Christopher F. F. Hopper v. Joseph F. and Bette P. Hopper

Citations: 155 Idaho 801; 317 P.3d 698; 2013 WL 6198245; 2013 Ida. LEXIS 305

Court: Idaho Supreme Court; November 26, 2013; Idaho; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Christopher F.F. Hopper, representing himself and his family, appealed a district court's ruling that dismissed his tort claims against his ex-wife Suzanne Swinnerton, her family, and others. The case stemmed from a divorce and custody dispute following their marriage in 1999 and the birth of their son C.H. in 2003. After a series of moves and legal actions initiated by Suzanne—including a domestic violence protection order and a divorce petition in Montana—temporary custody of C.H. was granted to her. Christopher filed for divorce in Ada County shortly after. Following a trial, the magistrate court awarded sole custody to Suzanne, but this decision was later overturned by the Idaho Supreme Court, which mandated a new custody determination. The district court's judgment was ultimately affirmed.

In July 2008, an order established joint legal and physical custody of C.H. to Suzanne and Christopher following a remand. Christopher initiated the current case in June 2005, post-original custody determination but pre-appeal to the Supreme Court, on behalf of himself, his son, and his parents. He asserted multiple claims against Suzanne, her family, her lawyer, and friends, including tortious interference with parent-child and grandparent-child relationships, emotional distress, alienation of affections, fraud, defamation, parental kidnapping, custodial interference, and civil conspiracy. 

On April 7, 2006, the district court granted summary judgment, dismissing claims against Gerald Swinnerton, Betty Swinnerton, and Emily Lanier due to lack of personal jurisdiction, removing C.H. as a plaintiff for lack of standing, and disqualifying Christopher from representing his parents. The court also granted summary judgment on claims for alienation of affections, malicious interference, civil conspiracy, defamation against Suzanne Swinnerton and Christina Gentry, and claims under I.C. 18-4506. 

A stay was imposed in May 2006 pending the outcome of a related case, lifted on October 30, 2008. In September 2009, the court determined Ms. Stevens's legal files were privileged and unreviewable by Christopher. On April 18, 2011, the district court granted summary judgment on the remaining claims, striking some of Christopher's affidavit evidence, ruling that Joseph and Bette Hopper lacked standing, and dismissing claims for fraud and emotional distress. The case was ultimately dismissed, with the court awarding attorney fees and costs to the Respondents. The Appellants filed a timely appeal. The standard of review for the summary judgment is consistent with the district court's application, where the appellate court reviews legal questions freely and assesses the trial court's discretion based on established criteria.

The Court requires that claims on appeal be substantiated with relevant arguments and legal authority, as established in prior cases such as Bach v. Bagley and Jorgensen v. Coppedge. Arguments must clearly present the appellant's contentions regarding the issues on appeal, supported by citations to legal authorities and relevant parts of the transcript. Issues merely mentioned in passing, without cogent argument, are not considered. An appellant must assert assignments of error with particularity; vague attacks on the district court's findings without specific evidentiary reference are insufficient. The Court will not search the record for errors, and failure to adhere to appellate rules results in waiver of those issues. In this case, Christopher submitted three opening briefs for himself and his parents, but they were effectively combined into a 156-page document lacking proper issue identification and legal support. Most of his claims lack merit due to Idaho law or insufficient evidence. The Court upheld the district court's decision regarding the admissibility of an affidavit submitted by Christopher, emphasizing that the admissibility of evidence is a threshold issue before assessing its sufficiency for trial.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requires that affidavits for summary judgment be based on personal knowledge, include facts admissible in evidence, and demonstrate the affiant's competence. The admissibility of such testimony is reviewed by the court under an abuse of discretion standard. In this case, the district court correctly exercised its discretion by determining the inadmissibility of Dr. Stephenson’s affidavit and an exhibit due to their incompleteness and lack of contextual relevance. The court also found the affidavit was submitted late without justification. The court's reasoning in identifying these evidentiary deficiencies aligned with the legal standards. Additionally, the district court properly dismissed claims for alienation of affections of a child and malicious interference with family relations, as these torts are not recognized in Idaho law. The Appellants incorrectly cited Shields v. Martin to support their claims; the court clarified that the torts in question do not exist within Idaho's tort framework, leading to the appropriate summary judgment dismissal of these claims.

The district court ruled correctly that Idaho Code 18-4506 does not create a civil cause of action for damages. Appellants contended that their claims for a private cause of action or negligence per se under this statute were valid. However, 18-4506, which penalizes child custody interference, does not include provisions for civil remedies. The statute defines child custody interference as the intentional and unauthorized taking or withholding of a minor child from a parent or guardian, both before and after custody actions are initiated. 

Although courts can create a new cause of action if a statute implies a need for civil remedies, the inquiry primarily focuses on legislative intent. The court indicated that without explicit legislative intent to imply a private remedy, it must assume that the legislature provided the remedies it deemed appropriate. The appellants failed to demonstrate any clear legislative indication favoring a private cause of action, merely asserting that the legislature intended for the statute to be enforced, which it is through criminal sanctions.

Regarding negligence per se, a statute must clearly define conduct standards, aim to prevent the specific harm caused, protect the plaintiff's class, and establish the violation as the proximate cause of injury for a plaintiff to recover. Thus, the district court appropriately denied recognition of a private cause of action under 18-4506, maintaining that the statute does not support such claims.

The district court determined that none of the Defendants were convicted or found in violation of Idaho Code 18-4506, and the Appellants failed to present any evidence indicating a triable issue regarding the Respondents' alleged violations. The Appellants' argument relied solely on a quotation from a 2004 magistrate court decision that did not address 18-4506, thus lacking relevance. Consequently, the Respondents were granted summary judgment concerning negligence per se. 

Regarding the fraud claims, the Appellants contended the district court erred in granting summary judgment, outlining the necessary elements of fraud, as established in Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass’n. The district court explained that failing to prove any element of fraud against any defendant would be detrimental to the claim. The Appellants alleged false statements made by Defendant Suzanne Swinnerton and others acting on her behalf, but did not provide specific supporting facts for these claims, rendering them insufficient to oppose summary judgment.

Moreover, the Appellants argued that the Respondents should have disclosed Suzanne's plans to abscond with C.H., asserting that silence can constitute fraud when a duty to disclose exists. However, they failed to identify which Respondents had such a duty or provide legal precedent supporting their claims. Ultimately, the Appellants did not offer specific evidence regarding any failure to disclose, leading to the dismissal of their fraud claims.

Appellants claim that Respondents conspired to take C.H. to Montana while assuring Plaintiffs that this was not occurring and that the child would remain in Idaho. However, the lack of specific supporting facts renders these claims inadequate to withstand summary judgment. The district court properly granted summary judgment on the fraud claim due to Appellants' failure to establish the necessary elements of fraud.

Additionally, the court dismissed claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which require: 1) intentional or reckless conduct; 2) extreme and outrageous behavior; 3) a causal connection to emotional distress; and 4) severe emotional distress. Under Idaho law, emotional distress claims must also involve physical injury or manifestations. Appellants did not present sufficient evidence of extreme conduct or severe emotional distress, with Joseph’s deposition indicating no intentional actions by Respondents toward him or his wife.

Appellants assert two specific actions as extreme: allegations made by Suzanne intended to prevent Christopher from seeing C.H. and the theft of luggage by Deena Kolb. However, they failed to demonstrate that these actions were extreme or that they suffered any injury from them. Evidence in the record does not support the claim for emotional distress, as Bette’s testimony about her physical symptoms was vague and lacked concrete instances of distress.

In Idaho, emotional distress claims require a physical manifestation of distress, as evidenced by headaches, stomach issues, and loss of appetite reported by Bette following C.H.’s kidnapping. Appellants failed to establish any emotional distress or support their claim that Respondents engaged in extreme conduct, leading to proper summary judgment. 

Regarding defamation, Appellants must demonstrate that the defendant communicated defamatory information about them and caused damage. They waived their defamation claim by not providing necessary record citations or legal authority. Their assertion that Chris Bray heard defamatory statements from the Kolbs lacks clarity and context. The district court previously ruled such statements as inadmissible hearsay, and Appellants did not sufficiently challenge this ruling or provide supporting evidence, resulting in the upholding of summary judgment on this claim.

The district court correctly struck the civil conspiracy claim, noting that conspiracy itself is not a standalone cause of action in Idaho; actionable claims arise only from wrongful acts resulting in injury. Appellants did not present substantive evidence of a conspiracy, justifying the dismissal.

Lastly, the district court awarded attorney fees to the Respondents, which is within judicial discretion in civil cases. Such fees are warranted only if the action was pursued frivolously or without foundation. Appellants bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of this discretion, which they have not accomplished.

Appellants did not meet their burden of proof, failing to provide a rational definition of frivolous in relation to their case, despite extensive attempts to rehash the record. This reexamination illustrates the frivolous nature of the litigation. The district court acted within its discretion when awarding attorney fees and costs to the Respondents, as the Appellants did not present strong arguments or legal authority to support their claims. The remaining issues raised by the Appellants have been deemed moot due to their lack of merit. These moot issues include allegations of jurisdictional errors, representation rights, dismissal of parties, and standing. The Respondents are entitled to attorney fees on appeal under I.C. 12-121, as the Appellants’ claims are deemed frivolous. Although Christopher was treated unfairly in a previous case, his appeal appears motivated by personal grievances rather than genuine legal concerns. Attorney fees will be awarded against Christopher, Joseph, and Bette Hopper, but not against the minor, C.H. The district court's judgment is affirmed, and attorney fees and costs are awarded to the Respondents named.