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State v. Boggs
Citations: 180 P.3d 392; 218 Ariz. 89Docket: CR-05-0174-AP
Court: Arizona Supreme Court; April 9, 2008; Arizona; State Supreme Court
On May 12, 2005, a jury sentenced Steve Alan Boggs to death for the murders of Beatriz Alvarado, Kenneth Brown, and Fausto Jimenez at a Mesa, Arizona fast-food restaurant in May 2002. The Supreme Court of Arizona automatically reviewed the case under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.2(b) and relevant statutes. On the night of the murders, Alvarado, Brown, and Jimenez were working late when a customer, Keith Jones, noticed an SUV with a male driver in the parking lot. After hearing Alvarado moan outside the back door, Luis Vargas approached her; she indicated in Spanish that there were robbers inside. Police Officer Daniel Beutal, who arrived shortly after, found Alvarado injured and later deceased from gunshot wounds. Inside the restaurant, police discovered Jimenez and Brown's bodies, both shot multiple times, with evidence suggesting they were shot in the freezer. Approximately $300 was stolen from the cash registers. Christopher Hargrave, a friend of Boggs, was later identified as a suspect after attempting to use Jimenez's bank card at an ATM shortly after the murders. Hargrave had worked at the restaurant shortly before the incident and was fired after Jimenez reported him for cash register shortages. He and Boggs were affiliated with a militia group that espoused racist views. Hargrave had been asked to leave his living situation due to his job loss. The Drivers were familiar with Boggs, who pawned a Taurus handgun at their shop two days after a double murder. William Driver cleaned the gun but felt uneasy about the transaction and stored it in his safe. Kay Driver later informed the police about the gun. On June 3, both Boggs and Hargrave attempted to reclaim it. The police recovered the Taurus and confirmed through testing that it was used in the murders, with DNA from both Hargrave and Boggs found on the weapon. On June 5, Boggs was interrogated by Detective Vogel after waiving his Miranda rights. He provided inconsistent accounts of the events surrounding the murders, which led to Hargrave's arrest. The following day, while being processed, Boggs expressed a desire to change his story. During a subsequent interrogation on June 6, he claimed Hargrave was solely responsible for the crimes but later admitted to planning a robbery and shooting at the victims. Boggs also revealed personal distress regarding his infant son and expressed suicidal thoughts during the interrogation. After more than an hour, he confessed to actively participating in the robbery and shooting. In January 2004, he sent a letter to Detective Vogel detailing the incident and stating that his motivations were racially driven rather than for financial gain. In June 2004, Boggs sought to represent himself in court, despite the judge's warnings about self-representation issues. His request was granted, and advisory counsel was appointed. While acting pro per, Boggs alleged interference by the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, claiming they confiscated legal documents and denied him access to items sent by his advisory counsel. Detective Vogel and the prosecutor received threatening letters purportedly from Boggs, prompting the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) to search Boggs' cell. Detective Vogel advised against proceeding without a warrant, leading to Boggs being moved to another cell while waiting for a search warrant. A detective presented the confiscated items to a special master, a superior court judge, for relevance review. Eighteen items were confiscated, and those deemed improperly seized were returned. The prosecutor did not view any privileged items taken. Boggs' advisory counsel was notified about the review but chose not to participate. Boggs claimed certain legal documents, including discovery items, were not returned, and the trial judge recommended both parties review the property for missing items. On March 23, 2005, Boggs filed a motion to dismiss due to the cell search and on April 4, he indicated missing items, including questions for a forthcoming hearing. He raised concerns that these could have been used to influence state witnesses. The prosecutor reiterated he had not seen privileged items, and the judge found no wrongdoing, allowing the hearing to proceed unless Boggs could prove significant missing materials. During the voluntariness hearing on April 4, Boggs sought to suppress statements made during his interrogations on June 5 and 6, citing a Miranda objection and questioning the police's treatment during his detention. Testimonies from Detectives Heivilin, Price, and Vogel addressed these claims. Heivilin stated that Boggs did not request an attorney during apprehension. Price noted that Boggs initiated contact on June 6 to revise his previous statements. Vogel confirmed he read Boggs his Miranda rights and did not threaten or abuse him. The trial court ruled Boggs' statements were voluntary. On the same day, Boggs' advisory counsel requested hybrid representation during voir dire, which the judge allowed, clarifying it would not extend to the trial. On April 11, after jury selection, Boggs decided to relinquish his right to self-representation, which the court deemed a prudent choice. The guilt phase of the trial commenced on April 11, 2005, with the prosecution presenting videotapes of the interrogations accompanied by transcripts. The defense made no objections, and on May 3, 2005, the jury convicted Boggs of three counts of first-degree murder. The sentencing proceeding for Boggs commenced on May 4, 2005, where the jury found three aggravating factors for each murder: expectation of pecuniary gain, heinousness of the crime, and prior convictions during the offense. The following day, Boggs sought to represent himself, but the trial judge denied this request, stating it was not wise to change counsel so late in the trial. Despite Boggs' insistence on dismissing his attorneys, the court affirmed his right to counsel and continued with the penalty phase, which began on May 9, 2005. During this phase, the defense presented mitigation evidence regarding Boggs' difficult upbringing and mental health, but the jury ultimately determined that the mitigating factors were insufficient and sentenced him to death for each murder. Boggs contended that admitting his June 6 police interview violated his right to counsel. The right to counsel is crucial at critical stages of the criminal process, and the state must respect a defendant’s choice to seek counsel. Following Boggs’ assertion of his right to counsel at his initial appearance, he later expressed a desire to change his story during subsequent interrogations. The police clarified that Boggs initiated the conversation, and after being reminded of his Miranda rights, he voluntarily agreed to speak. Therefore, the interrogation was deemed permissible as Boggs had initiated the contact with law enforcement. Boggs claims that his June 6 interview violated his right to counsel, arguing that once counsel is appointed, their presence is necessary for valid waiver of Sixth Amendment rights. He references State v. Hackman, which dealt with state-initiated contact, contrasting it with his situation where he initiated the communication. Boggs also cites People v. Arthur, another case of police-initiated contact, but the court declines to establish a requirement that counsel must be present when an accused initiates contact. The court finds no violation of Boggs' Sixth Amendment rights. Boggs further contends that the trial court violated his rights by admitting portions of the June 6 interview where Detective Vogel confronted him with statements from Hargrave, suggesting Boggs was the shooter. Detective Vogel testified that he had more information during the June 6 interview than the prior day, including information from Hargrave. The defense did not request jury instructions limiting the use of Hargrave's statements to prove their truthfulness. Challenges to admissibility under the Confrontation Clause are reviewed de novo, while unobjected errors are subject to fundamental error review, which focuses on errors that fundamentally impact the case. The Confrontation Clause guarantees the right to confront witnesses, but this right is not violated when statements are used to prove something other than their truth. In a similar case, the court upheld the admission of statements made by a non-testifying witness as a valid interrogation technique, provided the jury was instructed accordingly on their use. Boggs contends that his case is distinguishable from Roque due to the prosecution's failure to present evidence supporting the truth of out-of-court statements made by Detective Vogel. He argues that Vogel's testimony implied the truth of statements made by Hargrave during an interrogation. However, the State did not provide direct evidence to substantiate Hargrave's statements, did not introduce a transcript of Hargrave's interrogation, and did not use these statements as substantive evidence. Although Boggs could have objected at trial, potentially leading to a limiting instruction, the statements were admissible for contextual purposes regarding the interrogation, thus he cannot demonstrate fundamental error. Additionally, Boggs claims that Vogel's testimony about Hargrave's statements infringed on his right to a fair trial due to the lack of a jury instruction declaring the statements untrue. The defense did not object to the admission of the interview or request a limiting instruction, and the trial judge’s failure to provide one sua sponte was not considered fundamental error. During the interrogations, Vogel accused Boggs of lying, and the unredacted videos were shown to the jury without objection from Boggs. He argues that this violated his right to a fair trial. The court reviews evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and constitutional issues de novo, but due to Boggs's lack of objection, the review is limited to fundamental error. Arizona law prohibits testimony on the veracity of another witness's statements, leaving credibility assessments to the jury. The question of admitting interrogation videos with accusations of untruthfulness is a novel issue in Arizona. The court concluded that Vogel's accusations were part of an interrogation technique and not intended as opinion testimony, and thus found no fundamental error, supported by decisions from other states allowing similar evidence for context. In *Lanham v. Commonwealth* and similar cases, courts have largely recognized that police comments during interrogations serve as a legitimate tool to provide context for a suspect's changing statements. While such comments can clarify a suspect's responses, they should not be taken as evidence of deceit. In *Lanham*, the court concluded that officer statements are ordinary interrogation techniques, particularly when a suspect's narrative shifts. If a defendant requests a limiting instruction regarding the admissibility of these comments, it should be granted; however, failure to request such an instruction negates claims of prejudice, as seen in Boggs' case where the jury could discern his multiple conflicting stories without the officer's comments. Boggs argued that his statements to Detective Vogel after expressing a desire to be left alone and mentioning suicide were involuntary. The admissibility of confessions is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with a presumption of involuntariness resting on the defendant until the state proves the confession was made freely and not under coercion. The state meets this burden through officer testimony confirming the absence of threats or promises. The determination of voluntariness considers the totality of circumstances, requiring both coercive police conduct and a causal link to the defendant's compromised will. The court upheld the ruling that Boggs’ statements were voluntary, rejecting his claim that psychological pressure was applied, as his analogy to *United States v. Tingle* did not establish a similar level of coercion. Detective Vogel's approach during the interrogation of Boggs did not constitute coercion, as he did not threaten Boggs with the loss of his child but rather sought to elicit a sense of responsibility to encourage honesty. When Boggs was uncooperative about discussing his son, Vogel shifted the conversation away from that topic and did not press further, indicating that Boggs' will was not overborne. Boggs claimed that his statement "Just leave me alone" should have ended the interrogation, as per Miranda rights, which require cessation of questioning when a suspect indicates a desire to remain silent. However, this assertion was deemed ambiguous, and Vogel attempted to clarify Boggs' intent by offering to leave the room. Boggs' subsequent remarks suggested he was not asserting his right to silence, and he continued the conversation voluntarily. Overall, the circumstances indicated that Boggs' statements were made without coercion. Additionally, Boggs argued that the MCSO's failure to return certain documents infringed on his Sixth Amendment rights concerning confidential pretrial preparations and attorney-client communications. The court reviews alleged violations of the right to counsel de novo, while rulings on motions to dismiss are reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Sixth Amendment and the Arizona Constitution guarantee the right to counsel, but not all intrusions into attorney-client relationships result in a violation. A determination of whether a violation occurred hinges on the purpose of the intrusion and whether it led to the prosecution gaining evidence or insights into defense strategies. In Warner, the court addressed a situation where jail personnel seized all papers from a defendant's cell to gather evidence of alleged perjury. The seized materials included confidential communications between the defendant and counsel, which were returned to the defendant but also viewed by the prosecutor, resulting in a presumptive violation of the defendant's right to counsel. In contrast, Boggs' case did not involve the prosecutor receiving any privileged materials since the State took steps to protect Boggs' rights by having a special master review the seized items for privilege. The trial court found credible testimony from law enforcement and concluded no improper interference occurred, thereby placing the burden on Boggs to prove any violation of the attorney-client relationship. During the guilt phase, Boggs contested the admission of Alvarado's statements, claiming a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. While the Confrontation Clause typically applies to testimonial evidence, Boggs failed to object to the admission of these statements at trial, necessitating a demonstration of fundamental error. The court noted that the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial evidence as defined by the Supreme Court, which distinguishes between testimonial and non-testimonial statements based on the primary purpose of the interrogation. Alvarado's statements, made while she was dying and seeking assistance, were deemed non-testimonial because they were made under circumstances indicating an ongoing emergency, as recognized by the responding officers. The nature of her statements and the actions taken by law enforcement further supported this classification, leading the court to conclude that the admission of her statements did not violate Boggs' confrontation rights. Boggs presents two key arguments regarding his sentencing. First, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to represent himself (pro per) during the penalty phase. While defendants have a constitutional right to self-representation, this right is not absolute and must be exercised through a timely and unequivocal request, as established in Faretta v. California. The court has discretion to deny late requests to ensure the trial proceeds in an orderly manner. Boggs previously waived his right to self-representation on April 11, 2005, despite warnings from the judge that changing his mind would not be accommodated. As he had already relinquished this right, the court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting his subsequent request to represent himself. Second, Boggs argues that his due process rights were violated when the State presented threatening letters as rebuttal evidence during the penalty phase. The admissibility of evidence at this stage is evaluated for relevance, with the understanding that any relevant information may be introduced to determine if leniency is warranted for the defendant. The trial court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, while constitutional issues are assessed de novo. The relevant Arizona statute allows for broad evidence presentation at sentencing, which supports the trial court's decision in this instance. A.R.S. 13-703.C allows both parties to rebut information at the penalty phase, where rebuttal evidence must be relevant to the mitigation presented. The definition of "relevant" aligns with Rule 401 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, focusing on evidence that tends to prove or disprove the matter at issue. Courts grant deference to trial judges in determining the relevance of rebuttal evidence but can exclude evidence deemed irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial. In this case, the mitigation argument was that Boggs had mental health issues, including bipolar disorder, supported by testimony from Drs. Ruiz and Lanyon regarding Boggs' delusional militia activities. However, Boggs' threatening letters contradicted the benign nature of these claims. Boggs contended that the letters were too prejudicial, citing State v. Hampton, which allows exclusion of evidence if its prejudicial nature outweighs its probative value. The court noted that the letters were not used to attack Boggs' character but rather to rebut the mitigation claim, thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the letters. Furthermore, rebuttal evidence must not only align with Arizona's sentencing laws but also comply with the Due Process Clause. While the penalty phase does not require the same procedural protections as the guilt phase, testimonial hearsay must possess sufficient reliability. Boggs argued that the letters lacked this reliability, but their introduction at the penalty phase did not violate due process. The letters in question were determined to be neither hearsay nor testimonial. Boggs was aware of these letters prior to trial but did not object on foundational grounds during the sentencing hearing, despite the trial judge's inquiry. The defense did challenge the letters' reliability during cross-examination by comparing handwriting and questioning the absence of evidence indicating they were sent from jail. Nonetheless, no objection was made regarding their foundational validity. Boggs now argues that the letters lack reliability due to insufficient proof of authorship. This argument is weakened by several factors: identical letters were sent to both the lead detective and the prosecutor; the letters referred to Boggs as "Chief," matching his militia title; one letter was intercepted by jail staff, who reported that an inmate claimed Boggs had asked him to send it; and the letters included a threat indicating knowledge of the victim's address. The introduction of these letters did not violate Boggs' due process rights. Since the murders occurred before August 1, 2002, the Court independently reviewed the aggravating and mitigating factors related to the death sentence under A.R.S. 13-703.04.A. The State identified three aggravating factors for each murder, with a focus on the pecuniary gain aspect. A defendant is eligible for the death penalty if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed with the expectation of receiving something of value. Evidence supported this aggravating factor, including Boggs' confession, which explicitly stated that money motivated the crime, along with evidence of theft during the incident. Boggs contends that the evidence suggests multiple motivations, including a desire to silence witnesses. However, silencing witnesses, in this context, is considered an act that supports the pecuniary gain aggravator, as it furthered the robbery and facilitated the escape, aligning with legal precedents that recognize such motivations as relevant to establishing the aggravating factor. Pecuniary gain, as a motive for murder, does not preclude the existence of other motives; the State must only prove one aggravating factor for the death penalty eligibility. A.R.S. 13-703.F.6 stipulates that a first-degree murder committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner qualifies for the death penalty. To demonstrate a murder was especially cruel, the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim experienced mental or physical distress, requiring evidence that the victim was conscious during the violence and that the defendant intended for the victim to suffer or foresaw a substantial likelihood of suffering. In this case, the State proved the victims suffered sufficient mental anguish, which can be shown through evidence of the victims' consciousness during the violence and significant uncertainty about their fate. Boggs' case differs from State v. Soto-Fong, where there was a lack of evidence regarding the suffering of the victims. In contrast, Boggs provided detailed accounts of the murders, including forcing the victims into submissive positions and shooting them. This account was corroborated by physical evidence, establishing the especially cruel aggravator for all three victims. Additionally, A.R.S. 13-703.F.8 states that a defendant is death eligible if convicted of multiple homicides committed during the offense, with the aggravator applicable even if the defendant did not physically commit the murders. The evaluation of this aggravator includes the temporal, spatial, and motivational relationships between the homicides. While Boggs concedes the temporal and spatial relationships, he disputes the existence of a motivational relationship among the homicides. Boggs claims that Hargrave shot one victim due to job loss caused by that victim, while he himself participated in the shootings under duress from seeing the victims after Hargrave's actions. Boggs attributes different motives to the murders, including racial bias and the necessity to eliminate witnesses. The evidence indicates that the victims were killed primarily to prevent them from identifying the shooters, as shown by Boggs' confession during a June 6 interrogation, where he also noted the murders occurred in a freezer to muffle gunshot sounds. The racial motive was generalized among all victims, as Boggs described his intent to rid the world of "needless, illegals," failing to differentiate among the victims' ethnic backgrounds in his confession. Hargrave's anger was not solely linked to his termination but also stemmed from perceived discriminatory treatment compared to other employees. Thus, any race-based motive applies equally to all victims. Boggs also presented mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase, asserting a difficult upbringing, mental illness, and cooperation with law enforcement in apprehending Hargrave. Evidence from his aunt detailed Boggs' challenging childhood, including medical issues, mental abuse from his mother, and significant time spent in group homes. Dr. Ruiz supported claims of emotional and behavioral issues stemming from Boggs' early experiences, including sexual abuse and suicidal thoughts from a young age. The testimony established sufficient grounds for claiming a difficult upbringing by a preponderance of the evidence. Boggs experienced significant trauma throughout his life, losing several close family members between ages sixteen and twenty-one, including his grandmother, mother, sister, brother, and grandfather. He was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and bipolar disorder by Dr. Ruiz, who noted that PTSD can lead to dissociative states triggered by reminders of past trauma. Dr. Ruiz described the mood fluctuations associated with bipolar disorder, including potential psychosis during manic episodes, but could not determine Boggs' mental state during the murders. Dr. Lanyon, a forensic psychologist, confirmed Boggs’ chronic bipolar disorder and acknowledged that while delusions are symptomatic of the disorder, they did not definitively link his behavior on the day of the crimes to his mental illness. He suggested that Boggs' motivations were influenced by his disorder, yet noted that Boggs did not display impulsive behaviors typical of a manic state during the incident. The State's expert, Dr. Almer, contested the bipolar diagnosis, suggesting that Boggs exhibited traits of anti-social personality disorders and may have exaggerated his mental illness during evaluations. The conflicting expert testimonies indicate that while the defense demonstrated Boggs' mental health issues, they could not conclusively establish his mental state at the time of the crimes. Additionally, Boggs sought to use his voluntary assistance in capturing Hargrave as a mitigating factor, although the motivations behind his cooperation remain unclear. Boggs' cooperation with police in apprehending Hargrave is viewed with skepticism, as it appears self-serving, particularly since Boggs shifted blame entirely onto Hargrave. As established in State v. Doerr, cooperation motivated by self-interest holds minimal weight as a mitigating factor. The court undertakes an independent review of the death sentence by reweighing aggravating and mitigating factors, emphasizing the quality and strength of these elements as per State v. Greene. The State has demonstrated three significant aggravating factors, including multiple murders, which carry substantial weight. Boggs presents mitigation evidence related to his challenging upbringing and mental health issues. While these factors are considered mitigating, their impact is diminished by the absence of a causal relationship to the murders, as noted in State v. Garza. Furthermore, no expert testified regarding Boggs' understanding of right and wrong at the time of the crime, reducing the weight of mental health as a mitigating factor. Ultimately, the mitigating evidence is deemed insufficient to justify leniency when weighed against the significant aggravating factors. Additionally, Boggs raises constitutional challenges to Arizona's death penalty framework, acknowledging prior rejections of these arguments. He contends that the trial court's limitation on the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence to what was proven by a preponderance of the evidence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Furthermore, he claims that the indictment's failure to include aggravating factors necessary for death eligibility constitutes a fundamental constitutional defect under multiple amendments and sections of the Arizona Constitution. The document references several legal precedents and constitutional provisions relevant to the death penalty and its application. Both the United States and Arizona Constitutions prohibit ex post facto laws, and applying a new death penalty law to the defendant is deemed impermissible. The aggravating factor of "especially cruel, heinous, or depraved" is criticized as unconstitutionally vague, lacking sufficient guidance for juries, thus violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The inclusion of victim impact evidence during the penalty phase is argued to infringe on the defendant's constitutional rights. Additionally, the trial court is said to have improperly restricted jury instructions regarding the consideration of mercy or sympathy in mitigation. The overall imposition of the death penalty is contested as cruel and unusual, asserting violations of constitutional protections. The argument also posits that the death penalty is irrational, arbitrary, and unnecessary compared to life imprisonment, further claiming that the prosecutor's discretion in seeking the death penalty lacks proper standards, which violates constitutional due process. Arguments asserting that Arizona's death penalty discriminates against poor, young, and male defendants were rejected in *State v. Sansing*. Proportionality review is deemed necessary to narrow death penalty eligibility, and its absence violates due process, equal protection, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under multiple constitutional provisions, as previously ruled in *Harrod*. The capital sentencing scheme is criticized for not requiring the state to demonstrate that the death penalty is appropriate or for a jury to find aggravating circumstances outweighing mitigating ones, which was addressed in *Pandeli*. Additionally, the scheme fails to adequately guide jury discretion through objective standards, violating constitutional protections. Execution by lethal injection has been deemed cruel and unusual, a claim also previously rejected in *Van Adams*. The law's requirement for the death penalty upon the existence of one aggravating circumstance without any mitigating factors is unconstitutional, as affirmed in *State v. Miles*. Ultimately, the court affirms Boggs' convictions and sentences, with justices concurring. The document notes that facts are viewed favorably to uphold the jury's verdict and mentions a procedural motion by Boggs related to self-representation during sentencing.