Rockwell v. State

Citations: 176 P.3d 14; 2008 Alas. App. LEXIS 29; 2008 WL 399170Docket: A-9748

Court: Court of Appeals of Alaska; February 15, 2008; Alaska; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Michael L. Rockwell appeals his convictions for felony DUI and driving with a revoked license. He argues that his Miranda rights were violated during custodial interrogation, warranting the suppression of his statements. The court agrees that his rights were indeed violated in the latter part of the interrogation and finds a reasonable possibility of earlier violations as well. The case is remanded to the superior court for further findings regarding the suppression of evidence and the potential reversal of Rockwell's conviction.

Additionally, Rockwell claims that certain hearsay evidence was improperly admitted during his trial. However, the court concludes that all contested hearsay evidence falls under recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.

The incident occurred on January 16, 2004, following a crash at an intersection. Officer Patton observed Rockwell exiting his vehicle and initially admitting to driving, but later denied it. Officer Busby, who arrived later, noted Rockwell's signs of intoxication and that his license was revoked. Rockwell claimed another individual had been driving. He was asked to sit in the patrol car for his safety due to the cold weather, although he was informed he was not under arrest. During a pat-down, Busby discovered Rockwell's car keys. Once in the patrol car, audio recording began, and further questions were asked while Rockwell was taken to a police substation for sobriety tests, leading to his arrest for DUI after testing .130 percent alcohol. Rockwell was advised of his Miranda rights at 4:00 a.m., at which point he requested an attorney but declined to call one when offered.

Rockwell was charged with felony driving under the influence and driving with a revoked license. He sought to suppress statements made to Officer Busby, claiming he was subjected to custodial interrogation prior to receiving Miranda warnings and that after invoking his right to counsel, Busby continued questioning him. Superior Court Judge Michael L. Wolverton conducted an evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion and ultimately denied it, stating Rockwell was not in custody at any relevant time, but did not provide specific factual findings.

During Rockwell's trial before Judge John Suddock, he contended that someone else, Joshua Fagg, was driving the vehicle. The State called Fagg as a witness, who testified he was in South America during the incident, presenting a passport, bus ticket, and immigration card as evidence. Rockwell, having received copies of these documents shortly before the trial, requested a continuance to investigate them, but this was denied. The jury found Rockwell guilty on both counts, leading to his appeal.

The analysis of Rockwell's claims focused on Miranda rights, indicating that police must provide these rights before custodial interrogation. Routine traffic stops typically do not constitute custody unless they escalate. The Alaska Supreme Court established an objective test to determine custody, considering the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including the nature of the interaction, the presence of police, and whether the individual felt free to leave. The interrogation was divided into four phases, starting from the initial contact at the accident scene to the questioning in the patrol car leading up to his transport to a police substation.

The continuation of interrogation inside the patrol car and at police substations occurred before Rockwell was advised of his Miranda rights, and further interrogation took place after he was informed of those rights. The superior court, specifically Judge Wolverton, failed to provide factual findings regarding Rockwell's suppression motion, which contravenes Alaska Criminal Rule 12(d). This rule mandates that a trial judge must explicitly state essential factual findings when resolving suppression motions involving factual issues. Past cases indicate that lacking such findings precludes the presumption that unresolved factual issues favor the judge's ruling. 

Despite this omission, the court can still assess the admissibility of Rockwell's statements during different interrogation phases. The statements made by Rockwell while standing on the street were deemed non-custodial. Conversely, he was considered in custody for Miranda purposes during later questioning after being told he would be taken to the police substation. The court determined that explicit findings are necessary only for the statements made while Rockwell was in the patrol car but before the announcement of his transport to the substation. 

When Busby arrived at the accident scene, Rockwell was arguing with the other driver. Busby, noticing Rockwell's alcohol odor, questioned him about the accident and his drinking. Rockwell admitted to being intoxicated but claimed another individual, Joshua Fagg, was driving. This initial interaction was deemed appropriate for police investigation purposes, aligning with the reasonable person test for Miranda custody, which assesses whether an individual feels free to leave during police questioning.

Miranda warnings are not required during temporary Fourth Amendment seizures, such as routine traffic or investigative stops, even if the individual feels they cannot leave. In this case, Busby's questioning of Rockwell on the street was deemed permissible without Miranda warnings. Afterward, Rockwell was asked to enter the patrol car for safety reasons, and despite being told he was not under arrest and not being handcuffed, Busby conducted a pat-down, discovering car keys in Rockwell's pocket. Busby questioned Rockwell about his identity and the incident while recording the conversation. 

However, once Busby informed Rockwell he would be transported to the police substation for sobriety tests, Rockwell was considered to be in custody for Miranda purposes and should have been read his rights before further questioning. As a result, any statements made after this point are subject to suppression due to the lack of Miranda warnings. Although Rockwell argued he was in custody upon entering the patrol car, merely sitting in the vehicle does not imply custody. The Alaska Supreme Court in Waring v. State indicated that an officer instructing someone to sit in a patrol car constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure, suggesting that the nature of Busby's request impacts the determination of custody status.

Busby testified that he asked Rockwell to sit in the patrol car, which Rockwell agreed to, indicating he was not in custody at that moment. However, prior to Rockwell entering the car, Busby conducted a pat-down search and removed Rockwell's car keys without clarifying if he retained them afterward. Rockwell noted he could not exit the patrol car without Busby's assistance since the rear doors only opened from the outside. This circumstance raises a reasonable possibility that Rockwell was in custody for Miranda purposes when he entered the patrol car. The court cannot resolve this without further findings, directing the superior court to address this issue under Criminal Rule 12(d).

At the Dimond Mall substation, after Busby transported Rockwell for field sobriety testing, he interrogated Rockwell about his drinking. Following the tests, Rockwell was arrested for driving under the influence, and it was concluded that he was in custody for Miranda purposes during this questioning. Since Rockwell did not receive Miranda warnings before answering questions, his statements must be suppressed.

After his formal arrest at a second substation, Busby finally advised Rockwell of his Miranda rights. Rockwell requested an attorney but declined to call one when offered a phone. Despite agreeing to answer more questions, Rockwell argued that Busby's continued questioning violated his right to counsel. The State referenced a prior ruling stating that police must limit questioning to clarifying references to counsel if invoked ambiguously. However, Rockwell's demand for an attorney was clear and unambiguous; thus, police must cease questioning until counsel is present, unless initiated by the suspect, as established in Edwards v. Arizona.


The Supreme Court ruled that once an accused invokes the right to counsel during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established solely by their response to police-initiated questioning, even if they were advised of their rights. An accused, having requested counsel, cannot be interrogated further by authorities until counsel is provided, unless the accused initiates communication. In Rockwell's case, he did not initiate further discussions after requesting an attorney; instead, he was questioned by Busby, which failed to meet the requirements set by Edwards regarding a valid waiver. Consequently, Rockwell's statements during this subsequent interrogation must be suppressed.

On remand, the superior court must determine the admissibility of statements made by Rockwell. Statements made during the initial encounter on the street are admissible, but those made after Busby's announcement of transportation to the substation must be suppressed due to custodial interrogation without prior Miranda warnings and because Busby disregarded Rockwell's request for counsel. The court must also assess the circumstances of Rockwell's statements while in the patrol car to determine if he was in custody for Miranda purposes. If found to be in custody, those statements also must be suppressed.

After identifying which statements should be suppressed, the court must evaluate their introduction at Rockwell's trial and whether this necessitates reversing his convictions. Many of Rockwell's later statements appeared to support his defense at trial and were redundant to earlier admissible statements regarding Joshua Fagg being the driver and fleeing the scene.

During the trial, the State called Fagg, who testified about his prior acquaintance with Rockwell and provided evidence of his travels abroad, including documents like his passport and immigration card, which corroborated his claims of being out of the country from November 2003 to March 2004, with passport stamps verifying his entries and exits from Ecuador and Peru.

Fagg presented an immigration card dated December 27, 2003, and a bus ticket issued on February 1, 2004, during his testimony, which were admitted into evidence despite Rockwell's hearsay objections. Rockwell challenged the relevance of these documents, arguing that the bus ticket dated January 2, 2004, did not prove Fagg's absence from Anchorage on January 16, 2004, the date of the accident. He claimed that because both documents did not confirm Fagg's whereabouts on the accident date, they were irrelevant. Rockwell did not object to the evidence's relevance during the trial, necessitating a demonstration of plain error on appeal. Nonetheless, the court found the evidence relevant as it supported Fagg's claim of being out of the country and contradicted Rockwell's defense.

Rockwell further argued that the passport stamps constituted hearsay and were inadmissible under the public records exception, referencing United States v. Friedman, which required records to be kept by the issuing country for admissibility. However, the court clarified that Friedman does not impose this requirement. The State argued, citing Harris v. State, that public records do not need to be maintained by the government to be admissible. Past cases demonstrated the admissibility of passport evidence for establishing identity and entry into a country, affirming its probative value in similar contexts.

In United States v. Akbar, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the defendant's passport, which bore a Cuban stamp, as evidence, indicating it was stamped while the defendant possessed it. The passport and its stamps were deemed to fall under the public records exception to the hearsay rule (Evidence Rule 803(8)), as they are records maintained by a public agency to document the identity and citizenship of the passport holder. The admissibility of an immigration card was also upheld, as it was prepared by the defendant for entry into Peru and stamped by a Peruvian official during routine governmental operations. This card was not created in anticipation of litigation. Additionally, the bus ticket was admitted as a business record under Evidence Rule 803(6), with the defendant's testimony establishing its purchase and use for travel, demonstrating it was issued in the course of regular business activity.

Rockwell contended that the admission of the passport and immigration stamps violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, which restricts the use of testimonial hearsay unless the declarant is available for cross-examination or previously subject to it. However, the court noted that the statements in question did not qualify as 'testimonial' under Crawford, as they were not made for the purpose of criminal prosecution and were maintained as part of routine governmental duties. Citing Abyo v. State, the court reinforced that business records and similar documents do not fall under the Confrontation Clause, leading to the conclusion that the passport stamps and immigration card were properly admitted as they were not created with the intent of criminal investigation.

The court determined that the passport and immigration card were not considered 'testimonial hearsay' as defined by Crawford, and thus upheld the superior court's denial of Rockwell's motion to continue the trial. Rockwell contended that the last-minute disclosure of Fagg's bus ticket and immigration card prejudiced him, as he lacked time to investigate these documents. However, on April 17, 2006, he was informed that Fagg was available to testify, and he had already received Fagg's passport, which indicated Fagg's absence from the country during the relevant time. The trial court granted Rockwell a continuance until April 24, 2006, but denied a subsequent request on April 25, stating he had been adequately notified of the evidence concerning Fagg's whereabouts. To reverse the trial court's decision, Rockwell needed to show that the denial hindered his defense preparation and prejudiced his rights, which he failed to do. His argument focused on the inability to investigate the newly disclosed materials without claiming that further investigation would have been beneficial. As the passport corroborated the contents of the immigration card and bus ticket, the court upheld the denial of the continuance and rejected Rockwell's challenges to the evidentiary rulings, remanding the case for further findings related to his Miranda claims.

The superior court is required to transmit its findings to this court within ninety days. Upon receipt of these findings, this court will resume its consideration of the case. The excerpt includes multiple citations to relevant case laws and statutes, highlighting precedents and procedural rules pertinent to the case at hand. Notably, it references Alaska statutes AS 28.35.030(n) and AS 28.15.291(a)(1), alongside various judicial decisions from the Alaska Appellate courts and the U.S. Supreme Court, emphasizing the importance of procedural adherence and the implications of errors not raised at the trial level. The citations cover a range of legal principles, including search and seizure, the rights of the accused, and standards for appellate review.