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State v. Kaleohano
Citations: 56 P.3d 138; 99 Haw. 370; 2002 Haw. LEXIS 589Docket: 23828, 23829
Court: Hawaii Supreme Court; October 7, 2002; Hawaii; State Supreme Court
The State of Hawai`i appeals a September 27, 2000 order from the Second Circuit Court, which granted defendants Kristine K. Kaleohano and Leanda M. Rawlins’ motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop for suspected driving under the influence. The prosecution contends that Kaleohano voluntarily consented to a search of her vehicle, leading to the discovery of a glass pipe with suspected methamphetamine residue. The court had ruled that Kaleohano was unlawfully detained, invalidating her consent due to the absence of Miranda warnings. The Supreme Court of Hawai`i disagreed with the circuit court's conclusion regarding unlawful detention, stating that the police had reasonable suspicion for the stop and that Miranda warnings were not required as there was no probable cause for an arrest. However, the Court found that the circuit court did not adequately assess the voluntariness of Kaleohano's consent. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. The case background includes details of the traffic stop, during which Officer Serle observed Kaleohano's vehicle swerving. Despite noticing signs of impairment, he did not detect alcohol and Kaleohano denied consuming any alcohol. Officer Serle testified at the suppression hearing, stating that he ruled out alcohol as a cause of impairment for Kaleohano and chose not to administer field sobriety tests due to his lack of training in drug impairment assessments. He based his suspicion of Kaleohano's impairment on her erratic driving, red and glassy eyes, prior drug-related incidents, and the previous recovery of drugs from her vehicle. Although he asked for her consent to search the vehicle, he informed her she could refuse and was free to leave, without reading her Miranda warnings, as she was not under arrest at that time. Officer Serle decided not to allow Kaleohano to regain control of her vehicle, citing the potential evidentiary value and her possible impairment. Kaleohano, indicating she had nothing to hide, consented to the search. However, Officer Serle did not immediately search the vehicle, awaiting backup. He expressed that he would have applied for a search warrant had Kaleohano attempted to leave. Once Officer Manaois arrived, Kaleohano and her passenger Rawlins were asked to exit the vehicle to document her consent on a consent form, which she read and signed. During the search, a blue floral bag belonging to Kaleohano was discovered, for which he again sought consent. Kaleohano reiterated her willingness to allow the search, leading to the discovery of a glass pipe with suspected crystal methamphetamine residue. Rawlins claimed ownership of the pipe, resulting in the formal arrest of both individuals. They were taken to the Molokai Police Station, read their Miranda rights, and subsequently waived them, making incriminatory statements. Both were indicted for promoting a dangerous drug and prohibited acts related to drug paraphernalia. Kaleohano filed a motion to suppress the statements and evidence collected during the traffic stop on May 19, 2000, with Rawlins joining the motion on June 15, 2000. A hearing occurred on June 23, 2000, during which they presented differing arguments for suppression. Kaleohano contested the validity of her consent to search, claiming that the police violated her Miranda rights by failing to provide warnings before questioning her, despite having probable cause for her arrest due to impaired driving. Rawlins contended that Officer Serle lacked reasonable suspicion for the vehicle search, arguing that although erratic driving justified the stop, it did not support the search request or the directive for Kaleohano and Rawlins to exit the vehicle. The circuit court found the arguments contradictory; Kaleohano's position required a probable cause finding, while Rawlins' depended on the absence of reasonable suspicion. Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the defendants, suppressing the evidence based on the violation of Kaleohano’s Miranda rights, as she was in custody and interrogated without proper warnings. Consequently, any statements made by her after questioning about alcohol consumption were deemed inadmissible due to the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine. The court also deemed Kaleohano's consent to search invalid, ruling that the evidence obtained, including a glass pipe with residue, must also be suppressed. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied, and they subsequently appealed the decision. The standards for reviewing a motion to suppress evidence include a de novo review of the trial court's ruling to determine its correctness, with the burden on the motion's proponent to prove unlawful acquisition of evidence. Additionally, the probable cause determination is reviewed de novo, reflecting greater protections under Hawaii's Constitution compared to the federal standard. Findings of Fact (FOF) by a court are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, meaning they will not be overturned unless an appellate court is firmly convinced a mistake was made, supported by evidence. A finding is clearly erroneous if the appellate court, after reviewing all evidence, has a definite conviction that an error occurred. Conclusions of Law (COL) are subject to a 'right/wrong' standard of review, allowing appellate courts to examine facts without deferring to the trial court's conclusions, making them freely reviewable for correctness. On appeal, the prosecution argues two errors: first, that the circuit court erred in FOF No. 13 by suggesting Officer Serle would not have allowed Ms. Kaleohano to leave during his investigation, implying a specific period of detention. The appellate court finds that FOF No. 13 is not clearly erroneous, affirming the trial court's credibility assessment, which is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. Second, the prosecution contends that the circuit court incorrectly concluded that Officer Serle's failure to provide Miranda warnings before questioning Kaleohano necessitated the suppression of her statements and invalidated her consent to search, as well as contraband ownership admissions. The circuit court's reliance on State v. Blackshire to assert that Kaleohano was in custody during the traffic stop is highlighted, concluding that she was the focus of the investigation, and the questions were intended to elicit incriminating responses. The circuit court determined that the lack of Miranda warnings constituted a basis for suppression, establishing a connection to the 'poisonous tree' doctrine. On September 27, 2000, the court issued findings of fact (FOFs), conclusions of law (COLs), and an order granting the defendants' motion to suppress, coinciding with its opinion in State v. Ah Loo, which overruled the precedent established in Blackshire that a person is automatically considered 'in custody' upon being 'seized.' The Ah Loo decision clarified that a person, such as Kaleohano, is not in custody merely due to a lawful traffic stop. It reaffirmed that officers conducting investigative stops are not obligated to provide Miranda warnings before asking questions aimed at confirming or dispelling reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, as established in previous cases like State v. Wyatt and State v. Kuba. The court further noted that while questions during lawful temporary detentions may sometimes require Miranda protections, they do not do so without probable cause for arrest or coercive interrogation. The assessment of whether Officer Serle had probable cause to arrest Kaleohano was based on his observations: her car swerving within its lane, crossing the dividing line, the car's association with a known drug user, and Kaleohano's red and glassy eyes. However, these observations did not constitute probable cause for arrest, as past rulings indicated that probable cause typically arises from more definitive evidence, such as failing a field sobriety test. The court reiterated that observations consistent with both innocent and criminal behavior are not adequate for establishing probable cause. Officer Serle's observation of Kaleohano's red and glassy eyes, while noted, was insufficient alone to establish probable cause for arrest, especially since her explanation of being tired was plausible given the late hour. The court emphasized that a person's prior reputation as a drug user cannot solely justify probable cause, as such a standard would violate constitutional protections. It referenced cases indicating that mere past arrests or a criminal record cannot justify a Terry stop without additional facts indicating current criminal activity. Consequently, the court concluded that the combination of red eyes, a criminal record, and imperfect driving did not provide probable cause for arresting Kaleohano for driving under the influence. Additionally, since Officer Serle did not have probable cause, Miranda warnings were not required during questioning about alcohol consumption. Regarding the reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle, the court acknowledged that the initial traffic stop was valid. It emphasized that officers must articulate specific facts that, combined with reasonable inferences, justify an intrusion. The trial court found that Officer Serle observed Kaleohano's vehicle swerving within its lane and crossing a solid double center line, which provided sufficient grounds for the traffic stop to investigate potential impairment, aligning with previous rulings that weaving and swerving can establish reasonable suspicion. A police officer's observations of a vehicle speeding and weaving justified an investigative traffic stop under Kernan, 75 Haw. at 39, 856 P.2d at 1226. Officer Serle was authorized to detain Kaleohano to confirm or dispel his reasonable suspicion that she was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, as supported by Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). The defendants contended that Officer Serle exceeded the permissible scope of the stop by requesting consent to search for drugs; however, this was deemed appropriate. State v. Silva, 91 Hawai`i 80, 979 P.2d 1106 (1999), clarified that while temporary investigative stops must not exceed reasonable suspicion, they can involve brief detentions necessary to investigate potential criminal activity. The scope of such stops must be limited to what is necessary to address the officer's suspicions, as emphasized in State v. Ketchum, 97 Hawai`i 107, 34 P.3d 1006 (2001). The constitutionality of a seizure during a temporary stop balances public concerns, the advancement of public interest, and individual liberty interference, according to Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). Officer Serle had reasonable suspicion based on erratic driving, recognition of the vehicle linked to prior drug recoveries, and Kaleohano's past arrests for drug offenses. These factors collectively supported the officer's suspicion that her driving was impaired due to drugs or an attempt to conceal drugs upon seeing the police. Officer Serle's suspicion regarding Kaleohano's impairment was based on his observation of her red and glassy eyes, and the absence of an alcohol odor led him to consider drug involvement. This reasoning aligns with the legal standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio, which allows for reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop based on specific facts. Despite lacking the training to conduct a field sobriety test, Officer Serle was justified in briefly questioning Kaleohano to confirm or dispel his suspicion about drug use. The court emphasizes that neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Hawai`i Constitution requires officers to refrain from investigating potential criminal behavior due to a lack of probable cause. The balance between public safety and individual privacy supports the legitimacy of Officer Serle’s actions. Regarding the voluntariness of Kaleohano's consent to search her vehicle, the defendants claimed it was tainted by an unlawful detention or the absence of Miranda warnings. However, the court found no prior illegality in Officer Serle's request for consent. Although Kaleohano was considered effectively seized when she consented to the search, her lawful detention does not inherently invalidate her consent. The court cited precedents affirming that a suspect's voluntary consent can still be valid, even if they are under arrest. The trial court did not make specific findings regarding the voluntariness of consent to search, which limits the appellate court's ability to review the case effectively. The determination of voluntariness is a factual issue that must be assessed by the trial court based on the totality of circumstances, with significant deference given to the trial court's credibility assessments, resolution of testimony conflicts, and evidentiary weighing. The appellate court must uphold the trial court’s findings if supported by substantial evidence. The dissenting opinion, authored by Judge Acoba and joined by Judge Ramil, argues that the trial court correctly suppressed evidence but on different grounds, claiming that Officer Serle should have provided Miranda warnings before questioning Kaleohano about alcohol consumption. The dissent references the Supreme Court's ruling in Berkemer v. McCarty, which stated that roadside questioning during a traffic stop does not necessitate Miranda warnings unless the suspect's situation escalates to custodial interrogation. Ultimately, the appellate court vacated the circuit court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. Miranda safeguards apply when a suspect's freedom is curtailed to a level akin to formal arrest. Courts have generally held that Miranda warnings are not required during traffic stops, as established in cases like State v. Wyatt and State v. Kuba, where questioning did not involve coercive factors typically present in custodial settings. In Wyatt, the officer questioned a driver suspected of DUI after observing a traffic violation, and the court ruled that no Miranda warnings were necessary. Similarly, in Kuba, questioning about alcohol consumption did not constitute custodial interrogation. The present case, involving Officer Serle's questioning of Kaleohano regarding potential DUI, was consistent with these precedents, and the court incorrectly ruled that her Miranda rights were violated. After questioning, Officer Serle determined Kaleohano was not under the influence and lacked training for drug-related sobriety tests, meaning he had no grounds for arresting her for drug impairment. Further detention could only be justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, as outlined in Terry v. Ohio. Since Officer Serle did not provide specific facts indicating such suspicion, the continued detention was deemed unreasonable and illegal. The ruling emphasized that police cannot extend temporary investigative stops without substantiating the initial reasonable suspicion. If Officer Serle lacked reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendants after the initial traffic stop, then any evidence seized from Kaleohano's vehicle and statements made by the Defendants would be inadmissible as "fruits of the poisonous tree," according to State v. Edwards. Officer Serle acknowledged that Kaleohano was free to leave, as testified during the hearing. Although the officers could have taken precautionary measures if they suspected Kaleohano was impaired, such as securing the vehicle or notifying her to call someone, Officer Serle instead sought consent to search the car. The majority opinion concluded that Officer Serle's continued questioning and request for consent did not exceed the boundaries of a valid temporary investigative stop, citing specific facts he articulated as reasons for his actions. However, it was noted that merely suspecting impairment does not equate to having reasonable suspicion, and the trial court made no such finding. The prosecution's argument framed the suspicion as speculative, particularly since Officer Serle was not trained to recognize drug impairment and lacked a clear reason for believing Kaleohano was impaired. Officer Serle stated that he did not detain Kaleohano to obtain consent for a search but rather requested consent because of her previous drug-related arrest and other observations, despite admitting that her driving behavior could also be attributed to fatigue. Ultimately, he acknowledged he lacked grounds for arresting her, negating the justification for any detention. Kaleohano argued that the Defendant was free to leave the scene and would have sought assistance had it been necessary. Officer Serle and the prosecution claimed that Kaleohano was not detained and could leave at any time. They emphasized that for consent to search to be valid, the Defendant must voluntarily waive her rights against warrantless searches, and any invalid detention would nullify such consent. The prosecution treated Kaleohano's consent as legally significant, independent of the initial stop, despite no jurisdictional precedent requiring reasonable suspicion for requesting consent after a traffic stop. The court held that valid consent for searching a motor vehicle requires law enforcement to have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before seeking consent, acknowledging consent as an exception to the warrant requirement. Officer Serle testified that had the Defendant refused consent, he would have sought a warrant instead. During the suppression hearing, the prosecution did not assert that reasonable suspicion for detaining the Defendant for drug impairment existed. They maintained that the Defendant was free to leave and that any impairment she exhibited could have been due to fatigue, not drugs. The prosecution repeatedly asserted that the officer indicated to the Defendant that she was free to go before asking for consent, and that no detention occurred prior to the recovery of drug paraphernalia. The majority's view of a detention supported by reasonable suspicion was inconsistent with the prosecution's position. The officer lacked specialized training in drug identification and had no concrete evidence of drug-related impairment in the individual stopped. His basis for suspicion stemmed solely from hearsay regarding prior incidents and speculation rather than definitive proof. The court noted that this does not constitute probable cause for a search warrant. The officer acknowledged that driving under the influence is a crime but admitted he had no evidence to support such a charge against the individual. He only felt it unsafe for her to drive without understanding the reason for her impairment, which could have been fatigue. His expertise was limited to identifying alcohol impairment, and upon speaking with the individual, he found no signs of intoxication. Furthermore, he offered to arrange alternative transportation instead of detaining her. The prosecutor emphasized that the officer consistently stated the individual was free to go until evidence was discovered, asserting that she did not express a desire to leave during the encounter. The prosecution at the suppression hearing argued that the officer lacked probable cause for arresting Kaleohano, stating that all evidence was based on "speculation." Key points included: the officer would not have secured a search warrant based on available information; Kaleohano was free to leave before consent for a search was requested; there was no evidence of her driving under the influence, with the officer admitting he didn't know the cause of any impairment; he lacked specialized training to determine drug influence; despite feeling it was unsafe for her to drive, he could not identify why; he repeatedly stated she was free to leave, and no one detained her. The prosecution maintained that speculation does not equate to reasonable suspicion. Additionally, the prosecution is bound by the arguments presented at the trial court regarding the motion to suppress and cannot introduce new theories on appeal, as established in prior case law. The prosecution's stance was that the officer had only speculation regarding both drug influence and the presence of drugs in the vehicle, that Kaleohano was not detained, and that the searches were valid under her consent. Warrantless searches require justification under recognized exceptions, and the prosecution must prove that any consent given was freely and voluntarily provided. Determining the voluntariness of consent to a search hinges on the totality of circumstances, as established in legal precedents. The prosecution argued that the defendant, Kaleohano, voluntarily consented to the search, but the trial court did not make specific findings regarding this voluntariness. The burden of proof rested with the prosecution to show that consent was freely given. During the hearing, the prosecution acknowledged that the officer's basis for the search did not stem from reasonable suspicion, but rather from speculation. Kaleohano did not testify, and remanding the case would merely allow the prosecution another attempt to prove its case. Officer Serle informed Kaleohano she could refuse the search but also stated that, should she decline, the police would need to apply for a search warrant. Although she was orally consented to the search, it was indicated that she had to remain in her vehicle until a written consent form could be signed. The circumstances were further complicated by the late hour, with few cars on the road, suggesting Kaleohano may not have felt free to leave. Although the officer claimed Kaleohano could walk away, he did not communicate this option effectively. The objective evaluation of the circumstances suggests that a reasonable person might conclude they were not free to leave, especially given the officer's statements and the context of the situation. Officer Serle believed it was inadvisable for Kaleohano to walk along the road to call for a ride, a notion likely shared by Kaleohano. Although Officer Serle would have assisted her in getting a ride, he did not communicate this to her. From a reasonable person's perspective, Kaleohano had no realistic means to leave, leading to the conclusion that her consent was not freely and voluntarily given. The prosecution failed to demonstrate otherwise. The majority opinion suggests that this analysis encroaches on fact-finding roles; however, appellate courts can affirm lower court judgments based on any supporting grounds in the record, even if the reasons provided by the lower court were incorrect. The record in this case justifies affirming the court's order without remand, especially since the original judge has retired. Remanding would not provide new insights or better address the issues at hand. The author concurs with sustaining the court's order based on these findings. Additionally, the excerpt references specific legal statutes concerning drug possession and the prior attempts of Rawlins' attorney to focus on fourth amendment issues regarding the scope of detention. If the court finds that probable cause existed, it may grant the motion to suppress due to the failure to provide Miranda rights to Miss Kaleohano. However, an alternative argument may be presented if the motion is denied, which does not undermine co-counsel's position. Officer Serle's questioning of Kaleohano is characterized as "interrogation," aimed at eliciting incriminatory responses about drug use and impaired driving. The dissent asserts that the prosecution cannot introduce new arguments on appeal regarding evidence suppression that were not previously presented in the trial court. The precedent from State v. Rodrigues indicates that issues of exigent circumstances or a good faith exception were waived in that case due to insufficient record evidence, but here, reasonable suspicion concerning Officer Serle's continued detention of Kaleohano was sufficiently addressed in prior hearings. During the suppression hearing, Officer Serle confirmed that if Kaleohano had refused to allow a search of her vehicle, he would have secured the vehicle and sought a search warrant, indicating she was not under arrest at that time. The circuit court relied on Blackshire for its conclusions, and references to Terry v. Ohio support the legal framework being applied. HRS 291-7 defines the offense of driving under the influence of drugs, indicating that a person is guilty if operating a vehicle while impaired by any controlled substance. Justice Acoba's opinion, although dissenting in title, effectively agrees with the majority's conclusion that Miranda warnings were not required in this case. Officer Serle sought consent from Kaleohano to search her vehicle based on a belief that she might be under the influence or in possession of drugs, although the specific reason for the request was not detailed in the findings. The dissent misinterprets the record, as Officer Serle testified during the suppression hearing about her observations, including Kaleohano's weaving, which raised suspicions of drug impairment despite not having formal training in drug testing. She indicated that Kaleohano's driving patterns could suggest impairment, possibly due to attempting to hide something upon seeing the police vehicle. The trial court supported Officer Serle's suspicions, confirming that she suspected Kaleohano was impaired by illegal drugs. The prosecution contended that there were sufficient indications of possible drug presence in the vehicle, which justified the request for a search. Officer Serle's questioning after the traffic stop, which lasted approximately 15 minutes, was deemed a reasonable, non-invasive investigative detention aimed at clarifying her suspicions regarding drug impairment, supported by observations of Kaleohano's physical state and prior history. A search of Kaleohano's vehicle without her consent would be unreasonable due to Officer Serle's lack of probable cause for arrest. The court determined that Miranda warnings were required before questioning her about drug influence, referencing State v. Blackshire, which is not applicable since it did not involve a traffic stop and has been overruled by Ah Loo, which clarified the distinction between "seizure" and "custody." The prosecution's assertion that there was no reasonable suspicion to detain Kaleohano for drug impairment contradicts its own arguments in court, where it acknowledged that Officer Serle suspected drugs might be present in the vehicle. During proceedings, the court questioned whether Kaleohano had already become the focus of the investigation based on her prior drug incident and observable impairment. The prosecution maintained that the inquiry regarding her alcohol consumption was part of a routine traffic stop, not indicative of custodial interrogation. However, it would be contradictory for the prosecution to claim that she was not the focus of the investigation while simultaneously asserting that reasonable suspicion justified her detention. The focus of the investigation is a significant factor in determining whether custodial interrogation occurred, as established in State v. Kauhi.