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Davidson v. Sandstrom
Citations: 83 P.3d 648; 2004 Colo. LEXIS 49; 2004 WL 111652Docket: 03SC287
Court: Supreme Court of Colorado; January 25, 2004; Colorado; State Supreme Court
In 1994, a constitutional amendment in Colorado established a two-term limit for nonjudicial elected officials in various political subdivisions, allowing voters to modify, eliminate, or extend these limits. In 2001, the Pueblo County Board of County Commissioners referred a measure to voters in the Tenth Judicial District to exempt the district attorney from term limits. The Secretary of State, Donetta Davidson, directed County Clerk Chris Munoz to remove this measure from the ballot, asserting that the Board lacked the authority to submit it. Despite this, the measure was presented to voters, who chose to eliminate the term limits. G.F. Sandstrom, the elected District Attorney, faced potential disqualification from running for re-election as the Secretary stated she would not certify his candidacy based on her view that the Board's referral was void. Sandstrom, Munoz, the Board, and two voters filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that district attorneys are not subject to term limits or, alternatively, that the Board had the authority to refer the measure to voters. The district court ruled that district attorneys are indeed subject to term limits but also determined that the Board had the authority to refer the measure to the voters of the Tenth Judicial District, as its voters are the same as those in Pueblo County. Both parties appealed, and the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the district court's ruling, recognizing the Board's authority in this matter. District attorneys are classified as "nonjudicial elected officials" under section 11, making them subject to its term limits. Section 11 allows voters to modify or eliminate term limits for specific offices without requiring legislative action. Since the boundaries of the Tenth Judicial District and Pueblo County align, the Board correctly referred a measure to the voters to eliminate term limits for the district attorney. While the legislature may alter the procedure for term limits, section 11 is self-executing and does not need legislative action to function. The background on term limits in Colorado reveals that in 1990, voters imposed term limits on several high-ranking state officials and in 1994 extended these limits to additional officials through Amendment 17, which states that no nonjudicial elected official can serve more than two consecutive terms. Attempts to impose term limits on congressional delegates were deemed unconstitutional. Subsequent amendments in 1996 and 1998 sought to further address term limits, with the 1998 amendment allowing congressional candidates to voluntarily declare term limits on their ballots. In 2002, a proposal to exempt all district attorneys from term limits was presented to voters but was rejected. Section 11 of the Colorado Constitution addresses term limits for officeholders, applying to terms beginning after January 1, 1995. G.F. Sandstrom, serving as District Attorney for over twenty years, would be ineligible for reelection in 2004 under this provision. In September 2001, the Secretary of State learned of an intention to place a measure on the November ballot to exempt the district attorney from these term limits. However, the Secretary informed Munoz that only the General Assembly could refer such measures and instructed county clerks not to count or certify any votes on this matter. Despite this, Munoz chose to count the votes, leading to the measure's approval by the voters on November 6, 2001, and subsequent certification of the results. On August 16, 2002, a group, including Sandstrom and Munoz, filed a complaint against the Secretary, seeking a declaration that district attorneys were not subject to the term limits or, alternatively, that the measure was validly referred. The district court ruled on February 18, 2003, that district attorneys are subject to term limits under section 11 but disagreed with the Secretary’s assertion that the section was not self-executing or that the Board lacked authority to refer the measure. The court determined that section 11 allows voters in political subdivisions, such as the Tenth Judicial District, to modify term limits, affirming the validity of the voters' decision to exempt their district attorney from these restrictions. The court ruled that in judicial districts covering multiple counties, the Board of County Commissioners for each county must jointly agree to refer measures to voters. In March 2003, the Secretary filed an appeal against a district court ruling that mandated recognition of election results based on the Board's authority to refer measures. Sandstrom also appealed the decision affirming term limits for district attorneys under section 11. The parties jointly petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which was granted, leading to an affirmation of the district court's ruling. Section 11 applies solely to "nonjudicial elected officials," defined as officials from various political subdivisions, including counties and cities. District attorneys are elected within judicial districts. The court needed to establish whether district attorneys qualify as "nonjudicial elected officials" and if judicial districts fall under the categories outlined in section 11. It was determined that district attorneys are indeed "nonjudicial elected officials" and that judicial districts are recognized as political subdivisions of the state, thereby making district attorneys subject to section 11's term limits. In interpreting the constitutional amendment, the court emphasized the importance of reflecting the electorate's intent and applying a straightforward understanding of terms. The court noted that if an amendment's language is clear, it must be enforced as written, and ambiguity can lead to interpretations based on the amendment’s intended objective, as informed by relevant materials such as ballot titles and legislative analyses. The court referenced Black's Law Dictionary for definitions of "judicial" and "official" to clarify the term "nonjudicial elected official." "Judicial officer" is defined as a judge or magistrate in Colorado, and this definition has been upheld in case law, emphasizing that only judges qualify as judicial officers. District attorneys are explicitly identified as executive officers of the state, not part of the judiciary, and the term "nonjudicial elected official" encompasses them. Sandstrom argues against this classification, citing constitutional provisions that define district attorneys within the Judicial Department, and points out that they were not term-limited by a 1990 amendment. He claims this omission indicates an intent to exempt district attorneys from term limits. However, the court dismisses this argument, stating that the drafters' intent is irrelevant if not reflected in the amendment's language. The court also notes that if district attorneys were exempt from term limits, they would be the only nonjudicial elected officials in Colorado treated differently, which contradicts the overall intent of the term limit provisions. The definition of "political subdivision" from Black's Law Dictionary is invoked to discuss whether judicial districts qualify as such, indicating they are divisions of the state for carrying out governmental functions. Judicial districts and district attorneys fulfill functions traditionally recognized as public. The term "political subdivision," as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, refers to divisions of a state that primarily serve local government functions. Both definitions confirm that judicial districts fall within the scope of "any other political subdivision." Each judicial district serves a specific geographical area, providing judicial services to its residents and those conducting business there. District attorneys, while state officers prosecuting state law violations, are elected by voters within their judicial districts and represent both the state and counties in district court proceedings. They also advise county officers in their districts, demonstrating local political control characteristic of political subdivisions. Sandstrom argues against the inclusion of judicial districts within "any other political subdivision," invoking the maxim of ejusdem generis, suggesting that this general term should only encompass entities similar to those specifically listed (counties, cities, etc.), which possess governing boards and taxing powers. However, this narrow interpretation contradicts the electorate's intent and the plain meaning of the amendment. Ejusdem generis should not hinder legislative objectives, and historical context surrounding the drafting of section 11 further supports this interpretation, indicating a broader understanding contrary to Sandstrom's claims. Every initiative petition for a proposed constitutional amendment must be submitted to the Legislative Council and the Office of Legislative Legal Services for review to ensure clarity and accessibility to the average reader. This review process aims to leverage expert drafting experience and inform the public about the initiative's implications early in the process. Specifically, the proponents of Amendment 17, which became section 11 of the Colorado constitution, submitted their draft twice. The initial draft proposed that no nonjudicial elected official in Colorado could serve more than two consecutive terms. The Legislative Council raised concerns about the language, suggesting that only certain officials would be exempt from term limits, prompting the proponents to revise the amendment to clarify its intent. Eventually, the amendment was altered to include terms for members of the state board of education, indicating a clear intention to apply term limits to all elected officials in Colorado. The analysis concludes that the voters intended for every elected official in Colorado to be subject to term limits under section 11, which includes district attorneys. Additionally, section 11(2) allows voters in a political subdivision to modify term limits, establishing that the voters of the Tenth Judicial District could potentially eliminate term limits for the district attorney. However, the document questions whether section 11 is self-executing and how its provisions could be implemented without further legislative action, particularly regarding the Board's authority to refer a term limits measure to the voters of the Tenth Judicial District. The determination of the Board's authority to refer a term limits measure to voters in multi-county judicial districts hinges on the self-executing nature of section 11. It is concluded that section 11 is self-executing, allowing the Board to refer such measures without further legislative action. For multi-county districts, each county's board of commissioners must refer the measure to their respective voters. A constitutional provision is considered self-executing if it requires no legislative enactment to take effect, demonstrating the intent of the framers and the presumption that constitutional provisions operate independently. This presumption is particularly strong for initiated amendments. Although additional legislation can facilitate the execution of a self-executing provision, such a provision must be followed unless compliance is impossible. Section 11(2) explicitly allows voters to modify term limits without necessitating further legislative action, reinforcing the presumption of self-execution. The language and historical context surrounding Colorado's term limits do not suggest that voters intended to require legislative action for implementing section 11(2). The Colorado electorate intended to empower themselves to modify term limits for officials covered under section 11(1) without legislative action, indicating that section 11(2) is self-executing. However, the mechanism for its execution remains unspecified, prompting the need to determine how it applies to district attorneys. The court concludes that implementation is feasible and that the voters implicitly authorized county commissioners to refer term limit measures for district attorneys to local voters. The electorate's right to modify term limits is upheld, evidenced by the Tenth Judicial District's vote to eliminate such limits. The court emphasizes the fundamental nature of voting rights and expresses caution against invalidating election results without evidence of fraud or misconduct. It asserts that the Tenth Judicial District's election genuinely reflects the electorate's will, with no allegations of electoral impropriety. The central issue is whether the Board is responsible for calling the election, as district attorneys lack a designated governing body for this purpose. Although district attorneys are not county employees, their functions are closely linked to county operations, which fund their office and salaries. Consequently, the board of county commissioners is identified as the governing body for the limited purpose of adopting the district attorney's budget and ensuring necessary courthouse provisions. The county possesses the authority of eminent domain to acquire land or buildings essential for court and district attorney facilities, as per statute 30-11-104(2), 9 C.R.S. 2003. The district attorney is mandated to represent the counties within their district, provide legal opinions to county officers, and represent county officers in civil matters upon request from the board of county commissioners, according to statutes 20-1-102 and 20-1-105(1) and (2), 6 C.R.S. 2003. Although the district attorney operates independently from direct supervision by the board, their functions are intertwined with county governance. The board of county commissioners has the authority to present measures to voters, as outlined in 30-11-103.5, 9 C.R.S. 2003. In multi-county judicial districts, the electors of each county belong to the same judicial district, as stated in the Colorado Constitution, art. VI, 10(1). Voters retained the right to modify term limits for district attorneys under section 11(1), intending section 11(2) to be self-executing. However, no specific statutory process exists for electors to amend these term limits. The court concluded that voters implicitly granted boards of county commissioners the power to refer term limit measures to voters within their judicial districts. For districts spanning multiple counties, each board must refer measures to their respective voters. This ruling is a first impression, emphasizing that disregarding it would undermine voters' intent regarding term limits in the Tenth Judicial District and Colorado’s broader intentions in enacting section 11. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. Justice Hobbs concurred with the judgment, arguing that Colorado's constitution does not impose term limits on district attorneys, based on the language of Article XVIII, section 11. The section specifies term limits for non-judicial elected officials but does not explicitly include district attorneys, thus allowing the current district attorney the opportunity to seek re-election. The term "nonjudicial official" is interpreted as referring to local government officers within the executive and legislative branches of Colorado. According to Article VI, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution, district attorneys are classified within the judicial branch, with their election, term (four years), and qualifications defined therein. The 1994 constitutional amendment does not impose term limits on district attorneys, nor has the Colorado electorate designated them as term-limited officials. The Majority opinion asserts that Article XVIII, section 11, subsection (1) implies district attorneys are term-limited based on the classification of a judicial district as a "political subdivision." However, the amendment does not define "political subdivision," and the Majority fails to cite any legal precedent supporting this classification. Typically, political subdivisions are local government entities with governing bodies, local tax dependency, and debt-incurring capabilities. The argument presented emphasizes that the amendment lists specific examples of political subdivisions, and the broader dictionary interpretation used by the Majority overlooks the contextual meaning. Furthermore, the Majority misclassifies district attorneys as part of the executive branch, despite the Constitution clearly situating them within the judicial branch. Judicial districts differ from political subdivisions in that they lack a local governing body, primarily rely on state funding for salaries, and cannot incur debt. Article VI, section 10 of the Colorado Constitution establishes the judicial branch's role in delivering justice, with judges adjudicating criminal cases and district attorneys (DAs) executing functions within this branch by bringing cases to court. DAs must meet the same qualifications as district judges as per Article VI, section 13, and are regulated by the judicial branch's supreme authority. They represent both their counties and the state, as mandated by statute. Both judges and DAs, elected by voters in their judicial districts, receive state-provided salaries, retirement, and insurance, yet their functions differ significantly; judges hold adjudicatory power while DAs prosecute cases. Judges cannot direct DAs on criminal charges, highlighting the executive nature of the DA's role. Despite DAs performing executive duties, they operate within the judicial framework. Limitations on the terms of office for "nonjudicial elected officials" as outlined in Article XVIII, section 11 apply solely to local government officials and not to DAs. Judicial districts do not fit the description of political subdivisions that voters associate with term limits, meaning DAs are not term-limited by the Colorado Constitution. They may serve consecutive four-year terms as elected by voters. The rejection of a 2002 ballot measure aimed at exempting DAs from term limits does not imply a legislative history regarding existing term limit provisions; it reflects voter preference to maintain the status quo. The Colorado Attorney General's opinion regarding the 2002 ballot proposal misinterpreted constitutional provisions concerning term limits for district attorneys, which are governed by Article XVIII, section 11. The court holds that the determination of this constitutional issue lies within its jurisdiction, as established in Board of County Comm'rs v. Vail Assoc. 19 P.3d 1263, 1272 (Colo. 2001). The majority opinion aligns with the Attorney General's view, but it is argued that district attorneys should not be subject to term limits. The state constitution was amended in 1990 and again in 1994 to impose term limits on certain elected officials, specifically excluding judicial branch officials, including district attorneys, from such limitations. The amendments aimed to restrict term limits primarily to executive and legislative officials, not extending them to all local government officials. Consequently, district attorneys, as judicial branch officials, were intentionally left exempt from term limits. While concurring with the court's judgment, the author disagrees with its reasoning, emphasizing the historical context and intent behind the amendments. Justice COATS supports this concurrence. Additional notes clarify the implications of terms of office and the legislative authority concerning term limits measures. Judicial districts do not fall under the other government entities listed in section 11, prompting an examination of their status as political subdivisions of the state. Each judicial district is defined by county boundaries, meaning they consist of one or more counties, with no overlap between counties and judicial districts. Legislation that limits or undermines the rights reserved to the people is deemed invalid. The legislature has the authority to modify procedures as long as these changes facilitate the exercise of rights under section 11(2). Additionally, the business of the county is managed by the board of county commissioners, which possesses the powers of the county as specified in Colorado law.