State v. Barraza

Citations: 104 P.3d 172; 209 Ariz. 441; 443 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 5; 2005 Ariz. App. LEXIS 2Docket: 1 CA-CR 02-0591

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; January 11, 2005; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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Mayra Isabel Barraza was convicted of second-degree murder after the stabbing death of Gregorio Espinoza, who was found with over sixty stab wounds. Barraza's connection to the crime was established through physical evidence and a piece of paper with her name found in the victim's vehicle. Initially denying involvement, Barraza later admitted to stabbing Espinoza, claiming it was in self-defense against an attempted sexual assault. Despite her request, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the "crime prevention" defense under A.R.S. § 13-411, reasoning it did not apply since Barraza was an invited guest and not defending her residence. The court did provide a self-defense instruction but denied a clarification that would have defined forcible rape as deadly physical force, which limited the jury's ability to consider her actions as self-defense. Barraza was sentenced to twenty-two years in prison and appealed the conviction, asserting errors in jury instruction. The appellate court concluded that the trial court's decision to deny the crime prevention instruction was correct and affirmed the conviction.

Denial of a requested jury instruction by a trial court is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, while the appropriateness of the instructions given is reviewed de novo. Barraza argues she was justified in stabbing the victim to prevent sexual assault and claims entitlement to jury instruction on the "crime prevention" defense under A.R.S. § 13-411. Determining legislative intent involves examining the statute's context, language, historical background, and purpose, with a preference for clear statutory language. Related statutes should be construed together, and terms are given their commonly understood meanings unless specified otherwise. The scope of § 13-411 and its interplay with other justification statutes has been frequently litigated, with courts addressing its broad application against narrower justification statutes established in 1983. Historically, § 13-411 permits the use of deadly force to prevent non-imminent aggravated assaults, which contrasts with other statutes requiring an immediate threat to personal safety before using deadly force, potentially allowing § 13-411 to encompass more restrictive statutes like § 13-405.

Thomason is a pivotal case addressing the relationship between A.R.S. § 13-411 and other justification statutes. Thomason was charged with first-degree murder after shooting a business competitor's manager, claiming he acted in self-defense under § 13-411 to prevent an aggravated assault. The trial court denied his request for a jury instruction based on § 13-411, opting instead for instructions under §§ 13-404 and -405, resulting in a conviction for second-degree murder. On appeal, Thomason argued that his situation warranted application of § 13-411. 

The appellate court recognized a conflict between § 13-411 and other statutes but harmonized them by limiting the application of § 13-411 to scenarios involving the protection of a home, its contents, or residents from physical force or threats thereof. This interpretation aligns with legislative intent and minimizes statutory overlap. Subsequent cases, including Korzep and Taylor, affirmed this narrow construction, emphasizing that the justification defense applies only when protecting a home and its residents, and clarified that actions can be taken before an intruder physically enters a home if a reasonable relationship exists between the threatened criminal acts and the household.

In Hussain, the court equated an occupied motel room to a home for § 13-411's purposes, and later decisions further defined "resident" to be less restrictive. However, in the case of Barraza, the court declined to extend § 13-411's application to her assault on a home resident, distinguishing her situation from Garfield where the individual acted on the resident's behalf. Unlike Garfield, Barraza could not demonstrate she was protecting the sanctity of the victim's home.

Extending the provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-411 to allow a nonresident to attack a resident in their home would undermine the legislative intent to fully protect a person's home and its occupants. Therefore, the claim that the jury should have been instructed under § 13-411 is rejected. Regarding Barraza's appeal concerning the self-defense jury instruction based on §§ 13-404 and 13-405, the State argues that Barraza has abandoned her trial court argument by not raising the specific claim on appeal that the instruction violated State v. Grannis. The appellate court concurs, noting that the only argument presented is based on Grannis, which addressed a misstatement regarding the use of deadly force in self-defense. The jury instruction in this case correctly stated that deadly force could be used against apparent threats of deadly force, thus complying with Grannis. Barraza's trial counsel's request to instruct the jury that "forcible rape is deadly physical force" was not argued by appellate counsel, leading to the conclusion that this issue was also abandoned. The court emphasizes the necessity for proper argumentation in appeals and confirms that there was no fundamental error in the jury instruction.

Reversal for fundamental error may occur even if not raised on appeal if such error is "clearly apparent" from the record. In State v. Stroud and State v. Taylor, it was established that appellate courts need not overlook obvious fundamental errors in criminal proceedings. Although the trial court issued a correct self-defense instruction, its refusal to instruct the jury that a sexual assault constitutes "deadly physical force" did not deny Barraza a fair trial; thus, the issue was not addressed. The conviction of Barraza is affirmed.

In dissent, Judge Barker emphasized that the justification defense under A.R.S. 13-411 is intended to protect the sanctity of the home, including guests. The interpretation that invites guests are excluded from protection undermines this principle, especially in cases of sexual assault. The dissent argues that the language of the statute does not limit protection to residents alone and supports the notion that both residents and invited guests should have the same legal standing in self-defense scenarios. The dissent further contends that excluding guests from A.R.S. 13-411 protections creates an unfair disparity in a resident's legal rights within their home compared to public spaces.

The supreme court emphasizes that legislative intent must consider the effects and consequences of different interpretations of statutes. An example illustrates the issue with the majority's interpretation of statute 13-411, which allows homeowners to use deadly force for self-defense but denies the same right to invitees, such as an eighteen-year-old girl named Mary. In a scenario where both residents and invitees are assaulted, the majority's interpretation leads to inconsistent applications of the law: John, as a resident, can defend himself against an assault, while Mary, as an invitee, cannot defend herself against John, despite both being victims of the same attack. This inconsistency is deemed illogical and unsupported by the statute's language or underlying policy. Furthermore, the majority's rationale misapplies the principle that a home is a sanctuary by suggesting it only protects residents against intruders, neglecting the rights of invited guests. The document argues that invited guests should have equal protections, regardless of the assailant's status as a resident, as supported by precedent. The conclusion is that the majority's interpretation is erroneous and creates illogical consequences, while a proper construction would extend protections to invitees against residents in self-defense situations.

The crime of sexual assault under A.R.S. 13-1406(A) is defined as engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact without consent. A.R.S. 13-411 allows for the use of physical force, including deadly physical force, when "immediately necessary to prevent" such an assault. This provision is crucial as it permits the use of deadly force in situations where the victim is defending against sexual assault, even if the assault is not accompanied by deadly threats. The legislative intent emphasizes the importance of self-defense in sexual assault cases, given alarming statistics on the prevalence of such crimes.

The court should interpret statutes to uphold legislative intent and protect victims, particularly those invited into a home. The trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on A.R.S. 13-411, based on the notion that it does not apply to invited guests, is deemed erroneous. 

Jury instructions are warranted if supported by evidence, and in this case, there was evidence that the defendant, invited into the victim's home, used a knife in self-defense against an alleged sexual assault. Consequently, it was an error to deny the instruction based on 13-411. The court further examines whether this error was harmless, noting that the defendant's actions and prior statements complicate the determination of whether the error influenced the verdict.

The jury was not properly instructed on self-defense, which allowed them to disregard crucial evidence supporting the defendant's claim of acting in self-defense during a sexual assault. Key points included the defendant’s assertion that she stabbed the victim due to a sexual assault, the absence of robbery as a motive (since money was not taken), the medical examiner's testimony aligning the stab wounds with defensive actions during an assault, the defendant's young age (seventeen), and her lack of reporting the incident. Additionally, there was evidence of a previous sexual assault committed by the defendant and indications that the victim was violent when intoxicated.

The trial judge instructed the jury that deadly force could only be used in response to deadly physical force from the victim, which the state argued was not applicable. The judge also did not allow for consideration of using deadly force to prevent sexual assault, which would have enabled the jury to evaluate the self-defense evidence even if they concluded the victim did not use deadly physical force.

The flawed instruction on deadly physical force potentially influenced the jury's verdict, making the error significant rather than harmless. The dissent emphasizes the importance of allowing a jury to consider self-defense claims, particularly concerning sexual assault, under the correct legal standards. Furthermore, the dissent argues against the majority's exclusion of invitees from protection under the relevant statute, asserting it contradicts the statute's plain language and underlying policy.

An instruction under Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-411 would have favored Barraza by allowing a presumption that her actions in stabbing the victim were reasonable, provided she believed deadly force was necessary to prevent a sexual assault. The legislative "Declaration of policy" highlights the alarming rate of home burglaries and emphasizes the intent to protect residents and their homes, asserting that the law should uphold the sanctity of the home. This reflects the "Castle Doctrine," which permits individuals to use deadly force without a duty to retreat when unlawfully attacked in their homes, safeguarding against imminent threats of death, serious injury, or forcible felonies. "Deadly physical force" is defined as force aiming to cause death or serious injury or posing a substantial risk thereof. The dissent notes the State's claim that the victim did not engage in conduct constituting deadly physical force but suggests that Barraza's actions stemmed from a premeditated plan to assault rather than self-defense. The majority distinguishes this case from State v. Garfield, noting that Garfield did not involve a resident attacking an invitee, although it acknowledged principles applicable to the present case, emphasizing the importance of interpreting § 13-411 in light of legislative intent.