People v. Superior Court

Citations: 157 P.3d 1017; 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 421; 41 Cal. 4th 1; 2007 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5582; 2007 Cal. LEXIS 5099Docket: S130489

Court: California Supreme Court; May 21, 2007; California; State Supreme Court

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Ronald Decker is charged with the attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of his sister, Donna Decker, and her friend, Hermine Riley Bafiera, as well as solicitation of murder. Decker sought a hired assassin to avoid being the prime suspect in the planned murders. He provided detailed information about the victims and agreed on a payment of $5,000 as a downpayment after expressing his strong intent to proceed. Unbeknownst to Decker, he was communicating with an undercover police detective posing as the assassin. Although the evidence was sufficient for solicitation, the magistrate and trial court dismissed the attempted murder charges, citing a precedent from *People v. Adami*. The Court of Appeal disagreed and mandated the reinstatement of the attempted murder counts, leading to the Supreme Court of California granting review and affirming the appellate court's decision. Additionally, Decker had previously contacted Russell Wafer, a gunsmith, seeking to hire someone for a murder, which prompted Wafer to notify law enforcement and assist in a sting operation.

On September 2, Wafer informed Decker about a forthcoming visit from "John" and requested Decker's phone number to facilitate a meeting. After receiving Decker's description, Holston identified him through a photograph. A meeting was arranged for September 5 at a golf course parking lot, where Holston, posing as "John," wore a wire, capturing the interaction on video and audio. During the meeting, Decker disclosed that a "lady," identified as his sister Donna, owed him money, leading him to contemplate her murder. He offered Holston $25,000 for the killing, with an additional $10,000 bonus for a "clean job." Decker expressed that he could not commit the act himself due to the risk of being a prime suspect.

Decker suggested methods for the murder, including a staged car accident, but Holston advised against it, prompting Decker to request a more definitive approach. He endorsed Holston's idea of a staged robbery and specified that Holston should ensure Donna was shot in the heart and head. Decker also indicated a desire to eliminate a potential witness, Hermine Riley Bafiera, whom he disliked. The urgency of the job was emphasized as Decker requested an upfront payment of $5,000 to demonstrate his commitment.

At a subsequent meeting on September 7, Decker provided the cash and reiterated his instructions, including leaving a coded voicemail after the murder. He insisted on eliminating any witnesses without incurring additional charges. Holston confirmed his readiness to carry out the job swiftly, to which Decker responded with strong affirmation of his intentions. Shortly after this meeting, Decker was arrested.

The legal context notes that the superior court's dismissal of the attempted murder charges, based on the established facts, is subject to independent review on appeal, referencing People v. Watson (1981).

The key issue is whether there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant committed a public offense. "Sufficient cause" refers to facts that would lead a reasonable person to strongly suspect the accused's guilt. Evidence for prosecution does not need to be enough for a conviction. Attempted murder requires both the specific intent to kill and an ineffectual act toward that goal. The evidence against Decker indicates he had a strong intent to kill his sister, having expressed his desire to do so, researched hiring an assassin, saved money for the payment, and planned the execution of the crime, including knowing her daily routine and the surveillance level around her home. The main legal controversy is whether Decker's actions constituted an attempt, which must go beyond mere preparation and show a direct movement toward committing the crime. While preparation involves arranging the means for the crime, the attempt requires an act following those preparations. The law has struggled to define when preparation ends and attempt begins, with courts acknowledging that no single standard can capture this distinction. However, it is established that even minor acts in furtherance of a clear criminal intent can constitute an attempt.

Evidence supports the conclusion that Decker's actions constituted an attempt to commit murder under California law. His intent was to eliminate his sister to recover a debt, prompting him to seek a hitman, Detective Holston. Decker engaged in extensive planning, including researching contract killers, budgeting for the murder, assessing security around his sister's home, and considering witness implications. He subsequently met with Holston, negotiated a price for the murder of his sister and potentially her friend, provided vital information about his sister's routines, and paid a $5,000 downpayment. Holston warned him that once he left, the murder would proceed, to which Decker firmly affirmed his intent. This indicates that Decker was not merely contemplating the crime but actively setting it in motion.

The court distinguishes this case from *Adami*, where a defendant’s actions were deemed insufficient for an attempted murder charge, as those acts were classified as solicitation alone. Decker's case demonstrates clear intent and actions that go beyond mere preparation, aligning with the slight-acts rule in California law, which allows for a broader interpretation of what constitutes an attempt to commit a crime. Justice Epstein noted there was nothing further for Decker to do to facilitate the murder, emphasizing that by engaging a professional killer, he was directly contributing to the commission of the crime.

Adami's progeny reject the slight-acts rule, asserting that it conflicts with established California law and broader legal principles regarding attempted crimes. While some cases suggest that slight acts can suffice for serious offenses like murder, these opinions are criticized for their flawed reasoning. Decker contends that the slight-acts rule should not apply to attempted murder, but his argument lacks legal backing. The slight-acts rule was previously upheld in People v. Anderson, which cited a leading case on crime attempts. Decker's reliance on conflicting cases undermines his position, particularly as legal consensus supports the notion that slight acts can indicate intent to murder. In instances involving concerted action, there is increased urgency for state intervention. Had Decker engaged a real hitman, he would face conspiracy charges equivalent to first-degree murder, but because he unknowingly hired an undercover officer, he faces lesser charges. Both Decker and the dissent fail to justify an exception to the slight-acts rule for attempted murder. Furthermore, solicitation of another to commit a crime constitutes an attempt when the intent is clear, regardless of the solicited party's response. The solicitation is complete once the request is made, making it punishable irrespective of the outcome.

Decker's initial solicitation to Holston to kill Donna was completed during their first conversation. However, the prosecution does not argue that this alone justifies a charge of attempted murder. Instead, they assert that Decker's solicitation, combined with his later actions—such as agreeing to hire Holston, detailing the murder plan, and paying him $5,000—demonstrates that he attempted to have Donna and possibly her friend Hermine murdered. The key legal issue is whether this combination of solicitation and actions can establish probable cause for attempted murder, a position supported by various jurisdictions. Numerous states have recognized that solicitation, when coupled with a completed agreement and further actions toward execution, can constitute attempted murder. Decker's claim that solicitation and attempted murder are mutually exclusive is rejected; evidence supporting one can also support the other. The distinction between mere preparation and acts that constitute an attempt is a matter of degree, reinforcing that overlapping evidence is permissible. Ultimately, whether Decker's actions amounted to solicitation is less critical than whether they also demonstrate an attempt, particularly since even partial fulfillment of a murder contract can indicate an attempt, regardless of the hit man's existing capabilities.

The argument rejects the notion that a solicitation to commit murder should be treated differently solely because a downpayment has been made. It emphasizes that such a payment indicates the solicitous person's seriousness and brings the contract closer to execution. The court highlights that a significant distinction exists between merely inviting someone to commit murder and having an agreement in place with a hired killer, especially when a downpayment has been made. The evidence supported a strong suspicion of the defendant Decker's unambiguous intent to murder, suggesting he had taken substantial steps necessary for the commission of the crime. The court clarifies that whether actions are merely preparatory or sufficiently close to consummation depends on the specific facts of each case. In Decker's instance, he had effectively done what was necessary to ensure the murders would occur. The court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeal, stating that Decker should be held to answer for attempted murder, and disapproves of any previous case law inconsistent with this ruling. The concurrence indicates that the majority believes there was probable cause for the charges against Decker.

An attempt to commit a crime requires two elements: specific intent to commit the crime and a direct but ineffectual act toward its commission, as defined in Penal Code Section 21a. In this case, the defendant's actions, while demonstrating a clear intent to kill his sister, do not fulfill the requirement of a direct act toward committing murder. The defendant engaged in preparatory acts, such as hiring a supposed assassin, providing detailed information about the victim, discussing the murder, and expressing a strong desire to proceed. However, he never directly threatened or acted against his sister, instead relying on a third party to carry out the act. The dissent emphasizes that for an attempt, it must be clear what the suspect intends to do, and here, the defendant's intent was to have someone else perform the murder rather than taking direct action himself. The dissent asserts that while the defendant's conduct was reprehensible, it amounted to mere preparation rather than an attempt, as it did not consist of any direct acts toward the commission of the murder. Thus, the dissent concludes that the majority's reasoning misapplies principles from cases involving single actors, as the defendant's actions were fundamentally different due to the involvement of another person as the intended perpetrator.

The majority opinion conflates the legislative distinction between preparation and perpetration regarding criminal attempts, as defined by Penal Code section 21a, which necessitates a direct act. It fails to differentiate between the elements of specific intent and a direct act. Evaluating the defendant's actions alongside his explicit intent, there is sufficient evidence to apply the slight-acts rule for charges of attempted murder. The majority’s criticism of People v. Adami is deemed unpersuasive; Adami did not apply the slight-acts rule because it found no substantial act toward the crime was completed. Adami distinguished solicitation from attempted murder, asserting that actions such as hiring a murderer and planning do not equate to an attempt. The majority relies on out-of-state cases with differing statutes or contexts, overlooking jurisdictions that maintain the preparation-attempt distinction. The dissent emphasizes that neither the defendant nor the purported assassin engaged in any direct act toward the offense, highlighting that the defendant's involvement was limited to encouragement without any attempt. Thus, the dissent concludes there was no attempt, maintaining that the statutory requirements must be upheld.

The excerpt critiques the majority opinion regarding a defendant's alleged conspiracy to commit murder, highlighting that the supposed agreement with a detective was merely pretense, resulting in a lack of actual agreement and thus no conspiracy charges. The text references case law demonstrating that specific actions can constitute attempts at various crimes, asserting that merely having a plan or agreement does not suffice without direct acts towards the crime. It emphasizes the need for clarity in distinguishing between preparatory acts and those constituting a substantial step toward committing a crime, suggesting that this distinction is fact-dependent. Additionally, it cites various cases illustrating that actions need to be more than mere preparation to support charges of attempted crimes. Finally, it notes that under Penal Code section 31, all individuals involved in a crime, whether directly or indirectly, are considered principals in that crime.