State Of Washington, V Jeffrey S. Moore And Mario Gadea-rivas

Citation: Not availableDocket: 42707-9

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; December 19, 2013; Washington; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Jeffrey S. Moore and Mario Gadea-Rivas are appealing the superior court's affirmation of the district court's denial of their motions to dismiss DUI charges due to alleged violations of CrRLJ 3.3, which governs trial time limits. Both appellants contend that the superior court incorrectly determined that the district court's failure to timely schedule a trial date was remedied under CrRLJ 3.3(a)(4). They also argue that Moore's absence from motion hearings reset the trial timeline under the same rule. The appellate court reversed the superior court's ruling, asserting that the lack of timely trial scheduling necessitates dismissal of the charges. 

Moore was arrested for DUI in 2009 and underwent a breathalyzer test. After being arraigned on May 11, 2009, several pretrial hearings were rescheduled, during which Moore waived his trial rights multiple times. A trial initially set for November 30 was canceled without a new date being established. Moore’s last waiver on May 24, 2010, reset the trial commencement date to June 1, with an expiration on September 1. The district court did not set a new trial date, anticipating resolution of a joint motion to suppress involving numerous defendants. Throughout this period, Moore was absent from several hearings, but the court did not require his presence nor issue bench warrants for his absences. The court communicated only with defense attorneys about hearing dates, not directly with the defendants. The State’s motion to continue the suppression hearing was granted at an August 27 hearing where Moore was also absent, leading to further delays in his case.

Moore's counsel did not object to resetting the status hearing beyond the September 1 trial expiration date, and Moore did not waive his time for trial. The district court did not set a new trial date before September 1. At a September 24 status hearing, the district court rescheduled the Vosk Motion for November 5 without objection from Moore's counsel. Moore again did not waive his time for trial, and no new trial date was set. The State sought to continue the Vosk Motion hearing on October 27, and during a November 3 teleconference, Moore's counsel expressed concerns about speedy trial rights, but the continuance was granted, moving the hearing to December 13. Neither Moore nor his counsel attended this hearing, and on January 20, 2011, the district court denied the Vosk Motion for all defendants. The following day, a pretrial hearing was set for Moore on February 17, where he moved to dismiss the DUI charge due to expired trial time and objected to trial dates beyond existing deadlines. At a March 29 pretrial, Moore filed a written motion to dismiss for failure to adhere to time for trial rules. The district court scheduled a hearing on this motion for April 21 and set a new trial date for May 18. After continuing the April hearing to May 5, the court denied Moore's motion to dismiss.

Mario Gadea-Rivas, arraigned on December 2, 2009, waived his time for trial multiple times, with his last waiver expiring December 31, 2010. He filed a motion to suppress breathalyzer results, which was combined with the Vosk Motion. Like Moore, he waived attendance for Vosk Motion hearings. The court denied the Vosk Motion on January 20, 2011, and set Gadea-Rivas's trial for February 28. He moved to dismiss the DUI charge on February 7 for violation of the time for trial rule, but the court denied this motion on February 22.

Both Moore and Gadea-Rivas appealed to the superior court, which consolidated and denied their appeals. The court also denied their applications for writ of prohibition and mandamus, finding that any failure to comply with time for trial rules was cured under CrRLJ 33(a)(4) due to delays caused by the Vosk Motion, and that trial commencement dates reset after their failure to appear at a previous hearing, making Gadea-Rivas's trial date timely. Moore and Gadea-Rivas sought discretionary review of the superior court's denial, which was granted, and their cases were consolidated.

Moore and Gadea-Rivas contend the superior court incorrectly determined that 1) the district court's failure to set trial dates within the time limits of CrRLJ 3.3 was remedied under CrRLJ 3.3(a)(4), and 2) their non-appearance at hearings after May 24, 2010, reset their trial timeline. Moore additionally claims the superior court erred in asserting that his trial counsel was ethically obligated to inform him of court hearings. The court agrees with the first two points, leading to a reversal of the superior court's decision, thus not addressing Moore's third argument.

For standards of review, the district court's decisions are reviewed per RALJ 9.1, engaging with factual issues for substantial evidence and legal issues de novo. CrRLJ 3.3 regulates trial timelines in limited jurisdiction courts, and because the language of CrR 3.3 is substantially similar, it may be referenced in district court cases. The application of the time for trial rule to specific facts is a legal question reviewed de novo. Non-compliance with CrR 3.3 mandates dismissal regardless of demonstrated prejudice. Uncontested findings of fact on a motion to dismiss under CrR 3.3 are treated as established on appeal, while a trial court’s denial of such a motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 

CrRLJ 3.3 stipulates that the State must bring a defendant to trial within 60 days if detained and within 90 days if not. The court is responsible for ensuring trials align with these rules, and failure to meet the timeline necessitates dismissal with prejudice. A defendant’s trial commencement date resets if they fail to appear at required proceedings, with the new date being the next appearance. Moore’s trial commencement date was set at his arraignment on May 11, 2009, and since he was not in custody, the State had 90 days to bring him to trial.

Moore's trial commencement date was reset each time he filed a written waiver of his right to a timely trial or failed to appear at required proceedings. After his last waiver on May 24, 2010, with a commencement date of June 1, 2010, the deadline for trial was set to September 1, 2010. On March 29, 2011, Moore filed a motion to dismiss due to the state's failure to bring him to trial within the required timeframe, leading to a new trial date of May 18, 2011. The district court reasoned that Moore's absence from hearings between May 24, 2010, and February 17, 2011, constituted a waiver of his trial rights.

However, the record does not indicate that Moore's presence was mandated at these hearings, as there were no court orders requiring him to attend. CrRLJ 3.4 specifies that a defendant must be present at critical stages of trial, but status conferences and continuance motions are not included as mandatory appearances. The court's interpretation in State v. Branstetter clarified that a defendant's absence only resets the trial commencement period if their presence is required by a court rule or order. The State failed to demonstrate that Moore was required to appear at the hearings in question or that his absence hindered the case's progress. Moore contended that the only hearing necessitating his presence was the Vosk suppression motion hearing, for which he had filed an accepted waiver, asserting he did not violate CrRLJ 3.3(c)(2)(ii) as the other hearings did not require his presence.

The district court incorrectly reset the trial commencement date for Moore based on his absences from hearings, treating these absences as waivers of the time for trial rule, which led to a violation of CrRLJ 3.3(b)(2)(i). The court set Moore's trial date for May 18, 2011, exceeding the expiration of his last waiver on September 1, 2010. Although the district court and parties had made efforts to ensure waivers were executed for continuances and to keep trial dates within the required timeframe, the failure to reset the trial date before the expiration of Moore's last waiver constituted a failure to comply with the rules. The superior court's upholding of the district court's denial of Moore's motion to dismiss, based on delays caused by the Vosk Motion involving over 100 defendants, was also disputed since the parties had extended the time for trial through successive waivers. 

Regarding Gadea-Rivas, the district court ruled similarly, asserting that his failure to appear at hearings reset his trial commencement date. However, applicable rules do not mandate a defendant's appearance at status hearings or motion hearings. Gadea-Rivas had waived his time for trial rights multiple times, with his last waiver expiring on December 31, 2010. The trial date set for February 28, 2011, was beyond the permissible 90 days, and his motion to dismiss on these grounds was denied. Overall, the courts' interpretations of the rules regarding trial delays and waivers were deemed erroneous.

The district court did not specifically order Gadea-Rivas to appear for missed status or continuance hearings, which under Washington case law (CrR 3.4(a)) does not necessitate a defendant's presence. Consequently, both the district and superior courts erred in concluding that Gadea-Rivas' absence reset his trial commencement date. The superior court also ruled incorrectly that delays not addressed by CrRLJ 3.3 or 4.1 justified the denial of Gadea-Rivas' motion to dismiss related to the Vosk Motion, which sought to suppress breath test results. Despite prior extensions of the trial expiration date through waivers, the failure to extend the deadline in this instance does not excuse the lack of timely trial. Therefore, CrRLJ 3.3(h) mandates a remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss the charges against both defendants with prejudice. The superior court's affirmation of the district court's denial of their motions to dismiss DUI charges is reversed.