Certainteed Corp. v. Superior Court

Citations: 222 Cal. App. 4th 1053; 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 539Docket: B253308; B253311; B253316; B253330

Court: California Court of Appeal; January 8, 2014; California; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Petitioners CertainTeed Corporation, FDCC California, Inc., Oscar Erickson, Inc., and Foster Wheeler LLC filed petitions against the Superior Court of Los Angeles County regarding deposition limits under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.290. This section stipulates a maximum of seven hours or 14 hours for witness depositions, with allowances for additional time if justified. The court affirmed that the provision for extra time applies to both limits, but the trial court retains the discretion to impose restrictions in the interest of justice.

The factual background involves William Hart filing a personal injury complaint due to asbestos exposure, with the court granting him trial preference due to serious health concerns. As the trial was set for January 14, 2014, Hart's counsel conducted a direct examination lasting approximately 14 hours. Defendants then sought additional time to complete their examination, but the court ruled that they were limited to 14 hours based on section 2025.290, subdivision (b)(3), denying the motion for more time. The ruling emphasized the trial court’s discretion in managing deposition lengths while adhering to statutory provisions.

On December 10, 2013, the court issued an order limiting the defendants' ability to depose the plaintiff to fourteen hours, raising significant due process concerns due to the complexity of the case involving over seventy defendants and thirty years of asbestos exposure across multiple jobsites and products. The court denied the defendants’ request for additional deposition time, citing ambiguity in Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.290 regarding the court's discretion to grant such extensions, particularly in cases where a deponent has a serious illness that may affect their survival. The order emphasized that the ruling was based on this ambiguity, not the court's discretion. The trial court characterized the issue as a "controlling question of law" with substantial grounds for differing opinions, which could materially impact the litigation across similar cases in Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego Counties. 

On December 23, 2013, the trial court reaffirmed its order, denying an ex parte application challenging it. Subsequently, Certainteed Corporation and other defendants filed petitions for writ of mandate on December 24, 2013, seeking an immediate stay of the trial and challenging the order. These petitions were consolidated, and on December 27, 2013, the appellate court indicated its intent to issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its December 10 order and allow the defendants to depose the plaintiff for additional time. However, the appellate court did not grant a stay of the trial, leaving the trial court to determine the appropriateness of continuing the trial date. The trial court declined to vacate its order on December 30, 2013. Written returns were filed by the plaintiff and defendants in early January 2014. Multiple parties, including various corporations and municipalities, joined in the petition challenging the order.

The trial court, in its December 30, 2013 order, declined to modify its decision, believing a published opinion would benefit the legal community. Petitioners argue that section 2025.290, subdivision (a) provides an exception to the 14-hour deposition limit in subdivision (b) when additional time is necessary for a fair examination of the deponent. The court reviews statutory interpretations independently, aiming to determine legislative intent through the statute's language, which is interpreted in its ordinary meaning and context. Clear language is presumed to reflect the Legislature's intent, while ambiguous language may involve examining legislative history and public policy.

Section 2025.290, effective January 1, 2013, mandates that depositions, except as limited by subdivision (b) or court orders, are capped at seven hours, but allows for additional time if necessary for a fair examination or due to circumstances impeding the process. Subdivision (b) specifies exceptions, particularly for complex cases designated by the court unless a physician attests that the deponent has a medical condition that severely limits their survival. In such cases, depositions are limited to two days with a maximum of 14 hours total. The Legislature intended that the exclusions in this section do not alter existing deposition time limits or the rights to seek protective orders, emphasizing the court's discretion to limit depositions to prevent undue hardship.

Section 2025.290 establishes a seven-hour limit on depositions, which can be overridden by court orders, including case management orders, indicating the limit is presumptive. Courts have the discretion to allow additional time beyond this limit. However, subdivision (b) lacks similar language, creating ambiguity about whether court orders can also exceed the 14-hour limit specified in subdivision (b)(3). The statute's second sentence in subdivision (a) mandates that courts must allow additional time beyond any limits if necessary for a fair examination of the deponent, thereby applying this requirement to the 14-hour limit as well. Legislative history does not suggest an intent to prevent courts from granting additional time when needed for fairness in depositions. The inclusion of the phrase "beyond any limits imposed by this section" reinforces that both limits are subject to judicial discretion. The trial court expressed concerns about fairness if additional time was denied, suggesting the defendants needed more than 14 hours to adequately depose the plaintiff. The court's denial of additional time was based on its interpretation of statutory ambiguity regarding its authority, but the conclusion is that section 2025.290 not only permits but obligates the court to allow additional deposition time when necessary, unless limited for other valid reasons.

Subdivision (c) grants the court discretion to limit a deposition to protect parties or individuals from undue annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or expense. Immediate relief is justified when a petitioner’s right to relief is clear and there are no factual disputes, as outlined in *Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court*. The accelerated Palma notice procedure applies only in exceptional circumstances requiring urgent decisions. In this case, the trial court’s denial of additional time for the plaintiff’s deposition, based on its interpretation of section 2025.290, subdivision (b)(3), was erroneous. The trial court must reassess the defendants’ motion, considering the plaintiff’s health, right to a preferential trial date, and the necessity for further examination. The ruling emphasizes the need for expediency to complete the deposition without delaying the trial. The petitions for writ of mandate are granted, instructing the trial court to vacate its previous order and reconsider the motion based on the relevant factors. The decision is final upon filing.