Frazier v. JR Simplot Co.

Citations: 29 P.3d 936; 136 Idaho 100; 2001 Ida. LEXIS 64Docket: 26205

Court: Idaho Supreme Court; June 22, 2001; Idaho; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Idaho addressed the appeal of Beverly Frazier against J.R. Simplot Company, following the dismissal of her complaint based on statute of limitations grounds. Frazier, employed by Simplot for nearly twenty years until her termination on June 22, 1996, filed a seven-count complaint in August 1997 alleging various claims including gender discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation. The Simplot Company moved for summary judgment, asserting that Frazier’s claims were time-barred under Idaho Code § 67-5908(2), as her deposition revealed incidents of discrimination occurring in 1978, 1979, 1984, and 1985, all beyond the two-year limit prior to her lawsuit. Additionally, she indicated a lack of evidence for claims made post-1989 concerning physical and verbal abuse, discriminatory wages, and retaliation.

During the summary judgment hearing, Frazier voluntarily dismissed claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent retention/supervision. The district court granted summary judgment, confirming that Frazier’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Frazier later sought reconsideration, submitting an affidavit that claimed recent incidents of discrimination; however, Simplot contended that this affidavit conflicted with her earlier deposition testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The district court determined that Frazier's affidavit presented "sham issue[s] of fact" aimed at circumventing the statute of limitations and declined to consider it, leading to a denial of her motion for reconsideration and prompting her appeal. The standard of review for the appeal mirrors that of the trial court during summary judgment rulings, meaning disputed facts are interpreted favorably for the non-moving party, and summary judgment is warranted when there are no genuine issues of material fact.

Key issues on appeal include whether the district court erred in striking Frazier's affidavit and in granting the Simplot Company's motion for summary judgment. The district court found Frazier's affidavit contradicted her earlier deposition testimony, relying on precedent from Burrell v. Star Nursery and Kennedy v. Allied Mutual Insurance. The Court noted that, while preventing sham issues is essential, the district court must establish a genuine contradiction between the affidavit and prior testimony before dismissing the affidavit. In the referenced Tolmie Farms case, the Court clarified that there was no contradiction. Similarly, in this instance, Frazier's affidavit did not sufficiently conflict with her deposition, as it included statements regarding ongoing inappropriate conduct and gender-based ridicule that did not directly contradict her earlier claims of uncertainty about specific events.

From 1989 until the sale of the parts room, George Argenbright and other male employees referred to Frazier with derogatory terms such as "broad" and "chickie." After leaving the carton line in 1988, Frazier faced daily confrontations with Les Pearson, who frequently yelled at her, blaming her for issues related to part availability and asserting that her complaints about physical abuse led to his removal from the carton line. Pearson's verbal abuse included derogatory remarks such as calling her a "stupid broad" and suggesting she should "go home and scrub floors." 

The district court noted a conflict between Frazier's affidavit and her deposition testimony regarding whether she experienced physical and verbal abuse while in the parts room. While Frazier initially stated she did not experience such abuse in the parts room, she had previously detailed physical abuse from Pearson during her career, especially during her tenure on the carton line. The court interpreted her later testimony to mean that while she did not endure physical abuse after moving to the parts room, she perceived the question regarding abuse as requiring both physical and verbal abuse. 

Consequently, the court found no conflict in her statements and concluded that the district court erred in disregarding Frazier's affidavit. Frazier's complaint, filed under the Idaho Human Rights Act, alleges gender discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation, claiming that she was denied promotions in favor of less qualified male candidates. The district court ruled that her claim for gender discrimination was barred by the statute of limitations.

Frazier testified that her last incident of discrimination occurred in 1985, nearly twelve years prior to her complaint filing. In her affidavit, she noted that after being transferred to the parts room in 1989, she was denied maintenance job opportunities due to an injury from 1988, despite several men with more severe injuries being awarded those positions. The timeframe "shortly after" starting in the parts room extends beyond two years before her complaint was filed on August 28, 1997. On appeal, Frazier claims gender discrimination regarding a 1996 application for a timekeeper's position, which was awarded to another woman. For a factual issue to be material in a summary judgment motion, it must be disputed in the pleadings, as established in Bennett v. Bliss. Frazier's complaint alleged discrimination by Simplot Company based on gender for positions she was qualified for but denied, all occurring between 1978 and 1989. The 1996 incident was not part of her complaint, as it did not involve a less qualified male being awarded the position. This refusal constitutes a separate cause of action. The Cook v. Dep't of Transp. case illustrates that claims not included in the original EEOC complaint must be dismissed unless they are related. Cook's allegations regarding gender discrimination in filling positions were deemed distinct, leading to the dismissal of her claim. In cases alleging a hostile work environment, however, all wrongful acts combine to form a single cause of action, as noted in Paterson v. State, requiring evidence of pervasive misconduct to demonstrate a sufficiently hostile environment.

Allegations of disparate treatment based on gender can constitute a cause of action, as established in Bowles v. Keating. In Frazier's case, the denial of a timekeeping job in 1996 represents a separate cause of action from earlier job denials in her complaint, which occurred more than two years prior to filing. Consequently, the district court correctly dismissed her gender discrimination claim for being time-barred.

Regarding Frazier's hostile work environment claim, one key element requires proof of sexual advances or similar conduct. Frazier provided sworn testimony indicating such conduct occurred within two years before her complaint, leading the district court to err in dismissing this claim based on statute limitations.

For the retaliation claim, Frazier alleged reprisals for reporting violations of sex discrimination policies. While much of her testimony referred to events before her employment in the parts room, she also identified an instance occurring within the two-year period related to the denial of the timekeeping job. This situation, combined with her discussions with the Human Resources Manager about severance and gender discrimination claims, could suggest retaliation. Thus, the district court erred by dismissing this claim as well.

In conclusion, the district court's dismissal of the gender discrimination claim is upheld, while the claims for hostile work environment and retaliation are reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Costs are awarded to Frazier, but her request for attorney fees is denied due to lack of supporting argument.