Andrew R. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security

Citations: 224 P.3d 950; 223 Ariz. 453; 573 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 25; 2010 Ariz. App. LEXIS 4Docket: 1 CA-JV 08-0167

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; January 14, 2010; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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The Court of Appeals of Arizona addressed the application of Rule 60(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to A.R.S. section 25-812(E), which pertains to challenges of voluntary acknowledgments of paternity. Andrew R. (Appellant) appealed the juvenile court's decision that granted Jessica H. (Mother) relief from a judgment of paternity under Rule 60(c)(3) and denied Appellant's request for a change in physical custody. The appellate court concluded that the juvenile court should have applied the six-month time limit stipulated in Rule 60(c)(3) to Mother's motion, leading to the vacating of the court's orders and remanding the case for further proceedings, including a reconsideration of custody issues.

The factual background reveals that Mother, aged seventeen at the time of her child's birth in July 2007, initially did not name a father on the birth certificate. After living with Appellant and signing an acknowledgment of paternity in December 2007, a new birth certificate was issued in January 2008 naming him as the father. Subsequent to their move into an apartment with Mother's brother, who had a troubling history, Child Protective Services began an investigation due to unsanitary living conditions and alleged drug use. Following this, the Arizona Department of Economic Security filed a dependency petition, asserting that both Mother and Appellant were unfit to parent. The juvenile court ruled the child dependent as to Mother and placed her in the custody of the maternal grandmother. During a hearing, Appellant contested the dependency allegations and acknowledged the possibility that he might not be the biological father, though he maintained his legal standing as the child's father due to the acknowledgment of paternity.

The court recognized a "presumption of paternity" for Appellant but allowed ADES to add fathers John Doe and Randy B to the dependency petition, although ADES later chose not to amend it. Appellant pursued extensive visitation and engaged in mediation, parent aide services, and substance abuse assessments. At a June 11, 2008 pretrial conference, ADES agreed to an in-home dependency placing the child with Appellant, but objections from Mother and the guardian ad litem led to a request for a paternity test. The court maintained the current placement and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for June 25, 2008.

During the June 25 hearing, physical custody changes to Appellant or Mother were discussed but met with objections. A contested evidentiary hearing on custody motions was set. At a July 14, 2008 hearing, Appellant's counsel advised Mother to formally challenge the paternity acknowledgment under Rule 60(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. On August 1, 2008, Mother filed a "Notice of Request for Relief from Judgment of Paternity," claiming the acknowledgment was fraudulent and under duress.

Contested hearings were held on August 13 and 20, 2008, resulting in conflicting testimonies. The court denied Appellant's motion to dismiss Mother's Rule 60(c) motion as untimely and directed her to file a written motion for paternity testing of Randy B. The guardian ad litem supported Mother's request, while ADES backed Appellant. 

On October 6, 2008, the juvenile court granted Mother's Rule 60(c) motion, relieving her from the paternity presumption and denying ADES's custody change motion. The court deemed Mother's motion timely, asserting that earlier hearings raised questions about Appellant's paternity. It found the acknowledgment of paternity fraudulent due to the parties' disbelief in Appellant's paternity. Additionally, the court ruled that Mother's request wasn't barred by unclean hands, noting her lesser complicity in the fraud. The motion for custody change was denied without prejudice, pending paternity testing for Randy B. and the child. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on October 10, 2008, claiming the juvenile court erred in its rulings.

The juvenile court is recognized as best equipped to evaluate evidence, assess credibility, and make factual determinations in dependency actions. Consequently, appellate courts will not overturn the juvenile court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous and unsupported by reasonable evidence. However, the interpretation of statutes and rules is reviewed de novo, with the primary aim of discerning legislative intent through the statute's plain language. If a statute's wording is clear and unambiguous, it is applied as written; ambiguity prompts a deeper examination of context, historical background, and related statutory provisions to achieve consistency in interpretation.

According to A.R.S. 25-812(A)(1), paternity of a child born out of wedlock can be established through a notarized statement signed by both parents. Once signed, this acknowledgment is presumed valid until disproven. A.R.S. 25-812(D) allows for this acknowledgment to be filed with relevant agencies, granting it the same authority as a court judgment regarding paternity. Either parent may rescind this acknowledgment for any reason within sixty days of signing it. Therefore, the mother had the option to revoke her acknowledgment of paternity within sixty days following her signature on December 14, 2007.

After the sixty-day rescission period, challenges to paternity acknowledgments can only be made based on fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the challenger. A.R.S. 25-812(E) establishes this limitation. Additionally, Rule 60(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that motions for relief from judgment based on similar grounds must be filed within six months of the judgment or order. In this case, the mother's motion, filed on August 1, 2008, was untimely as it occurred more than six months after the acknowledgment of paternity was executed on December 14, 2007. The superior court correctly denied the motion as time-barred, as it was not filed within the required timeframe following the court's last order granting grandparent visitation.

The juvenile court's attempt to toll the six-month limit was unpersuasive. Awareness of the potential that the appellant was not the biological father did not satisfy the requirement for timely filing a motion as per Rule 60(c)(3). Furthermore, Rule 6(b) prohibits extending the time for actions under specified rules unless particular findings are made, which did not apply here. The juvenile court could not rely on Rule 60(c)(6) for relief either, since that provision cannot be based on grounds provided in the first five subsections of Rule 60(c). Given that A.R.S. 25-812(E) restricts challenges to acknowledgments of paternity to specific grounds, and since the mother’s motion was based on those restricted grounds, it could not invoke Rule 60(c)(6) to bypass the six-month requirement, leaving no independent justification for relief under that rule.

Mother references the case Dockery v. Central Arizona Light & Power Co. to argue that the juvenile court retains authority to vacate a judgment based on fraud, even after the six-month period for filing a Rule 60(c)(3) motion has elapsed. Although Dockery predates the adoption of Rule 60(c) in 1937, it is presumed that the case is not superseded by the rule. However, Mother’s motion does not qualify as an independent action for extrinsic fraud, which is defined in Honk v. Karlsson as fraud that prevents a party from learning of a proceeding or asserting a claim. For fraud to grant jurisdiction to vacate a judgment, it must be extrinsic and prevent a party from fully presenting their case, as established in Dockery.

Further analysis of legislative history indicates that A.R.S. 25-812, which outlines paternity establishment procedures, was introduced in 1989 and amended in subsequent years to include mechanisms for challenging voluntary acknowledgments of paternity. Notably, in 1996, language was added to subsection (D) that limits challenges based on Rule 60(c) to instances of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, reflecting a legislative intent to restrict collateral attacks on paternity acknowledgments. The 1997 amendments reaffirmed this limitation. The legislature did not explicitly disavow the time constraints of Rule 60(c) while incorporating its provisions into A.R.S. 25-812(E), suggesting an intention to maintain those limitations.

A strong public intent exists to prioritize a child's best interests by ensuring permanency. The interpretation of "at any time" in A.R.S. 25-812(E) as inclusive of the six-month limitation in Rule 60(c)(3) would permit indefinite paternity challenges, contradicting legislative intent. The court emphasizes the need for finality in paternity acknowledgments, indicating that the ability to challenge should be limited after a certain point, aligning with the provisions of A.R.S. 25-812(E) and Rule 60(c). Consequently, the juvenile court's acceptance of Mother's late Rule 60(c)(3) motion was erroneous, leading to the vacating of its orders and remanding for further proceedings regarding custody without commenting on the merits of the custody motion.

In dissent, Judge Weisberg argues against the majority's view that Rule 60(c)(3) imposes a time limit on A.R.S. 25-812(E). He stresses that the court's primary role is to interpret statutes based on their plain language, asserting that the statute explicitly allows challenges to paternity acknowledgments at any time post the sixty-day rescission period. Weisberg contends that the majority's interpretation undermines the statute's clear wording and renders the phrase "at any time" meaningless.

The phrase "at any time" is interpreted to mean without limitation, as supported by case law and dictionary definitions, indicating that it is not constrained by the six-month time limit imposed by Rule 60(c). Legislative history reveals that amendments to Arizona's paternity acknowledgment laws did not establish specific time limits for challenges, demonstrating a legislative intent to allow such challenges beyond a set timeframe. While Rule 60(c) contains a six-month limitation to ensure finality in judgments, this principle is less applicable in cases concerning acknowledgments of paternity. The context of paternity acknowledgment, which typically does not involve the complexity and multiple parties often seen in civil cases, suggests that the need for finality should be balanced against the opportunity for legal challenges.

A voluntary acknowledgment of paternity under A.R.S. 25-812 is typically uncomplicated, seldom disputed, involves few parties, and can be executed without legal assistance. Laypersons may not grasp that the six-month time limit of Rule 60(c) applies when contesting a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity under A.R.S. 25-312(E) due to a lack of explicit language. The significance of paternity actions, impacting the mother, putative father, and child, necessitates prioritizing a resolution on the merits over finality, especially when actual paternity is in question; thus, a natural father's right to a determination should not be dismissed. Additionally, genetic testing offers a reliable method for establishing paternity, eliminating reliance on potentially inaccurate assumptions due to fraud, duress, or mistake. When a proper party seeks clarity regarding paternity, any uncertainties should be conclusively addressed through scientific evidence. Consequently, the juvenile court's orders should be upheld.

Facts and inferences are assessed favorably for the juvenile court’s findings. Both Mother and Appellant, who were over eighteen, voluntarily signed an acknowledgment of paternity without coercion. Test results related to paternity were not included in the record. During a hearing on August 13, Mother's counsel indicated that a Rule 60(c) motion was based on subsection (3). Appellant objected to this motion on August 15, arguing it was untimely and asserting no fraud had occurred; he also claimed that the doctrine of unclean hands should bar Mother's relief if fraud was found. Appellant filed his opening brief on December 22, 2008, while the dependency case continued. At a January 5, 2009 hearing, the juvenile court noted Randy B. did not appear for a paternity test and recognized Appellant as the child's legal father per the birth certificate. The court maintained the dependency status of the child under the care of ADES, endorsed family reunification, and allowed visitation with Appellant. A signed order for the child's placement with Mother was issued on January 9, 2009. By March 9, 2009, the juvenile court dismissed the dependency petition, and Mother's counsel requested to withdraw from the appeal, leading to the appointment of appellate counsel for her. Mother's appellate counsel attempted to dismiss the appeal on April 23, 2009, but Appellant contested this, insisting the paternity issue remained unresolved. The court denied the dismissal and reinstated the appeal, with Mother submitting her answering brief on June 18, 2009. The best interest of the child remains the primary concern in dependency cases. Paternity for children born out of wedlock can be established by mutual agreement on genetic testing, supported by laboratory certification. Challenges to an acknowledgment of paternity under Rule 60(c) may be made beyond the initial sixty-day period only based on fraud, duress, or material mistake, with the challenger bearing the burden of proof, and the legal obligations of signatories remaining in effect during the challenge unless good cause is shown.

The court is mandated to order genetic testing for the mother, her child, and the alleged father to ascertain biological relationships through inherited characteristics, including blood and tissue types. If clear and convincing evidence indicates that the established father is not the biological father, the court will vacate the paternity determination and terminate the father's child support obligations. The term "party to the proceeding" is not clarified in terms of its application to individuals not initially involved, such as alleged fathers who later contest a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. Additionally, under Rule 6(b), if a party entitled to notice of a judgment or order did not receive it within 21 days, and no party would be prejudiced, the court may extend the action period for 10 days upon motion. A.R.S. 25-812 does not create a separate grace period that affects the six-month timeframe established by Rule 60(c) for seeking relief. Amendments made in 1997 were found to be incomplete, leading to a repeal and reincorporation in 1998, which included retroactive application. The finality of judgments is emphasized as a compelling interest, particularly concerning the permanency of decisions affecting children.

On remand, the case is likely to be shifted from juvenile court to family court following the dismissal of the dependency petition. The legal statute previously referred to as Section 12-852 has been renumbered to A.R.S. 25-812 as per the 1996 Arizona Session Laws. The document emphasizes the importance of the finality of judgments, acknowledging a compelling interest in this principle, especially concerning children's permanency. Citing various case law, it underlines a strong public policy that supports the finality of judgments, which is reinforced by procedural rules designed to uphold this finality, particularly in cases involving minors.