testimony in the current matter.

The prosecution's gang expert testified that the minor was an active gang member and that his possession of a weapon benefited his gang, as it could be used for protection. However, the court found the gang enhancement unsupported by substantial evidence, noting that the expert's opinion on the minor's intent was not backed by other evidence. There was no proof that the minor was in gang territory, with gang members, or intended to use the knife in a gang-related offense. The only supporting evidence was the minor's statement that he needed the knife for protection after being assaulted.

In contrast, the evidence against the defendant indicated a clear link to gang activity. Testimony established that the gang, Delhi, was involved in drug sales and illegal firearm possession. The defendant was charged with possessing drugs while armed, with significant quantities of heroin and methamphetamine, suggesting intent to sell. The gang expert testified that selling drugs in Delhi’s territory required sharing profits with the gang, providing a reasonable basis for concluding the defendant's actions benefited the gang. 

The court affirmed that the evidence, including the expert’s testimony, justified the jury's finding that the defendant’s crimes were gang-related, as the activities were not solely for personal gain but also intended to benefit the gang.

Defendant challenges the admission of evidence from STEP notices, FI cards, and police reports on several grounds: hearsay, violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and excessive prejudicial impact under Evidence Code section 352. The trial court's discretion in admitting expert testimony is broad, and its rulings are typically reviewed for abuse of discretion, except when constitutional issues regarding confrontation arise, which are reviewed de novo. 

Regarding hearsay, the court finds the defendant's objection is precluded by the Supreme Court's ruling in People v. Gardeley, affirming that expert opinions can rely on reliable hearsay, even if it is otherwise inadmissible, as long as it meets reliability standards. Evidence Code section 802 allows experts to explain the bases for their opinions, even if those bases include inadmissible material.

The trial court's discretion under Evidence Code section 352 allows for the exclusion of evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for undue prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury. This section differentiates between damaging evidence, which may indicate guilt, and evidence that evokes emotional bias against the defendant. The defendant's claims about prejudicial statements regarding his associations with gang members and incidents involving firearms and narcotics are considered in this context.

California courts acknowledge the prejudicial nature of gang evidence, which can carry negative implications when linked to criminal activities. The California Supreme Court has ruled against admitting such evidence if only marginally relevant to the charges. In a case involving a defendant connected to gang activities, statements he made about socializing with gang members, alongside various police reports detailing past incidents involving gang members and firearms, were deemed relevant to establish his active participation in the gang. The court found that the evidence was not overly prejudicial and supported the gang expert's conclusion that the defendant's drug and gun offenses were gang-related. The defendant's argument that the statements were prejudicial because they were made to non-expert officers, rather than the gang expert, was rejected. The trial court’s decision to admit the evidence was upheld under Evidence Code section 352.

Furthermore, the defendant argued that admitting statements from police encounters violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation since these statements were introduced through a gang expert rather than the officers who originally received them. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to confront witnesses, as established in Crawford v. Washington, which restricts the admission of testimonial statements from unavailable witnesses unless there was prior cross-examination. While the definition of "testimonial" remains somewhat undefined, it generally includes statements made during police interrogations. The court clarified that testimonial statements are protected under the confrontation clause, but such statements can still be used for purposes other than proving the truth of the matter asserted, particularly in non-evidentiary contexts like addressing emergencies.

The United States Supreme Court has not clarified whether the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause is violated when a gang expert relies on hearsay statements from absent witnesses that the defendant cannot cross-examine. Prior to the Crawford v. Washington decision, California courts determined that such hearsay statements, when used by an expert to form an opinion, are not offered for their truth. This principle, established in People v. Gardeley, remains binding. As a result, even if the hearsay statements are deemed testimonial, they can still be admitted since they are not offered for their truth.

Subsequent cases, including People v. Sisneros and People v. Ramirez, reaffirm that the confrontation clause applies to testimonial statements offered for their truth, not to those used by experts to support their opinions. In People v. Hill, while the court acknowledged the binding nature of Gardeley's ruling, it questioned the assumption that hearsay can assist the jury in evaluating an expert's opinion without considering the truth of the statements. Hill reviewed a New York case, People v. Goldstein, which criticized Gardeley’s reasoning, arguing that the distinction between hearsay offered for its truth and hearsay used to inform an expert's opinion is not meaningful in the context of the Sixth Amendment.

Despite these critiques, the Hill court noted that most hearsay used to support an expert's opinion would likely not be considered testimonial, as they often arise from consensual conversations unrelated to specific criminal prosecutions. This reasoning applies to the current case as well.

In 2007, the defendant was present when his cousin was shot, and he informed police about his background in the Delhi territory and his cousin's associations with gang members. There was no indication that either the defendant or his cousin was in custody or suspected of any crime during this police interaction, which focused solely on the shooting of the cousin. In another incident the same year, the defendant was with Salinas during a drive-by shooting, where Salinas identified his assailant as a member of the Alley Boys gang. Although Salinas's statement could be considered testimonial in a trial against his shooter, it was not deemed testimonial for the defendant’s trial concerning an offense occurring four years later. The court referenced the confrontation clause from Crawford v. Washington, emphasizing that for a statement to be testimonial, the declarant must have a reasonable expectation that their statement would be used against someone in a future prosecution. The defendant argued he was denied the right to confront police officers who recorded statements, but the court concluded that if the statements were not testimonial, their recordation also could not be considered testimonial. The defendant did not claim that the prosecution improperly used a gang expert as merely a conduit for inadmissible hearsay. Consequently, the conviction for violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a) was reversed, and the trial court was instructed to amend the judgment accordingly, while the rest of the judgment was affirmed.