Lewis v. Krussel

Citations: 2 P.3d 486; 101 Wash. App. 178Docket: 24599-0-II

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; June 16, 2000; Washington; State Appellate Court

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During a windstorm, two healthy hemlock trees from the Krussels' property fell, damaging the home of neighbors Dawn Lewis and Darold Teitzel. Lewis and Teitzel filed a lawsuit against the Krussels, claiming negligence for not removing the trees. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Krussels, noting they had no reason to believe the trees were hazardous. On appeal, Lewis and Teitzel argued that landowners should be responsible for removing healthy trees if aware that similar trees have fallen nearby. The court declined this argument, affirming the trial court's decision.

The facts reveal that the Krussels were aware of past incidents of fallen trees during windstorms but believed their trees posed no greater danger than others on their property. Testimony indicated that Lewis had previously expressed concerns about the trees, to which the Krussels responded that they would address the issue. A professional forester's assessment supported the Krussels, stating the fallen tree showed no signs of rot and was no more dangerous than other trees. Furthermore, a meteorologist testified that the wind speeds during the incident were typical for the season and not extraordinary. The trial court's grant of summary judgment was thus upheld, dismissing the claims of Lewis and Teitzel.

The trial court's denial of the motion to reconsider was appealed by Lewis and Teitzel. The Krussels noted that the appellants did not contest the trial court's finding of no genuine issue of material fact. They referenced the case Greater Harbor 2000 v. City of Seattle, asserting it may have altered the standard of review for summary judgment, but the court concluded it did not. Greater Harbor affirmed that an appellant's failure to assign error to a trial court's finding on genuine issues solidifies that finding, thus supporting summary judgment. However, since a plurality of justices focused on ripeness, the traditional rule regarding the superfluity of trial court findings in summary judgments remains unchanged.

Lewis and Teitzel did assign error to the summary judgment and raised relevant issues, allowing for a review under established standards. The court considered the facts favorably toward the nonmoving party and reviewed legal questions de novo. Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The claims by Lewis and Teitzel are based on nuisance and negligence, but the Krussels argue the court should limit its review to negligence, which underpins the nuisance claim. In Washington, a negligence claim presented as nuisance does not require separate consideration. The court agreed that the nuisance claim stems from alleged negligence regarding fallen trees, thereby applying negligence standards to the nuisance claim.

To establish negligence, there must be a duty owed to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and injury caused by the breach. The existence of a duty is a legal question. It is undisputed that the fallen trees from the Krussels' property damaged Lewis and Teitzel's house. The critical issue is whether the Krussels had a duty to remove the healthy trees before they fell.

The Krussels were argued to have a duty to remove potentially hazardous hemlock trees that could fall on the Lewis/Teitzel residence, but this argument equates to a strict liability standard, which lacks legal and evidential support. Strict liability typically does not apply to fallen trees, except in Louisiana under specific statutory provisions. Therefore, general negligence standards apply, defining duty as the obligation to conform to a reasonable standard of care to avoid harm to others. In negligence cases involving landowners, liability can arise from either 'misfeasance' (active misconduct) or 'nonfeasance' (failure to act). Landowners are primarily responsible for nonfeasance. The traditional rule from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS indicates that landowners are not liable for natural conditions on their land, including tree growth, unless they fail to exercise reasonable care in urban areas where trees may pose risks to public highways. A relevant case, Albin v. National Bank, illustrates this principle, where the court dismissed a wrongful death claim against a county after a tree fell during a storm, citing lack of notice regarding the tree's danger. However, the court suggested that the landowner could be liable due to alterations made to the land through logging, indicating a potential jury question on the matter.

Albin establishes that a rural landowner may be liable for injuries caused by alterations to natural conditions if they have actual or constructive notice of the hazard posed to adjacent properties. This aligns with the broader legal principle that landowners in urban or residential areas have a duty of reasonable care regarding defective trees, necessitating corrective action if they are aware of such defects. Actual or constructive notice of a “patent danger” is crucial for establishing this duty. Landowners are not required to conduct constant inspections for defects unless there is visible evidence of decay or danger; thus, there is no obligation to remove healthy trees based solely on the possibility of wind damage. In the case of Lewis and Teitzel against the Krussels, their claim that it was foreseeable for a windstorm to topple healthy trees does not demonstrate the necessary knowledge of any defect, failing to meet the established legal standards for breach of duty.

Lewis and Teitzel failed to provide evidence contradicting forester Truax's assertion that the inspected tree was defect-free. Although the Krussels were aware of concerns regarding tree stability and past incidents of fallen trees, this awareness did not equate to actual or constructive notice of a defect necessitating tree removal. Legal precedent establishes that lay opinions on the danger of trees, without evidence of defects, do not suffice for imposing liability. The Krussels' vague intentions to address the trees and their actions during wind storms did not demonstrate knowledge of any specific hazards posed by the trees in question. Moreover, Lewis's assertions regarding the vulnerability of hemlock trees lacked the necessary personal knowledge or competent evidence to substantiate claims of defects. Therefore, no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the Krussels’ awareness of any defects or a breach of duty toward Lewis and Teitzel, justifying the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Krussels. The decision was affirmed by Morgan and Houghton, J.